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I Introduction 
1 General overview of the topic 
From the outset of experimental economics in the mid-20th century, studies of experimental 
oligopoly markets have played an important role in this field. The earliest experimental 
oligopolies in the literature stem from the late 1950s (Hogatt, 1959; Sauermann and Selten, 
1959). They are based on the Cournot (1838) model and thus investigate firms' quantity 
choices. Soon afterwards, Fouraker and Siegel (1963) set a milestone with the systematic 
examination of their oligopoly markets where either quantity or price was the choice variable. 
The underlying model of their pricing markets is due to Bertrand (1883). Fouraker and Siegel 
were the first to conduct different treatments of an oligopoly experiment. They varied, one at 
a time, the number of competitors in the market and the amount of information disclosed to 
the participants, holding constant all other probably relevant features of their laboratory 
markets, and were thus able to isolate the effects of those variations. 
   Nowadays, experimental methods are widely established in economics. Conduct in 
oligopolies is still a frequent object of investigation in economic experiments, and the classic 
models by Cournot and Bertrand are still the most frequent basis for experimental oligopoly 
markets.
1
 However, experiments based on more complex oligopoly models have come to 
complement that work since the 1990s. In contrast to the ample experimental results that have 
been obtained in laboratory Cournot and Bertrand markets, the evidence regarding some more 
complex models is still somewhat scattered. The dissertation at hand aims at closing some of 
the gaps in the recent literature on experimental oligopolies. 
   The classical oligopoly models suffer from some shortcomings. The Cournot (1838) model 
predicts the intuitive result that the market price will be the lower the more firms operate in 
the market and will converge to the competitive price when the number of firms approaches 
                                                 
1
 Huck et al. (2004) provide a survey of Cournot experiments. An overview of recent oligopoly experiments in 
general can be found in the survey by Potters and Suetens (2013). Engel (2007) presents a meta-study on 
oligopoly experiments. 
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infinity. The model assumes a uniform market price being determined as the market-clearing 
price given aggregate supply on the market. Yet, it remains dubious how the effective market 
price emerges in reality if firms only decide on their production quantities. The then necessary 
side assumption of a Walrasian tâtonnement which via a trial-and-error process determines 
the equilibrium price has often been deemed unrealistic. Bertrand (1883) criticized Cournot's 
approach of quantity competition and assumed instead that firms compete in prices. While 
that assumption appears reasonable, the thus modified model yields the unrealistic implication 
that the market price in equilibrium will equal the perfectly competitive price as soon as there 
are at least two firms in the market. 
   The experimental investigations presented in this dissertation are based on two amendments 
proposed to overcome those deficiencies. The first suggested modification is due to 
Edgeworth (1925). He proposed that capacity constraints be added to the Bertrand model. 
Capacity constraints can be either exogenously given or endogenously brought about via the 
introduction of increasing marginal production costs. In the first case, for each firm a capacity 
limit is set beyond which further supply is impossible; in the second case, for a firm's given 
price choice marginal costs from some point exceed the sales price so that the firm is 
unwilling to supply beyond that point. In both versions of the so-called Bertrand-Edgeworth 
model, equilibrium analysis is very intricate. In fact, the Bertrand-Edgeworth model does not 
possess any Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
2
 Two chapters of the dissertation at hand are 
concerned with oligopoly experiments based on the Bertrand-Edgeworth model. The 
experiment presented in chapter II considers the case of increasing marginal costs, the one in 
chapter IV deals with fixed exogenous capacity constraints. 
   The second proposed modification is the model by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) that may 
be regarded as a synthesis of the Cournot and the Bertrand model. In the two-stage Kreps-
Scheinkman setting, firms decide on both quantities and prices. At the first stage, quantities 
are chosen and production costs are incurred; at the second stage, firms compete in prices 
after having been informed about their competitors' production quantities. Apart from its more 
realistic setting compared to the Cournot and Bertrand model, the Kreps-Scheinkman model 
also yields intuitive predictions. If suitable side assumptions are imposed, its outcome will be 
identical to the Cournot outcome. The experiment presented in chapter III investigates the 
effects of several variations within the Kreps-Scheinkman framework. 
                                                 
2
 This holds if one neglects degenerate cases with very low or high capacities where the equilibrium again 
corresponds to the Cournot (market-clearing pricing) or, respectively, the Bertrand (marginal cost pricing) 
outcome. 
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   A common feature of both discussed modified models, and hence all three experiments in 
this dissertation, is that demand rationing plays a crucial role. Demand rationing occurs when 
firms are unable or unwilling to satisfy all customers who want to make a purchase for the 
stated price and therefore turn some customers away. Which customers are turned away has 
an impact on the demanded quantities other firms charging higher prices face. The 
equilibrium predictions for the oligopoly models considered in this dissertation significantly 
hinge upon the assumed demand rationing rule. There are two prominent demand rationing 
rules in the literature: proportional and efficient demand rationing. Proportional rationing 
implies that customers are served in random order. Efficient rationing, by contrast, assumes 
that customers are served in the order of their willingness to pay with those with the highest 
willingness to pay being served first. In real markets, the effective demand rationing rule is an 
empirical matter which can hardly be influenced. Proportional demand rationing is a realistic 
assumption for those markets where customers drop by stores and make purchases rather 
incidentally. Efficient rationing can rather be found in markets where customers have more 
well-defined purchasing plans and take additional costs, e.g. queuing time, in order not to be 
rationed.
3
 In the artificial setting of laboratory experiments with computer-simulated demand, 
it is possible to freely manipulate the rationing rule and isolate the effect of such a 
manipulation. Demand rationing tremendously affects the Nash equilibrium predictions in the 
underlying models. In Bertrand-Edgeworth markets, mean price and profit in the mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium are considerably higher under proportional than under efficient 
rationing. Hence, proportional rationing is predicted to lead to a more collusive market 
conduct. In Kreps-Scheinkman markets, the Cournot outcome result depends on the 
assumption of efficient demand rationing. Under proportional rationing, there will in general 
be a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium which is more competitive than the Cournot outcome 
(Davidson and Deneckere, 1986). 
2 Overview of the experiments and their results 
The arrangement of chapters in the dissertation at hand conforms to the order in which the 
experiments were conducted. The study contained in chapter II is entitled "Bertrand-
                                                 
3
 Note that this argument is in a strict sense somewhat inconsistent. If a customer really incurred additional costs 
up to her willingness to pay by queuing, she would be better off with making a purchase from a higher-price firm 
without queuing. One may argue that customers with a higher willingness to pay can make credible threats to 
incur additional costs up to the difference to the next highest price and thus deter customers with a willingness to 
pay in that price range, which leads to some ordering of customers according to their willingness to pay, albeit in 
most cases no perfect efficient rationing. 
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Edgeworth Markets with Increasing Marginal Costs and Voluntary Trading: Experimental 
Evidence". Inquiries into the Bertrand-Edgeworth model with increasing marginal costs by 
Allen and Hellwig (1986) and Vives (1986) point to the sensitivity of its outcomes to the 
employed rationing scheme. Requate (1994) considered the infinitely repeated supergame 
version of the model and found that simple pricing patterns where all firms set a uniform price 
in all periods as long as no one deviates can be sustained as subgame perfect Nash equilibria. 
For the one-shot version of the model, however, a characterization of Nash equilibrium is 
unavailable. Hence, we solve numerically for the Nash equilibria in a discretized version of 
the parameterized model with the aid of the Gambit game theory software tool (McKelvey et 
al., 2014). To the best of our knowledge, the only experiment on price competition with 
increasing marginal costs and voluntary trading conducted so far is an explorative study by 
Kruse (1993). 
   Our experimental design contains three treatment variables which can each take two 
different states so that there are eight treatments altogether. The treatment variables are the 
number of firms in a market (duopoly or triopoly), the demand rationing scheme (proportional 
or efficient), and the subject matching rule (fixed or random). We find that two of our 
treatment variables entail large and significant effects. Prices and profits are substantially 
higher in duopoly than in triopoly and with proportional compared to efficient rationing. By 
contrast, the effect of the subject matching rule is small. The two large treatment effects we 
find are qualitatively in accordance with the theory predictions. However, our data do not 
reflect the quantitative Nash predictions of mean and median prices and profits, much less the 
predicted distribution of prices. In general, prices and profits are lower than predicted, i.e. 
conduct is more competitive than in the Nash equilibrium. The distance to equilibrium is 
larger in treatments with proportional rationing. We find no incidence of pricing patterns that 
accord with the simple subgame perfect Nash equilibria described by Requate (1994). 
Moreover, whereas Nash equilibria in pure strategies exist only in the infinitely repeated 
game, in the fixed matching condition which resembles the infinitely repeated game 
conforming stable pricing patterns are significantly less frequent. Since the prices that can be 
observed when stable pricing patterns occur are rather low, we conjecture that the intention 
behind stable pricing is to play safe rather than to try to set up collusion. Consequently, stable 
pricing is observed more often in the more uncertain environment with random subject 
matching. As alternatives to the Nash predictions, the off-equilibrium theories of myopic best 
response pricing (giving rise to Edgeworth cycles) and imitation of competitors' past prices 
are investigated. At first sight, our data suggest that only imitation has predictive power when 
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the two alternative theories are considered jointly. Yet, a closer scrutiny reveals that the 
ability of the two theories to explain our data is interacted with the treatment conditions. 
While in the duopoly myopic best response pricing accounts for the main effect, the main 
explaining factor in triopoly is imitation of the lower of the two competitors' prices from the 
last round. It appears reasonable that firms use the rather sophisticated pattern of myopic best 
response pricing as a form of imperfect collusion in duopoly, but resort to imitation in 
triopoly where finding the best response price is more intricate. 
   Chapter III contains the study "Number of Firms, Rationing, Matching, and Knowledge: A 
Comprehensive Study of Variations in Experimental Kreps-Scheinkman Markets". The 
theoretical basis for this study is the model by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) and the 
sensitivity of its outcome to demand rationing detected by Davidson and Deneckere (1986). A 
supergame version of the model was considered by Benoît and Krishna (1987). While the 
experimental evidence concerning Kreps-Scheinkman markets is somewhat richer than in the 
case of price competition with increasing marginal costs,
4
 also this evidence is still scattered. 
   The study presented in chapter III aims at closing some gaps in the experimental literature 
and at drawing a comprehensive picture of the effects of variations within the Kreps-
Scheinkman setting. For this purpose, we conduct seven different treatments of Kreps-
Scheinkman markets and investigate the effects of four treatment variables: number of firms 
in a market (duopoly or triopoly), demand rationing (proportional or efficient), subject 
matching (fixed or random), and subjects' understanding of the Kreps-Scheinkman setting, 
briefly referred to as "knowledge" (low or high). We find that conduct is more competitive 
than the Cournot outcome in all treatments. As to decisions at the first stage, market 
capacities are persistently higher in triopoly than in duopoly. Subjects with high knowledge 
about the market setting choose lower capacities in the initial periods, but the difference to 
subjects with low knowledge vanishes when the latter commence to reduce their capacities in 
the course of the experiment. Neither demand rationing nor subject matching affects capacity 
choices. At the second stage, also demand rationing entails a significant effect. Prices are 
higher with proportional than with efficient rationing. Moreover, higher prices are chosen in 
duopoly than in triopoly. Knowledge again has an effect only in the initial rounds where 
subjects with high knowledge choose higher prices. Subject matching does not entail a 
significant effect on price choices. All described effects at the second stage are retained if 
capacity choices from the first stage are controlled for. In most treatments, the sensitivity of 
                                                 
4
 Former experiments which investigate the effect of variations within Kreps-Scheinkman markets comprise 
Brandts and Guillen (2007), Le Coq and Sturluson (2012), and Lepore and Shafran (2013). 
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pricing to installed capacity is low at first, but increases with the number of periods played. 
An exception is the treatment with high knowledge where the sensitivity is large from the 
beginning. Apparently, many subjects in the low-knowledge treatments who initially have 
little understanding of how the market functions have to learn about the link between their 
decisions at the first and at the second stage by experience. The Cournot benchmark does 
poorly as a predictor of outcomes in absolute terms. Nevertheless, exact Cournot capacity 
choices occur significantly more often under efficient rationing, where the Cournot outcome 
is the equilibrium, than under proportional rationing. An analogous result is obtained for price 
choices when only markets with sufficiently low capacities such that market clearing is the 
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium are considered. Exact market-clearing prices are chosen more 
frequently under efficient than under proportional rationing. Overproduction at the first stage 
and subsequent fierce price competition at the second yield profits substantially falling short 
of the equilibrium predictions. Overproduction persists even after many rounds when subjects 
have had ample opportunities to learn from their experience. 
   Chapter IV returns to Bertrand-Edgeworth markets and considers fixed exogenous capacity 
constraints. The study in chapter IV is entitled "Demand Rationing in Bertrand-Edgeworth 
Markets with Fixed Capacities: An Experiment". The choice situation is the same as at the 
second stage in the Kreps-Scheinkman setting, but, contrary to the Kreps-Scheinkman game, 
the firms have had no opportunity before to decide on their capacities. Our study is inspired 
by the seminal experiment by Kruse et al. (1994). New insights are obtained as we also 
investigate the effect of demand rationing and consider imitation as an alternative explaining 
factor of individual pricing patterns. For the case of duopoly with symmetric exogenous 
capacities with which we are concerned in that study, we can mostly revert to closed-form 
solutions for the mixed-strategy Nash equilibria having been obtained in the theoretical 
literature (Beckmann, 1967; Levitan and Shubik, 1972; Allen and Hellwig, 1993). 
   Our experiment consists of four treatments; we vary the amount of capacity (high or low) 
and the demand rationing scheme (proportional or efficient). Both treatment variables entail 
significant effects. Prices are higher with low than with high capacities and higher with 
proportional than with efficient rationing. Those effects are qualitatively in accordance with 
the Nash equilibrium predictions. However, prices are significantly higher than the Nash 
prediction in all treatments, even if the Nash equilibrium is in pure strategies. The distance to 
equilibrium is larger when capacities are high. Profits are significantly higher than the Nash 
prediction only with high capacities; with low capacities profits approach equilibrium levels 
in the long run. We examine myopic best response pricing and imitation of the competitor's 
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price as possible explanations of dynamic pricing patterns. Considered separately, each 
approach can explain our data partially, and the myopic best response theory does somewhat 
better. A simultaneous analysis of both factors is inhibited by the tremendous collinearity 
between them. 
3 Structure of the dissertation and co-authorship 
As described above, the dissertation at hand contains three experimental studies. The content 
of chapters II, III, and IV each corresponds to one study. For each study, a modified working 
paper version is available. Two of the studies are joint work with one co-author. Table 1 
provides an overview of the titles of the studies, the corresponding chapter in this dissertation, 
the working paper versions, and the authorships. 
Chapter Title Working Paper Version Authors 
II 
Bertrand-Edgeworth Markets 
with Increasing Marginal Costs 
and Voluntary Trading: 
Experimental Evidence 
Economics Working Paper 2016-01, 
University of Kiel 
Martin Jacobs, 
Till Requate 
III 
Number of Firms, Rationing, 
Matching, and Knowledge: A 
Comprehensive Study of 
Variations in Experimental 
Kreps-Scheinkman Markets 
Economics Working Paper 2016-02, 
University of Kiel 
Martin Jacobs 
IV 
Demand Rationing in Bertrand-
Edgeworth Markets with Fixed 
Capacities: An Experiment 
Economics Working Paper 2016-03, 
University of Kiel 
Martin Jacobs, 
Till Requate 
Table 1: Studies contained in the dissertation. 
   The studies presented in chapters II and IV are joint work with my supervisor Prof. Dr. Till 
Requate. Prof. Requate detected the gap in the experimental literature on Bertrand-Edgeworth 
oligopoly and had already calculated the theory benchmarks for the model with increasing 
marginal costs when I started to work on my PhD project. While the author of this dissertation 
is responsible for the main work regarding the design of the experiments, the writing of the 
instructions, the conduct of the experimental sessions, the statistical analysis, and the writing 
of the corresponding papers, all those aspects profited considerably from Prof. Requate's 
collaboration and helpful suggestions. 
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   The author of this dissertation noticed the missing of a comprehensive study of treatment 
effects in experimental Kreps-Scheinkman markets and proposed to enlarge his PhD project 
to the two-stage Kreps-Scheinkman oligopoly setting. He is the sole author of the study 
contained in chapter III. Nevertheless, also the work presented in that chapter benefitted from 
Prof. Requate's assistance. Prof. Requate provided crucial remarks on how to improve details 
of the experimental design and the instructions in order to make the Kreps-Scheinkman 
market setting as comprehensible as possible to the subjects. Moreover, it was Prof. Requate 
who suggested varying subjects' understanding of the market setting and conducting the 
"high-knowledge" sessions with subjects recruited from his Bachelor class on competition 
policy and industrial organization. Not least, the experiment would not have been possible 
without the financial means from Prof. Requate's Chair of Innovation, Competition Policy and 
New Institutional Economics at Kiel University. 
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II Bertrand-Edgeworth Markets with Increasing 
Marginal Costs and Voluntary Trading: 
Experimental Evidence
*
 
Abstract: Price competition with increasing marginal costs, though relevant for many 
markets, appears as an under-researched field in the experimental oligopoly literature. We 
provide results from an experiment that varies the number of firms as well as the demand 
rationing and matching schemes in Bertrand-Edgeworth markets with increasing marginal 
costs and voluntary trading. We find that prices and profits are substantially higher in duopoly 
than in triopoly and with proportional compared to efficient demand rationing. The matching 
rule has little effect on prices and profits. Nash equilibrium predictions do not capture 
observed behavior. Neither the mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of the underlying one-shot 
game nor, for the fixed matching condition, the symmetric stationary outcome pure-strategy 
Nash equilibria of the infinitely repeated game are supported by the data. In contrast to results 
from related experiments, behavior is largely more competitive than predicted by Nash 
equilibrium theory. Individual pricing decisions can predominantly be explained by either 
myopic best responses (Edgeworth cycles) or simple imitative behavior, where the complexity 
of the decision situation plays a crucial role in which behavioral pattern applies. 
JEL classification: C72, C90, D43, L13. 
Key words: Bertrand-Edgeworth, demand rationing, increasing marginal costs, Edgeworth 
cycles, oligopoly, laboratory experiment.  
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1 Introduction 
In his "Papers Relating to Political Economy", Edgeworth (1925) advanced oligopoly theory 
by his critique of the Bertrand model. He suggested abandoning Bertrand's assumption that 
firms can produce any quantity at constant marginal costs and assuming instead capacity 
restrictions or increasing marginal costs. The Bertrand (1883) model predicts that price 
competition leads to marginal cost pricing and zero profits whenever there is more than one 
firm in the market. Edgeworth's modifications abandon that prediction and thus make the 
model more realistic. In this study, we concentrate our attention on Edgeworth’s second 
alternative supposition, that of increasing marginal costs. Note that strictly convex production 
costs, or, put differently, decreasing returns to scale, are also a key ingredient of the 
neoclassical model of perfect competition. However, the modification also complicates 
analysis tremendously. The Bertrand-Edgeworth model has no pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium. Edgeworth himself suggested that firms will react myopically to their 
competitors' price choices, thus giving rise to the price cycles that were later named after him. 
Advances in game theory later allowed for a more extensive analysis. Existence of Nash 
equilibrium in mixed strategies has been proven. It has been shown that equilibrium 
predictions can be heavily influenced by seemingly minor changes in the model design, 
notably by the rule according to which demand is rationed. 
   A considerable part of experimental economics has been concerned with conduct in 
oligopolies. The experimental investigation of the Bertrand-Edgeworth model, however, 
stands out as an under-researched topic. Compared to the wealth of experiments that study 
behavior in Bertrand and Cournot markets with diverse variations, experimental studies in the 
more realistic Bertrand-Edgeworth setting are relatively scarce. Additionally, most of the few 
existing studies deal with the case of fixed capacities instead of increasing marginal costs. We 
are aware of only three studies that consider price competition with increasing marginal costs 
in an experimental setting. Two of them – Abbink and Brandts (2008) and Argenton and 
Müller (2012) – assume, contrary to Edgeworth, that firms are obliged to cover the entire 
market demand at the price they choose. That assumption, while considerably simplifying the 
analysis, does not reflect reality in most cases where suppliers are free to limit the quantity 
they wish to bring to the market. The assumption pertains only to a minority of heavily state-
regulated markets, notably for utilities. The third study by Kruse (1993) is, to the best of our 
knowledge, the only former experiment of price competition with increasing marginal costs 
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and voluntary trading. In this study, however, only demand rationing is varied and behavior 
on the individual level is hardly analyzed. 
   Further experiments based on the Bertrand-Edgeworth model appear fruitful to us for at 
least two reasons. Firstly, since the model’s assumptions are more realistic than those made 
by Cournot and Bertrand, experimental results may more easily be transferred to real 
oligopolies. Secondly, as game-theoretic analysis has revealed that the model's outcome is 
highly sensitive to seemingly minor modifications in design, the question arises whether 
subjects in experiments and actual firms will in fact react to such inconspicuous changes. 
   In this study, we present an experiment of price oligopoly with linear demand and a 
quadratic cost function. We investigate both duopoly and triopoly markets. Furthermore, we 
vary the demand rationing rule and the matching scheme. We find substantially higher prices 
and profits in duopoly compared to triopoly and under proportional compared to efficient 
demand rationing. In contrast, it has only a small positive effect on prices and profits when 
subjects repeatedly interact within fixed groups instead of being re-matched after every round 
of the game. Analysis of individual price choices does not support the static Nash equilibrium 
prediction. In contrast to results from related experiments, behavior is largely more 
competitive than predicted by the Nash equilibrium. We observe both myopic best response 
and imitation behavior. While myopic best responses are the main driving factor in duopoly, 
subjects seem to resort to the simpler strategy of imitation in the more complex triopoly. 
Furthermore, subjects are more prone to stable pricing, i.e. set the same price in successive 
periods, under random matching. That stands in contrast to theory since a Nash equilibrium 
supporting such pricing patterns exists only in the infinitely repeated game. Our finding can 
be explained by the observation that stable pricing is hardly an indication of collusion in our 
data; rather, most subjects exhibiting stable behavior constantly set low prices following a risk 
averse maximin strategy. 
   The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses Edgeworth's model 
of price competition and later studies in game theory that ensued from it. Section 3 reviews 
the related experimental literature. Sections 4 and 5 introduce the setup of the model that 
underlies our experiment and the experimental procedures. Section 6 presents the rather 
complex Nash equilibrium predictions of the calibrated model. We present and discuss our 
experimental results in section 7. Section 8 concludes. 
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2 Theory 
The model of simultaneous price oligopoly by Bertrand (1883) assumes that firms can 
produce any quantity of a homogenous product at constant marginal costs and therefore 
suggests perfect competition leading to marginal cost pricing and zero profits whenever there 
is more than one firm in the market. To overcome this unrealistic result, Edgeworth (1925) 
proposed to either introduce production capacity constraints for firms or substitute strictly 
convex for linear production costs. In the latter case, self-imposed capacity constraints emerge 
implicitly since each firm is willing to produce only as long as its marginal production costs 
are no higher than the sales price it has set. Trading is voluntary, so firms are free to turn 
customers away when further supply becomes unprofitable. As in the Bertrand model, 
productions are made to order after demands have been revealed. Production costs are 
therefore incurred only for units that can be sold in the market. 
   The thus modified model turned out to be very intricate. It has no Nash equilibrium in pure 
strategies. The existence of equilibrium in mixed strategies was proven only many decades 
after Edgeworth's proposal (Dixon, 1984; Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986; Maskin, 1986). While 
equilibrium strategies have been characterized for special cases of the model with fixed 
capacity constraints (Beckmann, 1967; Levitan and Shubik, 1972; Osborne and Pitchik, 1986; 
Vives, 1986; Allen and Hellwig, 1993; Hirata, 2009; De Francesco and Salvadori, 2010; 
2013), an equilibrium characterization for the model with strictly convex costs still is 
unavailable. Instead, further model modifications have been suggested in order to restore 
existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Those suggestions comprise weakening the 
voluntary trading constraint (Dixon, 1990; 1992; Dastidar, 1995) and allowing only discrete 
pricing (Dixon, 1993; Roy Chowdhury, 2008). 
   The complexity of Bertrand-Edgeworth models is in part due to the fact that their outcomes 
depend on the assumption made about demand rationing. Customers first try to buy the good 
from the firm offering at the lowest price. Due to the capacity constraints, that firm may well 
be unable to satisfy the entire market demand. Some residual demand will then be left for the 
other firms offering at higher prices. To determine residual demands, an assumption about 
how demand is rationed is necessary. Two rationing schemes are prominent in the literature. 
The one, proportional rationing, assumes that customers are served in random order. 
According to the other scheme, efficient rationing, customers are served in order of their 
willingness to pay for the product. Those customers with the highest willingness to pay are 
served first, thus leaving the least residual demand among all possible rationing schemes. The 
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effect of different rationing schemes on residual demand is illustrated in Figure 1 for a 
triopoly with linear total demand  = 1000 − . In the figure, the bold line represents the 
remaining demand for firm 3 with given capacities ( = 300,  = 200) and prices ( =200,  = 400) of firms 1 and 2. While under proportional rationing residual demand is 
obtained by rotating the demand curve around the reservation price, under efficient rationing 
the demand curve is shifted leftwards in parallel. 
 
Figure 1: Residual demand under proportional and efficient rationing. 
   Whereas a full characterization of the equilibrium is unavailable, some results about its 
properties have been obtained. Allen and Hellwig (1986a; 1986b) show that, as the number of 
competitors increases, the probability mass of the equilibrium strategies moves towards the 
competitive price. However, under proportional rationing, there is no convergence in the 
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supports. A strictly positive, albeit declining, probability for a high price near the monopoly 
price always remains. An intuition for this result may be provided by the fact that if all firms 
but one set the competitive price, the last firm maximizes its profit by acting as a monopolist 
vis-à-vis its residual demand. Under proportional rationing, a random portion of customers is 
left for that firm and it pays off to set a high price. Under efficient rationing, in contrast, there 
is no point for the last firm in setting a high price since all customers with a high willingness 
to pay have already been served by others. In that case, also the supports of the equilibrium 
strategies converge (Vives, 1986).
1
 
   Further studies consider repeated interaction of firms, thus allowing for supergame effects. 
If there is a sufficiently high probability for the firms to interact again, threats of future 
punishment can deter them from uncooperative conduct. In repeated price competition with 
exogenous capacities, Brock and Scheinkman (1985) find two opposing effects of an 
increasing number of firms in the market. On the one hand, as the number of firms grows, 
each firm in a cartel receives a declining share of the cartel profit, which makes defection 
more attractive. On the other hand, with more firms there is more total capacity in the market, 
which allows for a fiercer retaliation against a defector. As it turns out, the effect is non-
monotonic; cartel power attains a maximum for some intermediate number of firms. 
   Moreover, as shown by Abreu (1988), infinitely repeated games possess subgame perfect 
Nash equilibria in pure strategies which follow a rather simple stick-and-carrot approach. 
Whenever a player deviates from collusion, a predefined phase of punishment is executed. In 
the Bertrand-Edgeworth framework, such equilibria are characterized by Lambson (1987) for 
the case with fixed capacities and by Requate (1994) for the case with increasing marginal 
costs. 
3 Related experiments 
Compared to the plenty of experiments investigating oligopolies in standard Cournot or 
Bertrand markets, the number of studies concerned with Bertrand-Edgeworth markets is 
relatively small. In a seminal study, Kruse et al. (1994) consider the effect of capacity and 
information conditions on pricing in a four-player Bertrand-Edgeworth game with 
exogenously given capacities and proportional demand rationing. They find that higher 
capacities go along with lower prices whereas the information condition entails no significant 
                                                 
1
 Börgers (1992) shows that this result can also be arrived at if one deploys iterated elimination of dominated 
strategies instead of the Nash equilibrium concept. 
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effect. Moreover, prices are higher than predicted by the static Nash equilibrium and there is 
evidence that subjects to some extent adjust their prices according to a myopic best response 
rationale as put forward by Edgeworth. A closely related experiment is conducted by Fonseca 
and Normann (2013) who vary capacities and the number of firms in the market.
2
 They also 
observe falling prices with increasing capacities and dynamic pricing patterns which are more 
in accordance with Edgeworth cycles than with the static Nash equilibrium. The explanatory 
power of Edgeworth cycle theory decreases with increasing market capacity and is lower in 
triopoly than in duopoly. Fonseca and Normann (2008) investigate duopolies and triopolies 
with symmetric and asymmetric firms. They observe that symmetric firms and a market with 
fewer firms lead to higher prices. Heymann et al. (2014) find that their experimental data fit a 
simple heuristic model according to which a subject increments her price as long as her sales 
hit the capacity constraint and lowers her price by a certain amount if she is unable to sell up 
to her capacity. 
   All experiments mentioned in the above paragraph pertain to a setting with constant 
marginal costs up to a fixed exogenous cap. A Bertrand-Edgeworth setting with strictly 
convex costs is investigated by Abbink and Brandts (2008). However, they abandon the 
voluntary trading constraint. In their experiment, the firm offering at the lowest price is 
obliged to satisfy the entire demand at its price. Residual demand for the other firms thus 
equals zero. Varying the number of firms in the market between two, three and four, Abbink 
and Brandts observe that a market with more firms yields lower prices. Yet, prices remain 
substantially above the competitive level. Moreover, price choices concentrate on a focal 
price not predicted by any benchmark result, which the authors rationalize by employing an 
imitation model. In a similar framework, Argenton and Müller (2012) study cost asymmetry 
in duopolies and find that asymmetry can be conducive to collusion. 
   Few experiments have studied the effect of demand rationing. Kruse (1993) compares 
proportional and efficient rationing in posted-offer markets with two sellers and U-shaped 
average costs. She finds that prices are higher with proportional rationing. That effect as well 
as the observed price levels are in accordance with the Nash prediction for the underlying 
one-shot game, though in the experiment repeated play was executed. Jacobs and Requate 
(2016) obtain a similar effect of rationing in price competition with fixed exogenous 
capacities. In contrast to Kruse, they observe that prices largely are higher than predicted by 
the Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game. Lepore and Shafran (2013) and Jacobs (2016) 
                                                 
2
 Fonseca and Normann employ a model with box demand, so an assumption about demand rationing is 
superfluous. 
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vary demand rationing in a two-stage quantity setting and pricing experiment resembling the 
model by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). Both studies find that while rationing has no 
significant effect on capacity choices at the first stage, prices at the second stage are higher 
with proportional rationing. Contrary to the aforementioned experiments, prices are 
considerably lower than the Nash prediction in that setting. Another study in which several 
different rationing schemes are employed is by Buchheit and Feltovich (2011). However, they 
aim at investigating a sunk cost effect and do not use demand rationing as a treatment 
variable; rather, in their experiment the effective rationing scheme is determined randomly. 
4 The model 
The underlying model of our experiment is a price-setting oligopoly market in which  
identical firms offer a single homogenous good. Firms are confronted with a linear market 
demand function 
 =  −  , ,  > 0, 
representing the total volume of the good that can be sold in the market at a certain price in 
each period. Each firm  has a quadratic cost function 
 = 2 ,  > 0,  = 1,… , . 
There are no fixed costs. As productions are made to order,  represents both the produced 
and the sold quantity of firm . A firm will stop producing and selling when its marginal 
production cost reaches its marginal revenue which is equal to the price it has set. Each firm 
therefore has an implicit capacity constraint  depending on its individual price :  =  ,  = 1,… , . 
If demand is not enough for all firms to exhaust their capacities, firms with lower prices will 
sell first and demand will be rationed according to the effective rationing scheme. We employ 
both proportional and efficient rationing. The quantity of firm  thus is the minimum of its 
implicit capacity and its residual demand  which depends on the price vector :  = min , !,  = 1,… , . 
The residual demand of firm  varies with the rationing scheme and is given by 
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 =
"#$
#%max (0, ) *1 −+ ,-,.-,.,|01203 45 for	proportional	rationingmax (0, 1)* −+ ,-,.,|01203 45 for	efficient	rationing
,	
 = 1, … , , 
where ) is the number of firms in the market charging the same price as  (including  itself). 
We assume demand to be divided equally among firms in case of price ties.
3
 Lastly, profits 
are given by @ =  − -.,  = 1,… , . 
   We calculate three benchmark outcomes. First consider the outcome in the competitive 
benchmark case which is characterized by marginal cost pricing. Since all firms have identical 
cost schedules, the marginal cost pricing rationale leads to identical price choices of all firms 
and to symmetric quantities. Quantities can therefore be expressed by  = /,  = 1, … , . Equating price and marginal cost then yields firms' quantities B = / + ,  = 1, … , , and the competitive (Walrasian) benchmark price 
B =  + . 
The corresponding profit for each firm is 
@B = 2 D  + E ,  = 1,… , . 
The second benchmark is the Cournot outcome which obtains when firms choose quantities 
rather than prices. Though there is no rationale for the Cournot outcome in our specific 
setting, it is the equilibrium prediction in the related Kreps-Scheinkman model of two-stage 
capacity setting and price competition under efficient demand rationing. Choosing 
simultaneously their quantities , firms maximize @ =  F − - + ∑ ,,H .I − /2, 
which yields J = /- + 1 + .,  = 1, … , . The corresponding endogenous Cournot 
price is 
J =  +  + 1 + . 
Profits are 
                                                 
3
 As it is common in the literature on demand rationing, residual demand under proportional rationing is defined 
by the expectation of all possible customer reservation price orderings, and we do not actually model the order of 
such prices as a random variable. Zouhar (2015) notes that this difference as well as the exact tie-breaking rule 
(when several firms set the same price) affects quantities and profits in some cases when firms are to choose both 
prices and quantities simultaneously. Yet, his arguments do not apply to our setting in which, by construction, 
the produced quantity of each firm cannot be larger than its residual demand. 
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@J = 2 + 2- + 1 + . ,  = 1,… , . 
The third benchmark is full collusion maximizing industry profit which is denoted by @ 
without subscript. As costs are strictly convex, maximization of joint profit demands 
symmetric quantities and thus symmetric pricing. The collusive price then is the argument 
that maximizes @ = ∑ @KL =  − /, which is 
M =  + 2 +  . 
Firms' profits under full collusion are given by 
@M = 4 + 2 ,  = 1,… , . 
Due to symmetric pricing, all benchmark outcomes are independent of the effective rationing 
scheme. 
5 Experimental setup 
In our experiment, we investigate the model described in the last section for the duopoly and 
triopoly  = 2, 3 with parameterization  = 1000, 	 = 1,  = 1. Subjects could choose 
integers from the interval [0, 1000] as prices. Price is the only choice variable as quantities are 
determined endogenously. Table 1 shows the benchmark prices and profits for the one-shot 
version of the game with our parameterization.
4
 
   = 2  = 3 
 B 333 250 
full competition @B 55,444.5 31,250 
 @B 110,889 93,750 
 J 500 400 
Cournot @J 93,750 60,000 
 @J 187,500 180,000 
 M 600 571 
full collusion @M 100,000 71,248.5 
 @M 200,000 214,285.5 
Variables , @ , and @ denote market price, firm profit, and 
market profit, respectively. Superscripts N, O, and  denote 
the fully competitive, Cournot, and fully collusive benchmarks. 
Table 1: Benchmark outcomes. 
                                                 
4
 Where applicable, prices were rounded to the nearest integer. Integer prices were used to calculate profits. 
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   Subjects chose prices repeatedly over several periods. Each experiment lasted at least 20 
periods. From the 20th period on, the probability for the experiment to continue for another 
period was 5/6. In order to enhance the comparability of our data, the total number of periods 
was equalized for all sessions as it was determined in advance by one random draw; it turned 
out that 24 periods were to be played.
5
 
   We conducted treatments with both fixed matching, where the same subjects interacted in 
one market throughout all periods, and random matching, where subjects were randomly 
assigned to markets anew in each period. While the fixed matching condition is clearly more 
in accordance with real oligopolies, random matching allows for a strict test of the static Nash 
equilibrium predictions of the game. On the whole, our experiment consists of eight 
treatments in a 2x2x2-design with the number of firms in a market ( = 2, 3), the rationing 
scheme (proportional, efficient), and the matching scheme (fixed, random) as treatment 
variables. 
   The experiment was conducted in the economics experimental labs at the Universities of 
Kiel and Heidelberg in June/July and November/December 2013. We usually conducted two 
sessions per treatment, one at each lab, yielding data of 9 to 11 markets for each treatment.
6
 
Subjects from all fields of study were recruited and each subject participated only once.
7
 The 
sessions proceeded as follows. Upon their arrival, the subjects were randomly seated at 
computer terminals in the lab. They could not infer with whom of the other subjects they 
would interact in the experiment. Printed instructions provided complete information about 
the setup of the experiment, including cost and demand,
8
 and about how their payoff would be 
determined. The instructions did not state any of the benchmark outcomes calculated in the 
last section. When reading was finished, the experimenter gave a short presentation 
highlighting the experiment's main features. Then, the computerized experiment – using 
Fischbacher’s (2007) z-tree software – started. First, subjects had to correctly answer a set of 
yes-no questions checking the understanding of the experimental procedures and setup before 
they could proceed. Three unpaid trial periods were played before the 24 paid periods started.
9
 
Throughout all periods, subjects could use a profit calculator implemented on their screens. 
When a subject entered a vector of hypothetical prices – one for each firm –, the profit 
                                                 
5
 A similar procedure is applied by Fonseca and Normann (2013). 
6
 In the duopoly treatment with efficient rationing and fixed matching, no-shows necessitated a third session 
which was conducted at Kiel University. 
7
 Subjects were recruited in lectures in Kiel. In Heidelberg the ORSEE recruitment software (Greiner, 2015) was 
used. 
8
 As students from all fields participated, cost and demand were described verbally rather than algebraically. 
9
 In the fixed matching treatments, subjects were re-matched after the trial periods. The new matching was then 
effective in all paid periods. 
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calculator returned the subject’s sales quantity and profit resulting from the chosen price 
combination.
10
 After each period, subjects were informed about the price choices in their 
market and about their individual sales quantity and profit. While information on the 
quantities and profits of other players was not stated explicitly, due to the symmetry of 
players, subjects could easily calculate those numbers using the profit calculator. In the end, 
subjects were paid the sum of their earnings from all paid periods at a predefined exchange 
rate in private.
11
 An average session lasted about 105 minutes; average earnings per subject 
were 15.0 Euro. 
6 Equilibrium predictions 
Figures 2 and 3 show the best response correspondences with our parameterization in the 
oligopoly with two and three firms, respectively, each for proportional and efficient rationing. 
The best response functions for the duopoly in Figure 2 consist of three sections. In the 
leftmost section, the other firm sets such a low price  that the best response PQ is to set a 
high price and thus act as a monopolist vis-à-vis residual demand. In the middle section, 
underbidding the other price by one unit is the best response. In the rightmost section, the best 
response price is the monopoly price, which happens whenever the other firm sets a price 
higher than the monopoly price. Comparing the best response functions for the two rationing 
schemes, it can be seen that proportional rationing supports higher best response prices in the 
leftmost section since it leaves more residual demand to the firm with the higher price. 
Moreover, under proportional rationing the discrete jump in the best response price between 
the leftmost and the middle section occurs at a somewhat higher price of the other firm (at  = 391 as compared to  = 367 under efficient rationing) and is considerably larger (the 
best response price jumps from 576 to 390 under proportional and from 423 to 366 under 
efficient rationing). 
   Figure 3 illustrates the best response correspondences for the triopoly in the form of three-
dimensional plots. The two horizontal axes correspond to the two prices  and  set by the 
two other firms. The vertical axis displays the best response price PQ, . Regarding all 
possible combinations of  and , best response prices range from 290 to 667 under 
proportional and from 268 to 667 under efficient rationing. A better understanding of what is 
                                                 
10
 Instructions for an exemplary treatment, including a screenshot of the profit calculator, can be found in 
Appendix A. 
11
 Throughout the experiment, money was accounted in experimental currency units (ECU). The exchange rates 
were 120,000 ECU per Euro in the duopoly treatments and 60,000 ECU per Euro in the triopoly treatments. 
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going on may be obtained if one looks at the density plots in Figure 4. This figure depicts best 
response strategies. The five regions of different brightness in the figure show the five 
strategies which can be distinguished, each of which takes the form of either underbidding or 
monopolizing some residual demand. First consider region (iii) in the lower left corner. In that 
region, the best response is characterized by setting the highest price and monopolizing 
residual demand since both other prices are low. When the prices of the other firms rise, 
underbidding becomes the best response at some point. Regions (i) and (ii) correspond to 
underbidding strategies. In region (i) the best response is to underbid the lower of the two 
other prices by one unit. If one of the other prices is sufficiently low, it can pay to only 
underbid the higher of the two other prices. This is the case in region (ii). The two strategies 
left again describe monopolistic behavior. In region (iv) sprawling from the upper left and 
lower right corners, one of the two other prices is so high and the other so low that the best 
response is to monopolize residual demand after the lowest-price firm has sold up to its 
implicit capacity, which leads to a best response price lower than the higher other price. The 
last strategy is monopolistic behavior vis-à-vis entire market demand; it obtains in region (v) 
when both other firms charge prices higher than the monopoly price. 
 
Figure 2: Best response functions in the two-player game. 
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Figure 3: Best response prices in the three-player game. 
 
Figure 4: Best response strategies in the three-player game. The five regions, from darkest to 
brightest, indicate five different best response strategies: (i) underbid the lower other price, 
(ii) underbid the higher other price, (iii) set the highest price and monopolize residual 
demand, (iv) set the middle price and monopolize residual demand, and (v) set the lowest 
price and monopolize residual demand. 
   The discretization of the pricing model with strictly convex costs can in general give rise to 
Nash equilibria in pure strategies (Dixon, 1993). However, the price grid we employ is 
sufficiently dense that there is no such equilibrium. We calculated the mixed-strategy one-
shot Nash equilibria under efficient and proportional rationing, each for duopoly and triopoly, 
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using the Gambit game theory software tool (McKelvey et al., 2014). Under proportional 
rationing, the set of rationalizable prices is very large, which makes the computation of the 
equilibria complex. Having been unable to have the equilibria calculated on a 2.1 GHz 
processor within ten days computation time, we slightly changed the input for the games with 
proportional rationing. Allowing only even integers as permissible prices proved successful. 
The densities of the calculated equilibria are displayed in Figure 5.
12
 All equilibria have full 
support on the respective set of rationalizable prices. Under efficient rationing, those price 
intervals are relatively short: [366, 423] in duopoly and [268, 309] in triopoly. Under 
proportional rationing, the supports of the mixed-strategy equilibria are [390, 576] in duopoly 
and [290, 542] in triopoly. The equilibrium densities exhibit a U-shaped pattern which is 
much more pronounced under efficient rationing. Table 2 shows the expected mean individual 
prices and profits with their standard errors as well as the median prices and profits in Nash 
equilibrium. Note that uniqueness of the equilibria we calculated is not guaranteed. 
 
Figure 5: Densities of Nash equilibrium pricing strategies. 
                                                 
12
 The class width in all histograms in the figure is 2 ECU. So, for efficient rationing, the bars show averaged 
densities over two prices. 
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Individual Price Individual Profit  = 2, efficient 395.745 68,451.259 
(17.665) (7,527.133) 
[396.000] [66,978.000]  = 2, proportional 487.008 71,010.396 
(55.471) (40,439.669) 
[490.000] [76,050.000]  = 3, efficient 289.007 37,167.132 
(12.577) (5,322.551) 
[289.000] [37,812.500]  = 3, proportional 416.191 44,498.162 
(73.463) (33,204.116) 
[416.000] [52,448.000] 
Standard errors in parentheses. Medians in square brackets. 
Table 2: Nash equilibrium predictions of individual price and profit. 
   All analysis so far pertains to the one-shot game. Requate (1994) analyzes infinitely 
repeated price competition with increasing marginal costs. He finds that the repeated game 
possesses subgame perfect Nash equilibria of a simple form. In such a symmetric stationary 
outcome equilibrium, a unique price is set by all firms throughout the entire game as long as 
no one deviates from that path. In case of a deviation, the severest credible punishment is 
executed from the next period on forever. The set of prices which can be sustained in 
equilibrium depends on both the number of firms in the market and the discount factor. For 
our parameterization and for discount factors we consider reasonable, the sets of sustainable 
equilibrium prices are large,
13
 i.e. there is a large multitude of pure-strategy Nash equilibria. 
The issue then becomes coordination on one equilibrium. Since the collusive benchmark price 
that maximizes industry profit can be sustained, it appears as a prime candidate for 
coordination.
14
 For a fixed discount factor, interestingly, the set of sustainable prices in pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium is smaller under proportional than under efficient rationing, which 
contrasts with the lager supports of the mixed-strategy equilibria under proportional rationing 
in the one-shot game. 
                                                 
13
 Since subjects are paid off their earnings from all periods at one point in time at the end of the experiment, one 
may assume that earnings are not discounted at all. In that case, the intervals of sustainable equilibrium prices 
are [405, 795] in duopoly with proportional rationing, [370, 830] in duopoly with efficient rationing, [296, 846] 
in triopoly with proportional rationing, and [269, 873] in triopoly with efficient rationing. Taking instead 5/6, the 
continuation probability from the 20th period on, as discount factor, the respective intervals are [410, 718], [371, 
762], [298, 720], and [269, 759]. 
14
 The other way round, we can check how large the discount factors need to be in order to make the collusive 
benchmark outcome sustainable in equilibrium. Those critical discount factors are 0.716 in duopoly with 
proportional rationing, 0.645 in duopoly with efficient rationing, 0.735 in triopoly with proportional rationing, 
and 0.697 in triopoly with efficient rationing. 
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7 Results 
We divide the presentation of our results into two parts. First, data on the market level are 
presented to compare the results to the benchmark outcomes and to elicit treatment effects. 
We then turn to the analysis of individual pricing decisions and inquire accordance of 
behavior with Nash predictions, its stability, and incidence of Edgeworth cycles or imitation. 
Within this section we also motivate and state our hypotheses and discuss our results. 
7.1 Market performance 
Summary statistics of the observed market data are provided in Table 3. Each treatment is 
denoted according to the scheme "number of firms per market, demand rationing scheme, 
matching rule"; for example, the duopoly treatment with efficient rationing and random 
matching is named " = 2, efficient, random". The price measure we employ is the average 
price in a market, weighted by the quantities the firms were able to sell at their respective 
prices.
15
 Profit is measured as the sum of firms' profits in a market. We will refer to these 
measures as "price" and "profit" throughout this subsection. Table 3 for each treatment 
displays the average price and profit together with their standard deviations as well as the 
median price and profit for all (1-24) and for the last ten (15-24) periods. 
   The evolution of prices and profits over the periods of the experiment is depicted in Figures 
6 and 7. The data points in the figures refer to averages over all markets in the respective 
period and treatment.
16
 In all treatments prices first decline and then mostly tend to stabilize 
in the later periods. The time trend is less clear for profits. Whereas profits rise and then tend 
to stabilize in the duopoly, there is no trend, or, if at all, a small decline, in the triopoly. 
Comparing the data to the benchmarks from Table 1, it can be seen that both prices and 
profits lie above the competitive and below the Cournot benchmark for all treatments and in 
all periods.  
   As to the effects of the three treatment variables, we set up the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a: Prices and profits will be higher in duopoly than in triopoly. 
Hypothesis 1b: Market conduct will be more collusive in duopoly than in triopoly. 
We state Hypothesis 1 in two different versions since the benchmark prices and profits in 
Table 1 vary with the number of firms in the market. Therefore, one cannot simply infer from 
higher prices and profits in the duopoly that duopoly markets are more collusive. To 
                                                 
15
 In this we follow Fonseca and Normann (2008; 2013). 
16
 Graphs for the evolution of prices in single markets with fixed matching can be found in Appendix B. 
Bertrand-Edgeworth Markets with Increasing Marginal Costs and Voluntary Trading 
27 
 
investigate collusiveness, we set up a measure that normalizes prices and profits using the 
benchmark outcomes. That measure is elaborated on at the presentation of the results below. 
Hypothesis 2: Prices and profits will be higher with proportional than with efficient 
demand rationing. 
Hypothesis 3: Prices and profits will be higher with fixed than with random subject 
matching. 
For Hypotheses 2 and 3, a case discrimination is not needed as the benchmark prices and 
profits are not affected by the rationing or matching condition. Higher collusiveness thus is 
equivalent to higher prices and profits. 
Market Price Market Profit 
periods 1-24 15-24 1-24 15-24  = 2, efficient, random 392.697 383.403 133,917.068 134,762.983 
(17.985) (9.379) (9,444.181) (2,721.021) 
[389.148] [383.797] [135,713.250] [135,006.250]  = 2, efficient, fixed 405.315 393.777 135,566.395 137,297.132 
(30.514) (20.763) (10,044.922) (7,475.537) 
[399.563] [390.331] [136,720.250] [136,723.250]  = 2, proportional, random 432.096 423.052 142,633.735 143,913.980 
(42.099) (35.679) (9,211.928) (7,961.372) 
[424.051] [415.891] [143,414.098] [144,112.625]  = 2, proportional, fixed 445.288 437.411 143,006.802 144,168.121 
(33.845) (32.472) (9,984.003) (8,983.197) 
[444.422] [434.477] [143,162.621] [143,998.267]  = 3, efficient, random 289.756 279.861 110,913.016 110,089.409 
(13.854) (4.902) (4,133.332) (3,237.614) 
[287.577] [279.866] [111,193.250] [110,126.500]  = 3, efficient, fixed 306.348 294.207 112,813.473 111,194.639 
(39.612) (36.899) (8,786.764) (5,848.259) 
[293.510] [283.134] [111,952.375] [110,979.250]  = 3, proportional, random 317.398 311.301 118,115.571 118,712.124 
(22.457) (22.585) (6,498.513) (6,175.035) 
[313.313] [304.648] [116,081.110] [116,395.410]  = 3, proportional, fixed 316.841 314.193 118,590.824 118,267.086 
(26.550) (31.302) (7,392.573) (7,984.267) 
  [313.149] [305.775] [115,928.617] [115,570.282] 
Standard errors in parentheses. Medians in square brackets. 
Table 3: Average market price and profit. 
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Figure 6: Series of market prices. 
   Hypotheses 1 and 2 accord with both theory predictions and evidence from earlier related 
experiments. As the analysis in section 6 has shown, the expected Nash equilibrium price is 
higher in duopoly than in triopoly and higher with proportional than with efficient rationing.
17
 
The same relations hold true for the equilibrium predictions for profits. Furthermore, one can 
infer from the best response correspondences in section 6 that setting higher prices under 
proportional than under efficient rationing is in a sense dominant: For every given other price 
(in duopoly) or vector of other prices (in triopoly), the best response price under proportional 
rationing is at least as high as the best response price under efficient rationing. In the repeated 
                                                 
17
 While the equilibrium price predictions presented in Table 2 pertain to individual and not market level prices, 
adding quantity weights leaves the qualitative relationships unaffected. 
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game, however, there is no unambiguous theory prediction for the rationing effect. One may 
argue that efficient rationing allows for punishing deviant behavior in an implicit cartel more 
effectively as less residual demand is left. Consequently, the threat of more severe 
punishment may sustain more collusion in the first place. Yet, for reasonable discount factors, 
full collusion can be sustained under either rationing rule. The experimental results by Kruse 
(1993) let us expect that proportional rationing goes along with higher prices also when fixed 
matching is employed. As to the procollusive effect of fewer firms, our hypothesis is in 
accordance with the results by Abbink and Brandts (2008) and by Fonseca and Normann 
(2008). 
 
Figure 7: Series of market profits. 
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   As regards Hypothesis 3, we cannot produce evidence from related experiments since those 
do not vary the matching scheme. From the theoretical viewpoint, however, we expect higher 
prices and profits with fixed matching from the fact that full collusion is supported by a Nash 
equilibrium only in the infinitely repeated game which the fixed matching condition 
resembles. 
   We start to investigate the effect of the treatment variables with a visual analysis of Figures 
6 and 7. In every of the 24 periods we compare the averaged prices and profits pairwise 
between treatments. For such a pairwise comparison, we use two treatments which differ only 
with respect to the relevant treatment variable while the two other variables are held constant. 
Each of the two other variables can take two states. Therefore, 2 ∗ 2 = 4 pairwise 
comparisons apply for each treatment variable.
18
 Multiplying the number of pairwise 
comparisons with the number of periods yields 4 ∗ 24 = 96 instances of comparison. When 
we compare the duopoly data to those from the triopoly, we find that both prices and profits 
are higher in duopoly in every single of those 96 instances. An analogous comparison of 
treatments with different demand rationing schemes yields that prices (profits) are higher with 
proportional than with efficient rationing in 90 (94) of 96 instances. Fixed as compared to 
random matching also a predominantly positive effect on prices and profits, as well, although 
the picture is not as clear-cut as with the other two treatment variables. Prices (profits) are 
higher with fixed matching in 78 (66) of 96 cases. 
   We now turn to a formal analysis and perform nonparametric significance tests of 
subsamples within single periods. For the sake of conciseness, we restrict our attention to the 
last ten periods. Our results remain qualitatively unchanged if we consider all 24 periods. To 
formally test for treatment effects, we repeat the pairwise comparison of treatments, holding 
all but one variable constant, and perform Mann-Whitney tests. The significance test results 
are summarized in Table 4.
19
 The observed difference between duopoly and triopoly is highly 
significant for both prices and profits. In every single test, we find that prices and profits are 
significantly higher in the duopoly at the one percent level.
20
 The results for the effect of 
demand rationing are somewhat less overwhelming, but still powerful. Both prices and profits 
are significantly higher under proportional rationing at least at the five percent level in 38 out 
 
                                                 
18
 For example, when investigating the effect of the rationing scheme, the following four pairwise treatment 
comparisons apply: " = 2, efficient, random" vs. " = 2, proportional, random", " = 2, efficient, fixed" vs. 
" = 2, proportional, fixed", " = 3, efficient, random" vs. " = 3, proportional, random", and " = 3, 
efficient, fixed" vs. "	 = 3, proportional, fixed". 
19
 Since we consider only the last ten periods, now 40 instances of comparison (four pairwise treatment 
comparisons multiplied by ten periods) apply. 
20
 All -values refer to two-tailed tests. 
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significant with 
wrong sign  < 0.1 
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2/40 
 
0/40 
Pairwise comparison of treatments in periods 15 to 24. Frequencies of results of two-tailed Mann-Whitney tests. Table entries in the first three 
columns indicate the number of cases in which the null hypothesis of equal medians is rejected at the displayed significance level in favor of 
the supported hypothesis. " = 2 >  = 3" ("proportional > efficient", "fixed > random") means that the median of the variable is higher in 
the duopoly than in the triopoly (under proportional than under efficient rationing, under fixed than under random matching). 
Table 4: Results of significance tests for treatment effects. 
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of 40 cases. By contrast, the visual impression of higher prices and profits under fixed than 
under random matching is not supported by significance test results. The difference between 
the two matching conditions is mostly insignificant. We find significance in the expected 
direction at the five percent level in only one case for prices and no such instances for profits 
– even less than what would be expected by coincidence, given that there is no difference 
between the two matching conditions. 
   In order to compare collusiveness between duopoly and triopoly, we define collusiveness 
indices that normalize the absolute data. The price collusiveness index is defined as 
Z[\\ =  − BM − B, 
where  is the observed price in a given market and period, and B and M are the benchmark 
prices as defined in section 4. A value of the collusiveness index of one (zero) thus 
corresponds to the fully collusive (competitive) outcome. An analogous index is defined for 
profits.
21
 Performing Mann-Whitney tests on the collusiveness indices, we find that pricing in 
the duopoly is significantly more collusive and that this conduct yields to profits significantly 
closer to the collusive benchmark. The collusiveness index is significantly higher in duopoly 
at least at the five percent level in 37 (39) of 40 cases for prices (profits). 
   Rather than to rely only on pairwise comparisons, we can make use of our full data set by 
multivariate regression analysis. Since there is heavy positive autocorrelation within markets 
in our data, we perform generalized least squares (GLS) regressions that correct the standard 
errors for effects of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity on the market level. We investigate 
regressions with price as well as profit as dependent variable. Independent variables comprise 
three dummy variables, " = 3", "proportional", and "fixed", related to the three dimensions 
of the treatment variable space. Each dummy equals one in those treatments for which the 
condition mentioned in the caption holds true and zero otherwise. Time trends are captured by 
the variable "1/period", the inverse of the period. Additional specifications furthermore 
include interaction terms of the treatment space dummies. 
   The regression results are presented in Table 5. All specifications indicate that the three 
treatment space dummy variables have the expected signs. The effects of the number of firms 
and of demand rationing are strongly significant.
22
 Contrary to the results of the pairwise 
significance tests, also the matching entails a statistically significant effect in three of the four 
                                                 
21
 Engel (2007) uses a similar collusiveness measure in his meta-study of oligopoly experiments. 
22
 In order to be able to analyze Hypothesis 1b by means of multivariate regressions, we also ran regressions (1) 
to (4) with the above-defined price or profit collusiveness measures as dependent variable. The " = 3" dummy 
variable is negative and significant at the one percent level in all four regressions. 
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regressions. In the fourth, regression (2), the effect of matching approaches significance 
( = 0.1126). Nevertheless, the economic significance of the matching effect remains 
doubtful. Consider for example regression (1). The estimated price increase with fixed 
matching by 7.4 ECU corresponds to an increase of no more than approximately two 
percentage points of the price collusiveness index. The effects of the other treatment variables 
are much more sizable: Prices are about 32 ECU higher with proportional than with efficient 
rationing and about 113 ECU higher in duopoly than in triopoly. The same pattern can be 
found in the other regressions. 
Dependent Variable Market Price Market Profit 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
c 392.131*** 389.716*** 135,133.745*** 134,276.370*** 
(2.411) (3.364) (460.711) (616.179) 
1/period 46.325*** 46.325*** -1,381.658 -1,381.658 
(3.452) (3.452) (1,271.250) (1,212.250)  = 3 -112.867*** -110.008*** -24,291.920*** -23,492.088*** 
(2.399) (4.709) (429.267) (831.167) 
proportional 31.710*** 34.098*** 7,291.657*** 8,496.899*** 
(2.399) (4.709) (429.267) (831.167) 
fixed 7.432*** 7.303 966.909** 2,005.167** 
(2.399) (4.601) (429.267) (812.057)  = 3*proportional 0.339 -468.684 
(6.751) (1,191.661)  = 3*fixed 3.736 -156.196 
(6.583) (1,162.013) 
proportional*fixed 8.100 -1,245.670 
(6.583) (1,162.013)  = 3*proportional*fixed -24.008** -1,555.620 
    (9.430)   (1,664.431) 
Observations 1,920 1,920 1,920 1,920 
Adjusted R
2
 0.573 0.589 0.645 0.659 
GLS regressions with clustered errors on the market level. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. See accompanying text for variable definitions. 
Table 5: Regression results for market level data. 
   The variable "1/period" is positive and significant in the price regressions whereas it is 
insignificant in the profit regressions, i.e. there is a significant downward time trend for 
prices, but no time trend for profits. The coefficient of the constant shows the level to which 
prices or, respectively, profits converge in the long run in treatment " = 2, efficient, 
random" when "1/period" approaches and all dummy variables are zero. Adding the 
coefficients of the suitable treatment space dummies (and, in regressions (2) and (4), their 
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interactions) yields the convergence levels for the other treatments. The results confirm that 
both prices and profits converge to levels well above the fully competitive and well below the 
Cournot outcome. 
   Combining the evidence regarding the treatment effects, we conclude that Hypothesis 1 (in 
both its versions) and Hypothesis 2 are strongly supported. In contrast, we have found only 
limited support for Hypothesis 3, and the observed effect is rather small. 
Result 1: Prices and profits are substantially and significantly higher in duopoly than in 
triopoly. Market conduct is significantly more collusive in duopoly than in triopoly. 
Result 2: Prices and profits are substantially and significantly higher under proportional 
than under efficient demand rationing. 
Result 3: Prices and profits are slightly higher under fixed than under random subject 
matching. The effect is mostly statistically significant in multivariate regressions, but 
not in pairwise treatment comparisons. 
   As has been mentioned above, most oligopoly experiments employ only fixed matching 
because that assumption is closer to real oligopoly markets. Having found that the matching 
condition does not entail a substantial effect on the collusiveness of our oligopoly markets, we 
can provide some justification for that approach and for testing also static predictions in a 
fixed matching setting with repeated interaction. 
   Aside from treatment effects, we are also interested in the general level of collusiveness in 
our experimental setting. We again employ the price collusiveness measure to quantify 
collusiveness. The data in Table 6 indicate that our markets are rather competitive. When zero 
(one) is defined as the fully competitive (collusive) price, the collusiveness of the mean price, 
averaged over all treatments, is 0.251. In 93.1 percent of all observations the collusiveness is 
smaller than 0.5, i.e. the price is closer to the fully competitive than to the fully collusive 
benchmark price. Only in 0.6 percent of the observations is a price collusiveness of at least 
0.75 attained, and there is not a single instance in which the fully collusive benchmark is 
reached. Moreover, we test for every single treatment and each of the last ten periods whether 
the median price or profit equals any of the benchmarks in Table 1. We observe that in every 
of the 80 instances
23
 both prices and profits are significantly higher than the fully competitive 
benchmark (all ]s < 0.01, Wilcoxon signed rank tests) and significantly lower than the 
Cournot (all ]s < 0.05 for prices, all ]s < 0.01 for profits) or the fully collusive (all ]s < 0.01) benchmark. 
                                                 
23
 The 80 instances of comparison to the benchmarks result from eight treatments multiplied by ten periods. 
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mean Z[\\ 
0.251 
 
0.224 
 
0.271 
 
0.371 
 
0.421 
 
0.124 
 
0.176 
 
0.210 
 
0.208 
 
Relative frequencies of market prices in the respective collusiveness ranges and mean collusiveness. Z[\\ = 0 (Z[\\ = 1) corresponds to the fully competitive 
(collusive) price. 
Table 6: Collusiveness of market prices: Frequencies. 
0.75 ≤ Z[\\ < 1 
0.006 
(12/1920) 
0.000 
(0/240) 
0.000 
(0/240) 
0.029 
(7/240) 
0.008 
(2/240) 
0.000 
(0/240) 
0.013 
(3/240) 
0.000 
(0/216) 
0.000 
(0/240) 
0.5 ≤ Z[\\ < 0.75 
0.063 
(120/1920) 
0.000 
(0/240) 
0.061 
(16/264) 
0.158 
(38/240) 
0.238 
(57/240) 
0.000 
(0/240) 
0.025 
(6/240) 
0.000 
(0/216) 
0.013 
(3/240) 
0.25 ≤ Z[\\ < 0.5 
0.318 
(610/1920) 
0.288 
(69/240) 
0.439 
(116/264) 
0.579 
(139/240) 
0.675 
(162/240) 
0.025 
(6/240) 
0.133 
(32/240) 
0.194 
(42/216) 
0.183 
(44/240) 
0 ≤ Z[\\ < 0.25 
0.612 
(1175/1920) 
0.708 
(170/240) 
0.492 
(130/264) 
0.233 
(56/240) 
0.079 
(19/240) 
0.975 
(234/240) 
0.829 
(199/240) 
0.806 
(174/216) 
0.804 
(193/240) 
Z[\\ < 0 
0.002 
(3/1920) 
0.004 
(1/240) 
0.008 
(2/264) 
0.000 
(0/240) 
0.000 
(0/240) 
0.000 
(0/240) 
0.000 
(0/240) 
0.000 
(0/216) 
0.000 
(0/240) 
 
all treatments 
  = 2, efficient, random 
  = 2, efficient, fixed 
  = 2, proportional, random 
  = 2, proportional, fixed 
  = 3, efficient, random 
  = 3, efficient, fixed 
  = 3, proportional, random 
  = 3, proportional, fixed 
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   Comparing the competitiveness in our markets to that in related experiments, we find that 
behavior in our setting is more competitive than in the markets in Abbink and Brandts (2008) 
who observe pricing at or above the Cournot level when firms have to satisfy all demand at 
the price they choose. Pricing below the Cournot benchmark is in line with what has been 
found in experimental tests of the Kreps-Scheinkman model with inexperienced subjects 
(Davis, 1999; Muren, 2000; Goodwin and Mestelman, 2010; Jacobs, 2016). Furthermore, the 
overall competitiveness in our markets seems comparable to the results by Dufwenberg and 
Gneezy (2000) in an experiment of price competition with no costs. 
   The question of session-specific effects is salient in our procedures because we conducted 
sessions with participants from two different subject pools at different universities. Subject 
pool effects may thus have translated into session effects. To test whether subjects' price 
choices diverge in different sessions, we regress the price on a constant, the time trend 
variable, and a set of session dummies and then test for equality of those dummy coefficients 
that refer to the same treatment. We find no significant session effects (all ]s > 0.10, _-
tests).
24
 
7.2 Individual behavior 
We now turn to the analysis of individual price choices. Figure 8 for each treatment displays 
the densities of observed individual prices. 
7.2.1 Nash equilibrium predictions 
We first compare the empirical individual price choices to the static Nash equilibrium 
predictions from section 6, testing our Hypothesis 4: 
Hypothesis 4: The distribution of individual price choices in any treatment follows the 
probability distribution of prices in the respective static mixed-strategy Nash 
equilibrium. 
There are four Nash equilibria to be compared to the data from eight different treatments. 
Each Nash equilibrium serves as a standard of comparison for two treatments with different 
matching conditions. 
                                                 
24
 However, in treatment " = 2, proportional, fixed", the session effect approaches significance ( = 0.1014). 
The values of the coefficients indicate that prices are circa 11 ECU higher in the session conducted at Heidelberg 
University. All other session effects are smaller and clearly insignificant. 
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Figure 8: Densities of prices. 
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   A visual comparison of Figures 5 and 8 already reveals that there is hardly any similarity 
between the predicted equilibrium densities and the according empirical data. Statistical 
analysis confirms the visual impression: In each case, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test at the one 
percent significance level rejects the hypothesis that the equilibrium and the empirical price 
distribution are equal. This result remains unchanged if the early periods in which some 
subjects may still have to learn are disregarded and only the data from the last ten periods are 
used for the tests. These findings are consistent with those from experiments in the related 
setting of price competition with fixed exogenous capacities (Kruse et al., 1994; Fonseca and 
Normann, 2013; Jacobs and Requate, 2016). 
   Whereas the test results are powerful, it appears unsatisfactory that, due to the lacking 
uniqueness of equilibrium, there could in principle be other Nash equilibria which fit the 
empirical data. We tackle this problem with Bernheim's (1984) rationalizability concept. 
Iterative elimination of prices that are never a best response yields the sets of rationalizable 
prices. As noted in section 6, one then finds that those sets coincide with the supports of the 
equilibria we calculated. Since all prices chosen with a strictly positive probability in a 
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium must be rationalizable, we know that the cumulative 
distribution function of any Nash equilibrium strategy must attain the value of zero for all 
prices lower than the lowest rationalizable price and the value of one for all prices equal to or 
higher than the highest rationalizable price. Using only this information, Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests reveal that the empirical price distributions (using data from all periods) are 
significantly different from any possible static Nash equilibrium distribution ( < 0.01 in 
seven out of eight treatments;  < 0.05 in the eighth treatment, " = 2, proportional, fixed"). 
In fact, non-rationalizable price choices are quite common in the data. Pooling the data from 
all treatments, the share of non-rationalizable price choices is 21.8 percent. Among single 
treatments, the shares range from 12.9 to 35.4 percent, with no obvious correlation to any 
treatment variable. Moreover, if only price choices in the last ten periods are considered, the 
share of non-rationalizable prices is somewhat diminished to 16.9 percent, but is still sizable. 
Accordingly, we conclude: 
Result 4: Empirical price choices do not follow any mixed-strategy static Nash 
equilibrium. Non-rationalizable prices are chosen frequently. 
   Although the Nash equilibrium price distributions do not provide a proper description of the 
empirical data, some properties of the equilibria we calculated might nevertheless be reflected 
in the data if we consider a higher aggregation level. As a weakened version of Hypothesis 4, 
we formulate Hypothesis 5: 
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Hypothesis 5: The average empirical price and profit levels in any treatment accord 
with the average price and profit levels predicted by the respective static mixed-strategy 
Nash equilibrium. 
To inquire this weaker hypothesis, we compare the predicted Nash equilibrium means and 
medians for prices and profits from Table 2 with the empirical observations summarized in 
Table 7.
25
 Figure 9 provides a graphical illustration of the comparison of mean prices and 
profits. Nash predictions are depicted as triangles, empirical data as circles. In order to avoid 
disturbances by outliers from early periods, only empirical data from the last ten periods are 
considered. 
Panel A: Individual Price 
periods 1-24 15-24 
mean 
comparison 
to Nash 
prediction mean  
comparison 
to Nash 
prediction  = 2, efficient, random 400.000 = 385.800 <*** 
(42.032) (15.831) 
[391.500] [380.000]  = 2, efficient, fixed 411.019 >*** 396.018 = 
(41.956) (25.546) 
[400.000] [394.000]  = 2, proportional, random 453.129 <*** 440.970 <*** 
(89.636) (74.413) 
[422.500] [400.000]  = 2, proportional, fixed 463.646 <*** 452.405 <*** 
(66.518) (59.961) 
[450.000] [440.000]  = 3, efficient, random 293.907 = 281.190 <*** 
(35.222) (11.480) 
[289.000] [280.000]  = 3, efficient, fixed 317.790 >*** 298.153 <*** 
(66.201) (46.154) 
[296.000] [284.000]  = 3, proportional, random 338.704 <*** 332.611 <*** 
(84.454) (81.119) 
[312.000] [299.000]  = 3, proportional, fixed 332.063 <*** 327.563 <*** 
(67.082) (67.829) 
[311.000] [304.000] 
    … 
 
                                                 
25
 The numbers in Table 7 differ from those in Table 3 because in Table 7 (i) the individual prices are not 
weighted by sales quantities and (ii) profits in the same market are not summed up. 
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Panel B: Individual Profit 
periods 1-24 15-24 
mean 
comparison 
to Nash 
prediction mean  
comparison 
to Nash 
prediction  = 2, efficient,random 66,958.534 = 67,381.471 = 
(12,317.095) (4,485.735) 
[66,486.000] [66,486.000]  = 2, efficient, fixed 67,783.197 = 68,648.566 = 
(18,852.463) (10,214.421) 
[67,147.500] [66,937.500]  = 2, proportional, random 71,316.868 <*** 71,956.990 <*** 
(26,563.938) (19,304.860) 
[73,142.560] [73,052.280]  = 2, proportional, fixed 71,503.401 = 72,084.061 = 
(30,193.821) (25,072.270) 
[75,136.000] [74,305.250]  = 3, efficient, random 36,971.005 >*** 36,696.470 = 
(8,974.914) (3,339.204) 
[38,642.000] [37,812.500]  = 3, efficient, fixed 37,604.491 >*** 37,064.880 = 
(16,556.877) (13,144.703) 
[38,920.500] [37,950.250]  = 3, proportional, random 39,371.857 <*** 39,570.708 <*** 
(17,207.199) (14,126.615) 
[43,512.500] [42,050.000]  = 3, proportional, fixed 39,530.275 <*** 39,422.362 <*** 
(16,750.299) (15,943.523) 
[42,340.500] [42,050.000] 
Standard errors in parentheses. Medians in square brackets. The entries in the columns "comparison 
to Nash prediction" show the results of two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank tests with the null hypothesis 
that the observed median is equal to the predicted Nash equilibrium median stated in Table 2. "<" 
(">") indicates that the observed median is significantly lower (higher) than the Nash prediction, 
where ***, **, and * denote the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. "=" indicates that equality of 
the two medians cannot be rejected at the 10 percent significance level. 
Table 7: Individual price (Panel A) and profit (Panel B) data with comparison to Nash 
prediction. 
   Inspection of the mean individual prices in Panel A of Table 7 and in the accompanying 
graphical illustrations in the upper two panels of Figure 9 shows that under proportional 
rationing the observed prices are considerably lower than their Nash predictions. Deviations 
from equilibrium predictions are larger in triopoly than in duopoly. In the treatments with 
efficient rationing, however, mean prices come rather close to the equilibrium levels. 
Considering only the last ten periods, the largest relative difference between the observed and 
the predicted mean price in an efficient rationing treatment corresponds to a 3.2 percent 
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deviation from the equilibrium price. That is, while the variation of the rationing scheme 
entails a sizable effect on prices, the predicted effect is even larger. In the upper two panels of 
Figure 9 this result is reflected by the larger distance between the orange and the blue 
triangles than between the orange and the blue circles. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Comparison of Nash predictions to empirical data. 
Figure 9: Comparison of Nash predictions (triangles) for mean individual prices and profits to 
empirical data (circles) from periods 15 to 24. Orange (blue) color corresponds to 
proportional (efficient) rationing. Filled (void) circles denote the empirical means in fixed 
(random) matching treatments. 
   A quite similar picture emerges when individual profits in Panel B of Table 7 and in the 
lower two panels of Figure 9 are considered. Mean profits under efficient rationing are close 
to equilibrium predictions, diverging from the mean equilibrium profit by no more than two 
percent in the last ten periods. However, this holds true also in the duopoly treatments with 
proportional rationing. Profits are clearly lower than predicted by the Nash equilibrium only 
in the triopoly with proportional rationing. 
380 390 400 410 420 430 440 450 460 470 480 490
mean price
Predicted and Empirical Mean Prices: Duopolies
280 290 300 310 320 330 340 350 360 370 380 390 400 410 420
mean price
Predicted and Empirical Mean Prices: Triopolies
67000 68000 69000 70000 71000 72000 73000
mean profit
Predicted and Empirical Mean Profits: Duopolies
36000 37000 38000 39000 40000 41000 42000 43000 44000 45000
mean profit
Predicted and Empirical Mean Profits: Triopolies
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   Since the Nash equilibrium prices and profits are not normally distributed, we resort to 
medians rather than means for significance tests and perform Wilcoxon signed rank tests.
26
 
The test results are indicated in the columns captioned "comparison to Nash prediction" in 
Table 7. Whereas the test results are somewhat ambiguous when data from all periods are 
pooled, confinement to the last ten periods brings about more clarity. In six (five) out of eight 
treatments, the median price (profit) is significantly lower than the Nash prediction.
27
 In the 
remaining instances, equality to the Nash prediction cannot be rejected at the ten percent 
significance level. This is the case for both price and profit in the two treatments with 
efficient rationing and fixed matching. The median price or profit is never significantly higher 
than the Nash prediction. According to these findings, we summarize: 
Result 5: The average empirical price and profit levels are mostly lower than the 
respective static Nash equilibrium predictions. The difference to Nash predictions is 
much more pronounced in treatments with proportional demand rationing. In the two 
treatments with efficient demand rationing and fixed subject matching, average prices 
and profits are close to their Nash predictions. 
   Consequently, behavior in our setting is quite competitive as measured not only by the 
average value of the collusiveness index on the market level. Individual pricing is also largely 
more competitive than predicted by the static mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. The last result 
contrasts with evidence from related experiments. Kruse (1993) in the study most closely 
related to ours observes profits that are not significantly different from the Nash predictions. 
Kruse et al. (1994), Fonseca and Normann (2013), and Jacobs and Requate (2016) find that 
prices and profits are rather higher than the Nash prediction in price competition with fixed 
exogenous capacities. 
                                                 
26
 If we ignore the distributional assumption and perform Gauß's `-tests (using the standard errors predicted for 
the Nash equilibrium and data from the last ten periods), we receive the following results: Empirical mean prices 
are significantly lower than the Nash prediction at the one percent level in six treatments. In one treatment 
(" = 3, efficient, fixed") the price is significantly higher at the one percent level, and in one treatment (" = 2, 
efficient, fixed") there is no significant difference at the ten percent level. Mean profits are significantly lower 
than the Nash prediction at the one percent level in one treatment (" = 3, proportional, fixed") and at the five 
percent level in two more (" = 2, efficient, random" and " = 3, proportional, random"). There is no 
significant difference at the ten percent level in the remaining five treatments. 
27
 In treatment " = 3, efficient, random" the Wilcoxon signed rank test for the last ten periods indicates a 
significant difference although the predicted and the empirical median profit are equal. That occurs since the 
empirical distribution is so asymmetric that a significant difference in the rank sums between the lower and the 
upper half of the observations ensues. The assumption of a symmetric distribution contained in the Wilcoxon 
signed rank test may be considered impermissible since the Nash equilibrium profit distributions are not 
symmetric. Acknowledging this problem, we nevertheless prefer the Wilcoxon signed rank test to the sign test 
because of the much greater statistical power of the former. Using instead the sign test leads to weaker, but 
qualitatively similar results: The empirical median profit (using data from the last ten periods) is significantly 
lower than the Nash prediction at the one percent level in three treatments (" = 2, proportional, random", 
" = 3, proportional, random", and " = 3, proportional fixed"); in the remaining five treatments there is no 
significant difference at the ten percent level. For the price data the Wilcoxon signed rank test is unproblematic 
anyway since the predicted Nash equilibrium price distributions are close to perfect symmetry. 
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   As to the treatments with fixed matching, another theory prediction is given by the subgame 
perfect stationary outcome pure-strategy Nash equilibria for the infinitely repeated game as 
described by Requate (1994). Those are the basis for our next hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6: Individual pricing patterns in the fixed matching treatments follow a 
stationary outcome pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. 
In those equilibria, a uniform price is set by all firms in the market in all periods as long as no 
firm deviates. Also full collusion is sustainable at reasonable discount factors. However, as is 
already obvious from the empirical price distributions in Figure 8, subjects do, if at all, only 
seldom manage to cooperate at or near the fully collusive level. Nevertheless, since a large 
range of prices is sustainable in equilibrium, one may expect lasting cooperation also at lower 
price levels. Such cooperation, however, is, on the one hand, difficult to achieve because 
firms have to coordinate on a price without explicit communication. On the other hand, it is 
fragile since a single deviation triggers punishment forever after in equilibrium. 
Acknowledging these difficulties, we look in our data for uniform stationary pricing and 
count as successful equilibrium cooperation all cases in which all firms in a market choose a 
uniform price for two successive periods, the shortest time interval for which stationarity can 
be tested. We find that there is only one single instance of successful cooperation according to 
our definition. In a duopoly with proportional rationing, the two players manage to coordinate 
on the Cournot price of 500 in periods 19 and 20 after one player set this price, presumably as 
a signal, in periods 17 and 18. In period 21, one player deviates to a price of 490 and a phase 
of underbidding starts. If the assumption of a uniform price is relaxed and asymmetric, but 
individually stationary pricing is allowed for, there are all in all five instances of cooperation 
in the data, all in duopoly markets. The conclusion thus is clear-cut: 
Result 6: There is no evidence of behavior in the fixed matching treatments that 
accords with the stationary outcome subgame perfect pure-strategy Nash equilibria of 
the infinitely repeated game. 
7.2.2 Stable pricing 
Despite the missing evidence for behavior according to the pure-strategy Nash equilibria, one 
may still presume to find evidence of the different Nash equilibrium predictions under 
random and fixed matching on the individual level. Whereas in the one-shot game there is 
only a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which firms have to randomize over prices, the infinitely 
repeated game also possesses Nash equilibria in pure strategies. Although we have found that 
players do not achieve to maintain the simple stationary pure-strategy equilibria, attempts to 
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reach them may be reflected by sequences of individual stable pricing as signals to collude. 
Under random matching, in contrast, it does not make much sense for players to signal to 
others with whom they will play again in the next period only with minor probability. We 
therefore hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 7: Stable individual pricing is more frequent in fixed matching treatments. 
 = 2  = 3 
efficient proportional efficient proportional pooled 
random 0.237 0.252 0.229 0.163 0.217 
(109/460) (116/460) (158/690) (101/621) (484/2231) 
fixed 0.069 0.133 0.159 0.091 0.115 
(35/506) (61/460) (110/690) (63/690) (269/2346) 
Relative frequencies of stable individual prices over two consecutive periods. 
Table 8: Stable individual pricing: Frequencies. 
Dependent Variable stableprice 
c -0.639*** 
(0.083) 
1/period -0.676** 
(0.295)  = 3 -0.037 
(0.071) 
proportional -0.092 
(0.070) 
fixed -0.418*** 
(0.068) 
Observations 4577 
McFadden R
2
 0.025 
Probit regression. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
"stableprice" equals 1 if a subject has not changed her price 
compared to the last period and 0 otherwise.  
Table 9: Stable individual pricing: Regression results. 
   We start to investigate the hypothesis by counting the instances of stable individual pricing 
in each treatment. An instance of individual price stability occurs whenever a subject does not 
change her price compared to the last period.
28
 Table 8 presents the relative frequencies of 
stable pricing. Contrary to our conjecture, the shares are lower in the fixed matching 
                                                 
28
 All results in this paragraph remain qualitatively unchanged if we demand price stability for three consecutive 
periods instead. 
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treatments. Overall, subjects choose the same price as in the last period in 21.7 percent of all 
cases under random matching, but only in 11.5 percent of all instances in the fixed matching 
condition. The hypothesis that the share of stable prices is independent of the matching 
condition is rejected for each pairwise treatment comparison and also for the pooled data (all ]s < 0.01, chi-square tests). Additionally, we set up a probit regression with a stable pricing 
dummy as dependent variable. The regression results in Table 9 again show that stable pricing 
is significantly less probable under fixed matching. As indicated by the significant negative 
coefficient of "1/period", stable pricing is more probable in later periods.
29
 
   We thus have a clear negative result: 
Result 7: Stable individual pricing is less frequent in fixed matching treatments. 
What causes this unexpected effect of matching on price stability? Whereas we cannot 
provide a definite answer, looking at the treatment-specific distributions of stable prices in 
Figure 10 leads us to a plausible presumption. We expected that instances of stable pricing 
would mostly arise as attempts to set up collusion. However, there are only few cases of 
stable pricing in the data that can be regarded as collusive. Instead, we observe clearly right-
skewed distributions due to large frequencies of relatively low stable prices. This effect is 
absent only in the duopoly treatments with fixed matching; in triopoly, the effect is present in 
all four treatments, but stronger under random matching. Those patterns of constantly setting 
relatively low prices may be considered to follow the intention to play safe, i.e. to ensure 
oneself a certain minimum payoff, no matter what the other players will do. A similar 
phenomenon is observed by Abbink and Brandts (2008) where subjects often chose the lowest 
possible price assuring a non-negative payoff. An extreme case of such risk averse behavior 
would be to choose one's price according to the maximin criterion. In our setting, the maximin 
prices are 375 or 376 in duopoly and 267 in triopoly.
30
 Those values match the modes of the 
distributions in Figure 10 fairly well. Hence, stable pricing does not signify an environment 
conducive to collusion where players try to cooperate. Contrariwise, it indicates a complex 
environment in which others' choices appear so unpredictable that many players resort to 
playing a low-risk near maximin strategy. Consequently, stable pricing occurs more often 
under random matching where players are more uncertain which prices they will be 
confronted with next period when they are matched with new competitors. Following this 
 
                                                 
29
 Interestingly, when we add demographic variables, we find further significant effects, according to which 
younger and male subjects are more prone to stable pricing. 
30
 Due to the discretization of the price space, the maximin price can vary with the rationing scheme, although 
the effect of rationing is tiny. In our setting, 375 (376) is the maximin price in duopoly with efficient 
(proportional) rationing. In the triopoly, the maximin price is 267 under either rationing rule. 
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Figure 10: Distribution of stable prices. 
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interpretation, for some players the increase in the number of firms in the market from two to 
three complicates the pricing game that much and makes its outcome so unpredictable that 
they play a maximin strategy even under fixed matching. 
7.2.3 Myopic best response and imitation 
Since pricing does not accord with the Nash equilibrium predictions, we investigate two off-
equilibrium behavioral strategies as alternative hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 8a: Individual price choices are based on a myopic best response rationale 
as purported by Edgeworth's price cycling theory. 
The figures in Appendix B showing price evolutions in single markets indicate price cycles in 
some markets. Furthermore, Kruse et al. (1994) and Fonseca and Normann (2013) have found 
supportive evidence for myopic best response behavior à la Edgeworth in related experiments. 
The second alternative hypothesis is imitation: 
Hypothesis 8b: Individual price choices are based on imitation of other firms' past 
prices. 
The imitation hypothesis is supported by evidence from the experiment by Abbink and 
Brandts (2008) who observe price imitation as a driving force in price competition with 
increasing marginal costs and compulsory trading. Moreover, Heymann et al. (2014) find that 
pricing in a Bertrand-Edgeworth experiment with fixed exogenous capacities can be explained 
by simple heuristics. From that point of view, myopic best response behavior may already be 
too advanced a strategy. 
   We start with a replication of the regression equation in Kruse et al. (1994). The dependent 
variable is ,a − ,ab, the change of subject 's individual price choice in period c compared 
to the last period c − 1. PQ,ab is 's best response price to the price vector she was 
confronted with in the last period; it thus equals Edgeworth's theory prediction for 's current 
price. Independent variables are the Edgeworth prediction for 's current price minus 's actual 
price in the last period, PQ,ab − ,ab, and its lag, PQ,ab − ,ab. The independent 
variables measure the shares of immediate and lagged adjustment to Edgeworth's myopic best 
response price. A strict interpretation of Edgeworth's theory, i.e. immediate and perfect 
adjustment to the best response price, translates into the prediction that the coefficient of PQ,ab − ,ab takes a value of one. However, what we expect from the results of related 
studies and what we indeed observe is only partial adjustment. The results of the regression, 
presented in column (1) of Table 10, are in line with those by Kruse et al. (1994) and Fonseca 
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and Normann (2013). We find a highly significant positive immediate adjustment effect; the 
coefficient indicates that an individual on average adjusts her price towards the Edgeworth 
price prediction by circa 22 percent. Running the regression for single treatments yields 
highly significant positive adjustment effects, as well (results not reported). 
Dependent Variable de,f − de,fbg 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sample Restriction None None None  = 2  = 3 
c -4.728*** -1.932** -1.902** -0.817 3.272** 
(1.003) (0.937) (0.952) (1.551) (1.381) PQ,ab − ,ab 0.219*** 0.001 0.697*** 0.451*** 0.046*** 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.167) (0.154) (0.012) PQ,ab − ,ab -0.012 0.002 0.001 -0.112 0.013 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.154) (0.011) b,ab − ,ab 0.468*** -0.238 0.019 
(0.017) (0.162) (0.148) ba,ab − ,ab -0.037** -0.040** 0.100 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.149) -PQ,ab − ,ab	.* = 3 -0.365** 
(0.146) -PQ,ab − ,ab	.*proportional -0.354*** 
(0.095) -PQ,ab − ,ab	.*fixed 0.014 
(0.025) -b,ab − ,ab.*	 = 3 0.452*** 
(0.143) -b,ab − ,ab.*proportional 0.315*** 
(0.094) -b,ab − ,ab.*fixed 0.012 
(0.037) b,abh − ,ab 0.530*** 
(0.024) b,abh − ,ab -0.107*** 
(0.023) b,abi − ,ab 0.054*** 
(0.020) b,abi − ,ab -0.011 
(0.019) 
Observations 4,378 4,378 4,378 1,804 2,574 
Adjusted R
2
 0.127 0.253 0.259 0.230 0.320 
Ordinary least squares regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1, 5, and 10 percent level. See accompanying text for variable definitions. 
Table 10: Edgeworth price adjustment and imitation: Regression results. 
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   However, the aim of regression (1) is just to check whether we can reproduce the results by 
Kruse et al. (1994) and by Fonseca and Normann (2013) in our setting. The regression is not 
suited to test Hypothesis 8a against Hypothesis 8b since imitation is not contained as an 
alternative explaining factor in the model. The Edgeworth adjustment effect we have found 
and that has been found in the earlier studies may obscure the simpler behavioral pattern of 
imitation. Since for a large set of price vectors the best response is to underbid the price of 
another firm by one unit, there is considerable collinearity between imitative and myopic best 
response behavior. What is essentially imitation may thus have strengthened the Edgeworth 
adjustment effect in regression (1). 
   In specification (2) we consider both myopic best response and imitation, adding to model 
(1) variables that measure the adjustment towards the other prices b observed by  in the last 
period. The additional independent variables in regression (2) are b,ab − ,ab and its lag, b,ab − ,ab. In duopoly, b,ab is simply the price of the other firm  was matched with 
in period c − 1; in triopoly, we define b,ab as the arithmetic mean of the two other prices. 
The results of regression (2) in Table 10 suggest that price changes are due to imitation rather 
than myopic best response behavior. Inclusion of the additional variables considerably 
increases the fit of the regression; the share of explained variance of the dependent variable 
roughly doubles. The coefficients measuring the immediate and lagged Edgeworth adjustment 
are clearly insignificant and virtually equal to zero. In contrast, the immediate imitation effect 
of circa 47 percent is highly significant. The significant negative coefficient of the lagged 
term indicates that the imitative adjustment towards other prices slows down if those other 
prices stay constant. At this stage we conclude: 
Preliminary Result 8: Individual price choices are based on imitation of other firms' 
past prices and not on a myopic best response rationale. 
   Yet, things may be more complicated than that one of our two hypotheses is completely 
right and the other is completely wrong. One may suppose that the extent to which imitation 
or myopic best responses explain pricing varies across treatments. Specifically, we conjecture 
that imitation has more explaining power in triopoly where more sophisticated strategies such 
as finding the best response to past price vectors are more intricate. This conjecture is 
corroborated by our above finding that the simple pattern of stable maximin pricing occurs 
more frequently in triopoly and by the result by Fonseca and Normann (2013) that Edgeworth 
pricing cycles are more prominent in duopoly than in triopoly. Moreover, myopic best 
response behavior appears reasonable only within fixed groups of competitors. It does not 
make sense to adapt to the specific price choice of someone with whom the subject will not 
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interact again in the next period. In contrast, prices of other firms can provide subjects with an 
orientation of which price range is reasonable independent of the effective matching scheme. 
Consequently, we set up a third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 8c: The extent to which pricing is based on myopic best response or 
imitative behavior varies with the treatment conditions. Imitation has more explaining 
power in triopoly than in duopoly and with random than with fixed subject matching. 
   Estimations of specification (2) for single treatments are interfered, in one case even 
precluded, by collinearity. However, the (unreported) results broadly suggest that imitation is 
indeed more prominent in triopoly. In contrast, we cannot detect a clear effect of matching. 
As a more viable alternative, we augment specification (2) with interaction terms. We include 
interactions of both the immediate Edgeworth adjustment variable PQ,ab − ,ab and the 
immediate imitation variable b,ab − ,ab with the three treatment space dummies " =3", "proportional", and "fixed". With respect to the number of firms in the market, our 
conjecture is confirmed by the regression results presented in column (3) of Table 10. In the 
baseline treatment " = 2, efficient, random" (where all treatment space dummies are zero), 
myopic best response behavior and not imitation explains pricing. While the results imply a 
highly significant immediate Edgeworth adjustment of circa 70 percent for this treatment, the 
immediate imitation effect is insignificant. In treatments with triopolies and/or proportional 
rationing, the immediate Edgeworth adjustment effect is significantly and substantially 
diminished whereas the immediate imitation effect gains importance. This is indicated by 
significant negative (positive) coefficients of the interaction terms with myopic best response 
pricing (imitation). Compared to the baseline, triopoly decreases the coefficient of the 
Edgeworth adjustment effect by 36 percentage points and increases the coefficient of the 
imitation effect by 45 percentage points. The effect of proportional rationing, while somewhat 
smaller, is also substantial: The Edgeworth adjustment coefficient is decreased by 35 
percentage points and the imitation coefficient is increased by 32 percentage points. Though 
we acknowledge that proportional rationing complicates the underlying oligopoly model and 
thus the identification of the best response to a given price vector, we find the magnitude of 
the effect entailed by the rationing scheme quite surprising. The matching condition, on the 
contrary, surprisingly, does not entail a significant effect.
31
 
                                                 
31
 Additionally, we run a regression of model (3) with further interaction terms pertaining to gender, age, and 
field of study. The only significant effect (at the five percent level) we find is that subjects who do not study 
economics or a related field adjust their price to the best response price by seven percentage points less. That 
appears plausible if one assumes that best response pricing is a rather advanced behavioral pattern that requires 
some grasp of economics. 
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   Having found that the number of firms entails the largest effect on which behavioral pattern 
best explains pricing, we divide the sample according to that dimension and investigate the 
Edgeworth adjustment and imitation effects separately for duopoly and triopoly markets.
32
 
Regression (4) in Table 10 is a replication of regression (2) on the restricted sample 
considering only duopoly treatments. The results show a highly significant Edgeworth 
adjustment effect and no significant imitation effect.
33
 Regression (5) in Table 10 estimates 
the effects for the triopoly. Since only triopoly markets are included, we do not collect the two 
other prices an individual has observed in one term, but consider both of them with own 
variables in the regression. b,abh  denotes the lower of the two prices  has observed in 
period c − 1. Analogously, b,abi  denotes the higher of the two prices. Thus, b,abh − ,ab 
and b,abi − ,ab measure the adjustment towards the lower and, respectively, the higher 
other price observed in the last period. Again, we also include the first lags of these terms to 
allow for delayed adjustment. The regression results reveal that both an Edgeworth 
adjustment effect and imitation of the lower and higher other prices are present in the data. 
All three effects are highly statistically significant. Yet, imitation of the lower price entails by 
far the largest effect. The average individual in the triopoly adjusts her price by 53 percent to 
the lower of the two other prices observed in the last period; the higher price and the best 
response price, in contrast, each account only for an adjustment of about five percent. 
Result 8: The extent to which pricing is based on myopic best response or imitative 
behavior varies with the number of firms in the market. Myopic best response 
(imitation) is the main explaining factor in duopolies (triopolies). The matching 
condition does not influence the rationale of individual price choices. 
   Thus, we have found partial support for both Edgeworth's hypothesis of myopic best 
response pricing and the hypothesis of simple imitation. In the duopoly individual pricing is 
well explained by Edgeworth's theory. In the triopoly, in contrast, imitation of past other 
                                                 
32
 To recheck our hypothesis that pricing patterns are also influenced by the matching condition, we additionally 
run regression (2) separately for markets with fixed and random matching. The results of the two regressions on 
a partitioned sample are largely similar to those of the regression on the full sample. Under fixed as well as under 
random matching, the immediate imitation effect is highly significant and of magnitude 0.45 to 0.5 while the 
immediate Edgeworth adjustment effect is insignificant and close to zero. Consequently, we again find no 
evidence that the matching condition has a substantial influence on the rationale of individual price choices. 
33
 While we are still able to receive clear results in regressions (3) and (4), the tremendous increase in the 
standard errors of the coefficients compared to regression (2) points to the issue of collinearity mentioned above. 
The variance inflation factors of the coefficients attain values of up to 72 in regression (4) and even up to 444 in 
regression (3). As collinearity can cause overfitting and make coefficient estimates highly dependent on 
particular samples, we test the validity of our results by a jackknife resampling approach. We run regressions (3) 
and (4) with varying subsamples of our data, leaving out observations from one particular period at a time. The 
coefficient estimates from those regressions with subsamples come close to the estimates with the full sample, 
which gives us confidence that the coefficient estimates reported for regressions (3) and (4) are not artifacts 
caused by overfitting to observations of a particular sample. 
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prices possesses more explaining power. While playing the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium 
is too complicated anyway, subjects can achieve higher profits than under full competition by 
choosing myopic best response prices. However, subjects seem to resort to the simpler 
behavioral pattern of imitation when finding the best response price becomes more intricate. 
This interpretation partly coincides and partly contrasts with Fonseca's and Normann's (2013, 
p. 220) conjecture. We may agree with them that myopic best responses à la Edgeworth are 
more common in markets with fewer firms because this kind of behavior constitutes a form of 
imperfect tacit collusion. Yet, Fonseca and Normann furthermore argue that, as in markets 
with more firms and thus higher production capacity it is less attractive to be the high-price 
firm since this results in a relatively larger loss of potential profits, it may pay off for firms to 
behave unpredictably. We do not agree that behavior in markets with more firms follows such 
a rationale. After all, we observe that in triopoly subjects substitute myopic best responses for 
another behavioral pattern which is hardly unpredictable, namely simple imitation of others' 
prices. 
8 Conclusion 
This study investigates by means of a laboratory experiment firm conduct in a Bertrand-
Edgeworth framework with increasing marginal costs and voluntary trading. While the 
Bertrand-Edgeworth setting is more realistic than the standard Cournot or Bertrand model, 
there have so far been relatively few experiments based on the Bertrand-Edgeworth model. 
Moreover, virtually all those earlier experiments either research the case with fixed capacity 
constraints instead of strictly convex costs or, if they do consider strictly convex costs, 
abandon the voluntary trading constraint, which restricts the applicability of those studies to a 
small minority of markets. Our study thus closes a relevant gap in the experimental 
economics literature. 
   The game-theoretic predictions of our underlying model are sophisticated. For the one-shot 
game there is only a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium whose features are influenced 
tremendously by the rather inconspicuous change of the demand rationing rule. In the 
infinitely repeated game there is a large multiplicity of equilibria, but the stationary outcome 
pure-strategy equilibria that follow a simple stick-and-carrot approach and allow for full 
collusion to be sustained may appear focal. Further off-equilibrium predictions are 
Edgeworth's supposition that firms optimize myopically, taking into account the past choices 
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of their competitors, thus giving rise to price cycles, and the hypothesis that subjects simply 
imitate others' prices they have observed in the past. 
   Our experiment examines the effect of three treatment variables: number of firms in a 
market, demand rationing, and subject matching. We find that subjects behave considerably 
and significantly more collusively in duopoly than in triopoly and with proportional than with 
efficient demand rationing. Whether subjects are re-matched in every period or play in fixed 
groups repeatedly entails only a small effect. Whereas the former two effects reflect Nash 
equilibrium predictions qualitatively, the quantitative prognoses mostly do poorly. Conduct is 
largely more competitive than predicted by the static Nash equilibrium and also than might be 
expected from the results of related experimental studies. We observe some risk averse near 
maximin pricing, especially under random matching. The stationary outcome pure-strategy 
Nash equilibria of the infinitely repeated game we investigate do not possess any explaining 
power. In contrast, Edgeworth's price cycle theory rationalizes our data partially. Examining 
also imitation of other firms' past prices as an alternative behavioral pattern, we find that 
imitation is the main driving force in triopolies while in duopolies myopic best response 
pricing à la Edgeworth best explains behavior. We hypothesize that the complexity of the 
decision situation is crucial to what behavioral strategy subjects employ. Whereas play 
according to the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is computationally infeasible anyway, 
subjects can realize profits above the competitive level by mutually choosing their respective 
myopic best response price. When finding the myopic best response price becomes more 
intricate, subjects resort to imitation as a simpler strategy. 
   Further experiments of Bertrand-Edgeworth markets with increasing marginal costs and 
voluntary trading appear desirable for a validation of our results and a closer scrutiny of some 
phenomena we have found. As the conduct in our setting is quite competitive, it seems 
worthwhile to investigate whether changes in the setting such as the admission of overt 
communication or a variation in the amount of information provided to the subjects about the 
market or competitors' behavior and success will permit subjects to attain more collusion also 
in Bertrand-Edgeworth markets with increasing marginal costs. 
Appendix A 
English translation of the written instructions in treatment " = 2, efficient, fixed". 
 
Welcome to the Laboratory for Economic Experiments at Kiel University. 
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You are about to participate in an economic experiment where you will have to make some decisions. You can 
also earn some money. The amount of money will depend on both your own decisions and the decisions of the 
other participants in the experiment. 
 
Please read these instructions carefully. If after reading there are any questions, please raise your hand. An 
experimenter will approach you and answer your questions in private. Please do not communicate with other 
participants during the experiment. 
 
All participants receive the same instructions. 
 
In this experiment you represent a firm that produces and sells a single good. On a market you compete with 
one other firm being represented by one of the other participants. Both firms produce and sell the same good. 
 
The experiment consists of multiple periods. There will be at least 20 periods. The exact number of periods will 
be determined by a random process. The experiment will end after the 20th period with probability 1/6. With 
probability 5/6, there will be another period. Provided that the 21st period will take place, after the 21st period 
there will be an identical random decision on whether the experiment will continue for another period. The same 
holds true after all following periods, if applicable. The random decisions made after each period will be 
independent of one another. 
 
At the beginning of the experiment, the participants will be randomly matched into groups of two. The other 
member of your group will be your competitor. The grouping will be fixed throughout the experiment. 
 
In each period you and the other firm must simultaneously and independently decide on the price at which to 
offer the good on the market. All integers from 0 up to 1000 are admissible prices. 
 
Throughout the experiment, all money amounts will be accounted in Experimental Currency Units (ECU). 
Your total profit will be paid off to you after the experiment at an exchange rate of 120,000 ECU/Euro, i.e. for 
each 120,000 ECU earned in the experiment you will receive 1 Euro. 
 
The demand side of the market will be simulated by the computer and will be identical in all periods. There are 
many different potential customers with different willingnesses to pay for the good. A sale will come about if the 
offer price is no higher than a customer's maximum willingness to pay. At a price of 0 ECU there will be a total 
demand for 1000 units on the market. With a price increase by 1 ECU, demand is reduced by 1 unit. At a price of 
1000 ECU no one will be ready to buy the good. Here is a graphical representation of this relationship: 
 
Customers will first try to purchase the good from the firm offering at a lower price. Those customers with the 
highest willingness to pay will be served first. In case one firm does not meet its whole demand, the remaining 
demand will be left for the other firm that offers the good at a higher price. If both firms choose the same price, 
demand will be divided equally among them. 
 
Firms incur production costs that rise progressively in the quantity produced. The production costs are 1 ECU for 
the first unit produced, 2 ECU for the second unit, 3 ECU for the third unit, and so on. Your total production cost 
is the sum of the costs for the respective units. In the diagram below, total costs equal the grey area up to the 
respective quantity. Due to the progressive cost schedule, it can be unprofitable for a firm to satisfy its whole 
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demand at a low price. You only want to produce and sell an additional unit of the good as long as the revenue 
from its sale exceeds its production cost. Therefore, for any offer price chosen by you, there exists an upper 
production limit above which further units become unprofitable to produce. 
 
Example: Assume you choose an offer price of 5 ECU, i.e. every unit sold yields a revenue of 5 ECU. In this 
case it will be unprofitable for you to produce more than 5 units. The production of a 6th unit would incur costs 
of 6 ECU, while its sale would yield only 5 ECU. Your profit (revenues minus cost) would decrease. 
 
 
 
The arrangements in the experiment are such that quantities are computed automatically; you only have to decide 
on your offer price. The algorithm calculating the quantities ensures that you will produce only up to your 
implicit production limit explained above. Furthermore, it is ensured that each firm in each period only produces 
as many units as it can sell at the effective prices. 
 
Your profit (in ECU) per period equals the offer price chosen by you multiplied by your sales quantity minus 
the production cost for this quantity. Your profit thus depends on the offer prices chosen in that period by you 
and by the other firm. 
 
To get a general idea of your quantities and profits resulting from different price combinations, you may use the 
"profit calculator". Simply enter two hypothetical prices (one for each firm) and click on "Calculate". Then 
your resulting quantity and profit will be displayed. You may use the profit calculator throughout the whole 
experiment. 
 
Moreover, after each period a screen with a "history" will inform you about the outcomes so far. For all past 
periods the "history" shows the prices chosen by the two firms, your resulting quantity, your resulting profit per 
period, and your total profit over all previous periods so far.  
 
The following two screenshots illustrate the use of the profit calculator and the history: 
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 Here you can enter two hypothetical prices   Here you can enter and submit your price 
 and have the results calculated.    choice for the current period. 
 
 
 
The results of the profit calculator are displayed here. 
 
Your total profit so far is displayed here.   The results of the last period are displayed here. 
 
 
 
 This is the history showing the outcomes of all past periods. Zeros are displayed for trial periods. 
 
To practice there will be three trial periods before the actual periods start. The procedures in the trial periods 
are the same as in the actual periods described above, but the outcomes of the trial periods will not add to your 
total profit or payoff. After the trial periods, the participants will be randomly re-matched into new groups. The 
new groups will stay fixed throughout all actual periods of the experiment. The profit calculator will be available 
to you during both trial and actual periods. The history, however, will not be displayed after trial periods and will 
only contain the data of the actual periods. 
 
Your total profit is the sum of your profits in the single periods of the experiment (not including the trial 
periods). 
 
Your total profit will be paid to you after the experiment at the above-mentioned exchange rate. None of the 
other participants will come to know your profit, and neither will you come to know the profit of any other 
participant. Furthermore, no participant will come to know with whom he or she interacted during the 
experiment. 
 
If you click on the "Continue" button on your screen, some statements will appear to check whether all 
participants have understood the instructions. Please decide whether those statements are right or wrong. As soon 
as all participants will have evaluated the statements correctly, the first trial period will start. 
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If there are any questions concerning the experimental procedures, please raise your hand. Enjoy the experiment! 
Appendix B 
Evolution of the market price in single markets with fixed matching. 
 
Figure B1: Mean market prices in single markets in treatment " = 2, efficient, fixed". 
Bertrand-Edgeworth Markets with Increasing Marginal Costs and Voluntary Trading 
58 
 
 
Figure B2: Mean market prices in single markets in treatment " = 2, proportional, fixed". 
Bertrand-Edgeworth Markets with Increasing Marginal Costs and Voluntary Trading 
59 
 
 
Figure B3: Mean market prices in single markets in treatment " = 3, efficient, fixed". 
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Figure B4: Mean market prices in single markets in treatment " = 3, proportional, fixed". 
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III Number of Firms, Rationing, Matching, and 
Knowledge: A Comprehensive Study of 
Variations in Experimental Kreps-Scheinkman 
Markets
*
 
Abstract. This study provides a comprehensive picture of experimental Kreps-Scheinkman 
markets with capacity choice at the first stage and subsequent price competition at the second. 
We conduct seven different treatments of Kreps-Scheinkman markets, varying the number of 
firms, the demand rationing scheme, the subject matching, and subjects' knowledge about the 
market. We find that only the number of firms entails a persistent effect on capacity choices. 
Price choices are affected by both the number of firms and the rationing scheme. Subjects in 
the high-knowledge condition behave in the same manner from the first periods as subjects 
with low knowledge do in later periods after having gained experience. In all treatments 
conduct is generally more competitive than the Cournot outcome, irrespective of whether the 
Cournot outcome is the Nash equilibrium or not. Nevertheless, the Cournot model entails 
some predictive power. Exact Cournot choices are more likely to occur for both capacities and 
prices under efficient demand rationing, where the Cournot outcome is the equilibrium, than 
under proportional rationing. 
JEL classification: C90, D43, L11, L13. 
Key words: Kreps-Scheinkman, Cournot, price competition, capacity choice, demand 
rationing, oligopoly, laboratory experiment.  
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1 Introduction 
The model of sequential capacity and price choice by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) 
(hereafter KS) provides a more realistic description of oligopolies than the classical models 
by Cournot (1838) and Bertrand (1883) with only one choice variable. The most remarkable 
feature of the KS model is that its outcome is, under suitable assumptions about demand 
rationing, equivalent to the Cournot outcome. This implies that prices decline as more firms 
operate in the market. 
   While the KS model has been put to experimental tests against other market institutions, and 
more recently also variations within the KS model have come into the focus of experimental 
research, the evidence about the latter is still scattered and limited. The aim of this study is to 
provide a comprehensive analysis on how different experimental conditions affect the results 
within KS markets. For this purpose, we set up seven treatments mimicking the KS market 
environment while controlling for (i) the number of firms in a market (duopoly vs. triopoly), 
(ii) demand rationing (efficient vs. proportional), (iii) subject matching (random vs. fixed), 
and (iv) subjects' understanding about the KS market mechanism, referred to as "knowledge" 
(low vs. high). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to experimentally 
investigate the effect of the latter two variables in KS markets. While the impacts of both 
number of firms and demand rationing have been investigated in one study already, our 
results present a comprehensive picture of what drives outcomes in experimental KS markets. 
   As to capacity choices, we find, contrary to existing literature, that the number of firms in 
the market significantly affects behavior. Notably, larger capacities are chosen in triopoly 
than in duopoly. Demand rationing, in line with earlier findings, does not significantly 
influence capacity choice. The matching procedure does not have an impact either. Subjects 
with good understanding of the KS mechanism ("high-knowledge" treatment) choose lower 
capacities in the early periods, but the difference vanishes in later periods when subjects in the 
"low-knowledge" treatments gain experience. While capacities tend to decline as the number 
of periods already played increases, they converge to levels significantly higher than the 
Cournot benchmark in all treatments. Exact Cournot capacity choices are rarely observed, but 
occur significantly more often under efficient demand rationing, where the Cournot outcome 
is the Nash equilibrium prediction, than under proportional rationing. 
   As to the second-stage outcomes, we observe considerably lower prices than in the Cournot 
outcome. Once more, the number of firms entails a significant effect: duopoly yields higher 
prices than triopoly. "High knowledge" again shows an effect only in the early periods, and 
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subject matching never influences pricing in a significant way. Contrary to the first stage, also 
the rationing scheme has a significant effect: prices are higher with proportional than with 
efficient rationing. All effects remain valid if we control for the capacities chosen at the first 
stage. 
   The sensitivity of pricing to installed capacity is low in the initial rounds and increases with 
the number of periods played. That is, subjects have to learn about the effect of their capacity 
choices on the pricing subgame at the second stage. Only in the high-knowledge condition do 
subjects exhibit a large sensitivity from the beginning. 
   If subjects choose capacities sufficiently low such that market-clearing pricing is the pure-
strategy equilibrium at the second stage, markets do not always clear. Again there is a 
significant effect of demand rationing on behavior. The exact market-clearing price is chosen 
more often under efficient rationing. 
   As a result of the choices at the two stages, average profits substantially fall short of the 
Cournot benchmark. It remains a puzzle why subjects continue to install excess capacities 
even after many rounds. Explanatory approaches from the literature do not withstand a closer 
scrutiny of our data. 
   The remainder of this study is structured as follows. In sections 2 and 3 we briefly review 
the theoretical and experimental literature on KS markets. Section 4 explains the design and 
procedures of our experiment. Section 5 provides the equilibrium predictions. We present and 
discuss our results in section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
2 Theory 
The two most prominent oligopoly models by Cournot (1838) and Bertrand (1883) both suffer 
from major shortcomings. While the Cournot model of competition in production quantities 
yields the intuitive result that the market price is the lower the more firms compete in the 
market, the mechanism by which the market price is determined remains apocryphal. Bertrand 
makes the more realistic assumption that firms compete in prices. However, his model implies 
the unrealistic result that the price is equal to marginal cost and firms earn zero profits as soon 
as there is more than one firm in the market. KS suggest a resolution of this dilemma by 
introducing a two-stage duopoly setting. At the first stage, the two producers of a 
homogenous good simultaneously choose their production capacities and incur costs for 
building capacity. At the second stage, simultaneous price competition takes place, where 
each firm can sell only up to its capacity chosen before. Customers first access the firm which 
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offers the good at the lower price. Demand is rationed according to the efficient scheme, i.e. 
those customers with the highest willingness to pay for the good are served first. KS show 
that the unique Nash equilibrium in this setting is equivalent to the Cournot outcome. 
   Davidson and Deneckere (1986) detect that the KS result is sensitive to which rationing rule 
is assumed. They argue that under different rationing rules leaving more residual demand to 
the firm with the higher price generally only a mixed-strategy equilibrium will exist whose 
outcome is more competitive than the Cournot outcome. This matter is elaborated on and 
clarified by Lepore (2009). While the KS result does not necessarily hold under other than the 
efficient rationing rule, it still can hold. Investigating the alternative assumption of 
proportional or random demand rationing, Lepore provides conditions for the Cournot 
outcome to be an equilibrium and to be the unique equilibrium of the two-stage game. 
Loosely speaking, the KS result still holds under proportional rationing if the cost for building 
capacity is sufficiently high relative to customers' willingness to pay.
1,2
 
   Whereas the KS result thus to some extent hinges upon the rationing assumption, other 
ingredients of the original model have been found to be unproblematic. Boccard and Wauthy 
(2000; 2004) generalize the KS result to the oligopoly with more than two firms. Benoît and 
Krishna (1987) deal with a dynamic setting in which firms play the KS game repeatedly. 
When firms have to choose their capacities once and for all at the beginning or can only 
adjust their capacity choice by a small amount in each period, the Cournot outcome is a 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. However, the equilibrium is no longer unique. All further 
subgame perfect equilibria of the game entail excess capacities which are necessary threats to 
sustain collusion. When capacities can be adjusted freely in each period, excess capacities are 
no longer needed and also full collusion with monopoly-level profits can be sustained in 
equilibrium, provided that discounting is not too severe. 
3 Experimental literature 
Early experimental tests of the KS model are mainly concerned with performance compared 
to theoretical benchmarks and to other market institutions. The main result is that subjects in 
KS markets choose higher capacities and lower prices than predicted. When subjects gain 
                                                 
1
 In two further studies Lepore (2008; 2012) is concerned with the conditions for the Cournot outcome to be an 
equilibrium of the KS game under either rationing rule when the competitor's production costs are uncertain or, 
respectively, market demand is uncertain when firms choose capacities. 
2
 That strand of literature follows the assumption made by KS that the market demand function is concave. 
Madden (1998) and Wu et al. (2012) analyze the conditions for the KS result to hold under different 
specifications of demand. 
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experience, their behavior approaches, but mostly does not reach the Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium.
3
 
   Davis (1999) compares treatments of price competition with and without advance 
production in posted offer triopoly markets with efficient demand rationing, finding prices to 
settle somewhere between the competitive (Bertrand) and the Cournot benchmark. Profits 
increase throughout the experiment, but do not converge to the predicted Cournot level. The 
reported data about sold quantities indicate that capacities (not being reported) are chosen 
above equilibrium level. 
   Muren (2000) investigates KS triopolies with efficient rationing and compares her outcomes 
to both theoretical predictions and the experimental results on Cournot and Bertrand by 
Fouraker and Siegel (1963). She observes that inexperienced subjects set capacities 
considerably above the Cournot level. In early periods, capacities even exceed the predicted 
level with full competition. Capacities then fall, but are still closer to the competitive than to 
the Cournot benchmark by the last rounds. Price choices are not reported. As a result of 
massive overproduction, more than half of the inexperienced subjects do not realize overall 
profits throughout the experiment. Experienced subjects’ capacity choices are still somewhat 
above, but come close to the Cournot prediction. 
   Goodwin and Mestelman (2010) compare KS duopolies with efficient rationing to Cournot 
markets and, similarly to Muren, vary subjects' experience. While inexperienced subjects in 
Cournot markets behave close to the theory prediction right from the beginning, in KS 
markets too high capacities and too low prices are set first, but in the last rounds behavior 
converges to the Cournot outcome. Experienced subjects behave similarly, namely somewhat 
more collusive than the Cournot-Nash prediction, in Cournot and KS markets. 
   Some more recent experiments are, like our study, mainly interested in the effects of 
variations within the KS framework. Considering price competition with advance production 
in markets with two and three firms, Brandts and Guillen (2007) find no significant difference 
between market capacities in duopolies and triopolies. However, in duopoly firms choose 
higher prices at the second stage.
4
 
   The experience effect is further scrutinized by Le Coq and Sturluson (2012) who not only 
let inexperienced and experienced subjects play against each other in homogeneous groups, 
but also pair inexperienced with experienced subjects, thus varying both the subject's own and 
                                                 
3
 Another related strand of literature which is not considered here deals with sequential capacity and price choice 
of firms producing heterogeneous goods, see e.g. Anderhub et al. (2003). 
4
 Brandts and Guillen assume box demand which, strictly speaking, does not fit the KS model. 
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her competitor's experience, where subjects' experience levels are common knowledge. 
Moreover, in contrast to all aforementioned studies, subjects do not play in fixed groups, but 
are re-matched in every round of the experiment. Le Coq and Struluson find that capacities 
(prices) decrease (increase) with both the subject's own and her competitor's experience. 
Furthermore, experienced subjects are more responsive in their price choices to capacities 
installed at the first stage. The authors conjecture that the subjects' level of rationality 
increases with experience and that experienced players anticipate and respond to the lesser 
rationality of their inexperienced competitors. 
   Finally, Lepore and Shafran (2013) put differently parameterized versions of the KS model 
with diverging equilibrium predictions to the test. They vary the rule by which demand is 
rationed and the cost of installing capacity and thus conduct four different KS duopoly 
treatments. In their low-cost condition with proportional demand rationing, the Cournot 
outcome is not a Nash equilibrium. Subjects are randomly re-matched in every round in order 
to approximate a one-shot game more closely. Lepore and Shafran observe that Cournot 
capacities are chosen frequently in the high-cost condition while higher capacities are 
common in the low-cost treatments. While the demand rationing rule does not influence 
capacity choice, pricing is affected as in the low-cost treatments subjects set higher prices 
under proportional rationing, controlling for capacity. In the high-cost treatments, Cournot 
capacities are mostly followed by Cournot prices at the second stage. 
4 Experimental design and procedures 
As our experiment aims at drawing a comprehensive picture of the effects of different 
variations within the KS setting, our design contains four treatment variables: number of firms 
in the market, demand rationing, subject matching, and understanding of the KS market 
mechanism, briefly referred to as "knowledge". 
   All in all, we conducted seven treatments with different combinations of variable states. A 
matrix of the conducted treatments is provided in Figure 1 where the seven black numbered 
squares stand for the seven treatment conditions. Treatments which differ with respect to only 
one of the four treatment variables are connected with a line. The core treatment structure is 
made up of the treatment variables "number of firms" (duopoly and triopoly) and "demand 
rationing" (efficient and proportional) which are varied in a 2x2-design (treatments 1-4). In 
these four treatments, subjects interact within fixed groups throughout all rounds. 
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Figure 1: The treatment matrix. 
Additionally, we also conducted two duopoly treatments with random subject matching and 
different rationing rules (treatments 5 and 6). While fixed matching is the prevailing condition 
in related experiments and certainly the most realistic assumption with respect to real 
oligopoly markets, the original KS model pertains to a one-shot game. Treatments with 
random matching resembling a one-shot game are therefore needed to rigorously test the 
predictive power of the KS Cournot outcome and its sensitivity to the employed rationing 
scheme. Due to financial constraints and because the results of a study by Kruse (1993) 
suggest that one-shot Nash equilibria can predict behavior also in fixed matching treatments, 
we abstained from conducting random matching treatments in the triopoly. The remaining 
treatment number 7 has the purpose to investigate the effect of subjects' understanding of the 
KS setting. For the so-called "high-knowledge" condition, subjects were recruited from an 
industrial organization class in the undergraduate economics program. They received special, 
more extensive instructions in order to allow for a distinguished understanding of the 
underlying model.
5
 As the number of subjects suitable for the high-knowledge condition was 
                                                 
5
 The instructions are explained in greater detail below. 
5 6 
1 2 
3 4 
7 
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limited, we conducted only one high-knowledge treatment, namely duopolies with efficient 
rationing and fixed matching. Whereas the experience dimension in earlier studies considered 
the effect of learning-by-doing, our high-knowledge condition enhances theoretical 
understanding ex ante. 
   The linear total demand function in our duopoly and triopoly markets is  = 1000 − . 
At the first stage, firms choose their individual capacities j. Each firm can install 0 to 1000 
integer units of capacity where each such unit costs 100 Experimental currency units (ECU). 
At the second stage, each firm decides about its price , where integer values from 0 to 1000 
ECU are admissible prices. When choosing prices, firms know their competitors' capacity 
choices from the first stage. Computer-simulated buyers first approach the firm that offers the 
good at the lowest price. If that firm cannot satisfy all the demand with its capacity, residual 
demand is left for the other firms. The quantity  firm  is able to sell in any period depends 
on the price vector , the capacity vector k, and the effective rationing scheme, , k
=
"##
$#
#% maxl0,min (1)*1000 −  −+ j,,|01203 4 , j5m for	efficient	rationing
maxl0,min (1000 − ) *1 −+ j,1000 − ,,|01203 4 , j5m for	proportional	rationing
, 
where ) represents the number of firms charging the same price as firm  (including  itself). 
Firm 's profit is given by @, k = , k − 100j.6 
   In total 15 sessions were conducted in the economics experimental lab at Kiel University in 
three waves during January, July, and November 2014. 170 students from all fields of study 
participated as subjects in the low-knowledge treatments.
7
 Due to some no-shows, the number 
of markets per treatment varies between 11 and 14. For the high-knowledge treatment, 32 
other students were recruited from an industrial organization class in the undergraduate 
economics program. All those students were familiar with the standard Cournot and Bertrand 
oligopoly models (but not with the KS model). Each subject participated only once in the 
experiment. 
                                                 
6
 As it is common in the literature on demand rationing, residual demand under proportional rationing is defined 
by the expectation of all possible customer reservation price orderings, and we do not actually model the order of 
such prices as a random variable. Zouhar (2015) notes that this difference as well as the exact tie-breaking rule 
(when several firms set the same price) affects quantities and profits in some cases. While those effects also 
cause differences concerning the Nash equilibrium outcomes, the differences are tiny. 
7
 For part of the sessions, the hroot software package (Bock et al., 2014) was used for recruitment. 
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   Subjects were randomly seated in the lab upon their arrival. They could not infer with 
whom of the other subjects they would interact during the experiment. Subjects were provided 
with printed instructions.
8
 In the low-knowledge treatments the settings were explained 
verbally and graphically, and examples illustrating demand rationing were given. The more 
extensive instructions for the high-knowledge treatment also contained an algebraic 
representation of the underlying model. Furthermore, candidates for the profit-maximizing 
prices were proposed given capacities and the competitor's price. The experiment was 
computerized using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). In all treatments subjects could simulate the 
results of their decisions by using a built-in profit calculator which returned a subject's 
resulting sales quantity and profit when hypothetical capacity and price choices for all firms 
were entered. 
   When subjects finished reading the instructions, the experimenter again highlighted the 
experiment's main features in a short presentation. Before subjects could proceed to the actual 
experiment in the computer program, they had to master a set of tasks. In the low-knowledge 
treatments, some rather simple yes-no questions about the experimental setup and procedures 
had to be answered correctly. In the high-knowledge treatment, subjects were required to 
calculate their sales and profit for three given sets of capacity and price vectors without the 
aid of the profit calculator. Moreover, in three more tasks, now with the profit calculator, they 
had to determine the profit-maximizing price given hypothetical capacities and a hypothetical 
price of the competitor. In one of those three tasks, we asked for the profit-maximizing price 
given (i) Cournot capacities were installed at the first stage and (ii) the market clearing 
Cournot price was set by the competitor at the second stage. The instructions and training in 
the high-knowledge treatment were tailored in a way to give the Nash equilibrium prediction 
its best shot without actually telling the subjects what the Nash equilibrium is and thereby 
implementing recommended play. 
   After the tasks had been finished, three unpaid trial rounds and 18 paid rounds of the KS 
game were played. Since reading the instructions and working through the tasks would take 
considerably more time in the high-knowledge treatment, we reduced the number of paid 
rounds to nine for that treatment. The number of rounds to be played was common 
knowledge. An average session took about 135 minutes in both knowledge conditions. After 
each round, subjects were informed about all choices in their market and about their sales 
quantity and profit resulting from those choices. Subjects were not informed about their 
                                                 
8
 The instructions of the high-knowledge treatment, exemplary instructions of one low-knowledge treatment, and 
the control questions to be answered by the subjects can be found in the appendices. 
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competitors' profits explicitly, but could easily inquire them using the profit calculator if they 
wanted to. 
   Subjects received a show-up fee of 6 Euro plus the sum of their earnings in the paid rounds 
at a predefined exchange rate. Moreover, they had a starting balance to compensate for losses 
in early periods.
9
 Subjects had an unlimited credit during the experiment; if their balance 
became negative, they could nevertheless go on installing capacity and selling. In case a 
subject's balance was negative after the last round, only the show-up fee was paid. Payments 
were made in private. The average payment per subject was 19.7 Euro, including the show-up 
fee. 
5 Equilibrium predictions 
The setting originally investigated by KS is most closely resembled in treatment 5, the 
duopoly with efficient demand rationing and random subject matching. The Nash equilibrium 
prediction for this treatment is the Cournot outcome with individual capacities j = 300 
installed at the first stage (implying a market capacity of  = ∑ j = 600) and a market-
clearing price of  = 400 set at the second stage. The resulting equilibrium profit per firm is @ = 90000. In oder to investigate the effect predicted by Davidson and Deneckere (1986), 
demand rationing is varied in treatment 6. Although Davidson and Deneckere do not provide 
a closed-form equilibrium solution of their modified two-stage game, they show that the KS 
result does no longer hold and that in general there will be a unique mixed-strategy Nash 
equilibrium that, given the low production costs in our setting, is more competitive than the 
Cournot outcome. The last prediction stands in contrast to experimental evidence indicating 
that markets are less competitive with proportional than with efficient demand rationing 
(Kruse, 1993; Lepore and Shafran, 2013; Jacobs and Requate, 2016a; 2016b). 
   The five remaining treatments employ fixed subject matching. They thus deviate from the 
original KS model, but are closer to real oligopoly markets. With that matching, repeated 
game effects may possibly arise. In case of infinite repetition and a sufficiently high discount 
factor, all outcomes that dominate the one-shot Nash equilibrium can be sustained by a 
suitable trigger strategy (Friedman, 1971). Benoît and Krishna (1987) show that in the KS 
framework this can be achieved without excess capacities if capacities can be freely adjusted 
                                                 
9
 The exchange rate was 40,000 ECU per Euro in the triopoly treatments and in the high-knowledge duopoly 
treatment, and 80,000 ECU per Euro in the low-knowledge duopoly treatments. The starting balance was 
240,000 ECU in the triopoly treatments, 200,000 ECU in the high-knowledge duopoly treatment, and 320,000 
ECU in the low-knowledge duopoly treatments. 
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in each round, as is the case in our setting. Nevertheless, we maintain the equilibrium of the 
one-shot game also as a prediction for the fixed matching treatments, i.e. we predict the 
Cournot outcome for treatments 1, 3, and 7, and a more competitive mixed-strategy 
equilibrium outcome for treatments 2 and 4. The altered subject matching is theoretically 
irrelevant since our subjects were informed in advance about the number of rounds to be 
played. The repeated game induced by our experiment can thus be solved via backward 
induction and the equilibrium predictions for the stage game remain valid. Moreover, the 
results by Kruse (1993) indicate that the one-shot Nash equilibrium predicts behavior in price 
competition experiments with fixed matching even if subjects do not know when the game 
will end. The variation of knowledge in treatment 7 does not influence the theory prediction 
either. While subjects in the high-knowledge treatment receive more extensive instructions 
and training, also the instructions given in the low-knowledge treatments allow for full 
information. Boccard and Wauthy (2000; 2004) have extended the KS result beyond duopoly; 
hence our predictions for the triopoly treatments 3 and 4. In triopoly, the Cournot outcome 
corresponds to a market capacity of  = 675 at the first stage and a market price of  = 325 
at the second stage; the equilibrium profit per firm is @ = 50625. Figure 2 summarizes the 
equilibrium predictions. 
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Cournot outcome: j = 300,  = 600,  = 400, @ = 90000. 
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Unique mixed-strategy NE, 
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Treatments 1 and 7: 
Cournot outcome: j = 300,  = 600,  = 400, @ = 90000. 
Treatment 2: 
Unique mixed-strategy NE, 
more competitive than 
Cournot outcome. 
=3
 Treatment 3: 
Cournot outcome: j = 225,  = 675,  = 325, @ = 50625. 
Treatment 4: 
Unique mixed-strategy NE, 
more competitive than 
Cournot outcome. 
Figure 2: Nash equilibrium (NE) predictions for the treatments. 
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6 Results 
After a short remark on the effect of bankruptcies, we will analyze choices at the two stages 
of the game separately. We first consider capacity choices and then proceed to the analysis of 
price choices. Finally we examine the profits that result from subjects' choices at the two 
stages. 
6.1 Bankruptcies 
Our bankruptcy rules exposed in section 4 are a potential source of contamination for our 
data. As subjects can go on playing, but cannot lose further money when their balance is 
negative, they may have an incentive to behave more adventurously in order to have a chance 
to return to a positive balance. When designing the experiment, we considered the starting 
balance sufficiently high to prevent bankruptcies and therefore chose a rule as simple as 
possible to deal with the hypothetical case of a bankruptcy. However, it turned out that in fact 
six of our 202 subjects went bankrupt in the course of the experiment. Four bankruptcies 
occurred in treatment 3, where there were two markets in each of which two of the three 
participating subjects went bankrupt. Two further bankruptcies occurred in treatments 1 and 
4. Despite the possible effect of bankruptcies on incentives, we do not find outcomes in 
markets with bankruptcies to be substantially different from those without bankruptcies when 
we look into the data.
10
 Markets with bankruptcies are therefore included in our analyses to 
retain a larger data set. Our results would change only slightly and all conclusions we draw 
will remain the same if we exclude those markets where bankruptcies occurred. 
6.2 Capacity choices 
Figures 3 and 4 summarize capacity choices at the first stage. Figure 3 aggregates the data 
within each treatment and period and shows the development of the mean market capacities in 
each treatment across periods. Combining the data from several periods, Table 1 numerically 
presents the information visualized in Figure 3. In the histograms in Figure 4, in contrast, 
choices across markets in the same treatment are not aggregated, but the distributions of 
market capacities in each treatment over all periods are illustrated. 
                                                 
10
 Muren (2000) reports on a similar incentive problem in her KS experiment. She also concludes that 
bankruptcies did not substantially affect her data. 
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Figure 3: Series of market capacities. 
   The first obvious result from Figure 3 is that mean market capacities in all treatments are 
considerably higher than Cournot capacities. Comparing the mean capacities across all 
periods in Table 1 to the respective Cournot benchmark, we find that the observed mean 
capacities are largely 40 to 60 percent above Cournot levels. This holds true for all treatments, 
no matter whether the Cournot outcome is the theoretical prediction or not. Although the 
mean capacities in Table 1 are mostly somewhat higher than the corresponding medians, the 
latter are still substantially above Cournot levels. The results thus are not driven by a few 
outliers, which is also confirmed by the capacity distributions in Figure 4. 
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Market Capacities 
periods 1-18 1-9 10-18 
Treatment 1 926.163 992.325 860.000  = 2, eff. rat., fixed match. (296.191) (294.493) (283.917) 
  [850.000] [1000.000] [800.000] 
Treatment 2 860.940 911.102 810.778  = 2, prop. rat., fixed match. (189.428) (197.477) (167.406) 
  [825.500] [900.000] [800.000] 
Treatment 3 1083.051 1203.750 962.352  = 3, eff. rat., fixed match. (387.863) (455.162) (256.321) 
  [950.000] [1200.000] [896.000] 
Treatment 4 1014.991 1063.361 966.620  = 3, prop. rat., fixed match. (256.595) (278.391) (223.770) 
  [1000.000] [1010.000] [948.000] 
Treatment 5 932.621 967.949 897.293  = 2, eff. rat., random match. (202.022) (196.472) (202.284) 
  [919.500] [950.000] [900.000] 
Treatment 6 967.324 1029.463 905.185  = 2, prop. rat., random match. (289.262) (274.644) (291.380) 
  [950.000] [1002.500] [900.000] 
Treatment 7 n.a. 846.229 n.a.  = 2, eff. rat., fixed match., high knowledge (191.890) 
[829.000] 
Standard errors in parentheses. Medians in square brackets. 
Table 1: Market capacities: Summary statistics. 
   Figure 3 indicates that mean capacities across treatments diverge in the first periods. The 
highest capacities are observed in the triopoly treatments (3 and 4),
11
 the lowest in the high-
knowledge treatment (7). Mean capacities then decline over periods. An exception is the high-
knowledge treatment which features no visible time trend. By period nine, the last period for 
which observations from the high-knowledge treatment are available, the mean capacities in 
the six other treatments have roughly approached that in the high-knowledge treatment. 
Towards the last periods, mean capacities appear to reach constant levels. Those hypothesized 
convergence levels are close to each other for all treatments. Capacities in the triopolies still 
are the highest, but there is no big difference to the capacities in duopoly markets. In the last 
few periods, capacities in the triopoly treatments are largely between 900 and 1000 while 
those in the duopoly treatments are mostly between 800 and 900 (see also the rightmost 
column of Table 1). 
                                                 
11
 The very large mean capacities observed in the first periods in treatment 3 are partly due to markets in which 
bankruptcies occurred. However, even if one disregards those markets, treatment 3 still has the highest mean 
capacities among all treatments in the first periods. 
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Figure 4: Distributions of market capacities. 
   To investigate those observations formally, we set up a regression that originates from 
Noussair et al. (1995) and has been applied to KS experiments by Davis (1999), Le Coq and 
Sturluson (2012), and Lepore and Shafran (2013). It has the following form: 
A Comprehensive Study of Variations in Experimental Kreps-Scheinkman Markets 
79 
 
na =+D,o, 1c + ,o, c − 1c E + pna
q
,L . 
The dependent variable in the regression is the market capacity  in market ℎ and period c. 
By o,, s = 1,… ,7, we denote a set of treatment dummy variables, where o, equals one in 
treatment s and zero else. Interacted with two different period weights, each treatment dummy 
appears twice on the right hand side of the equation. The first period weight, 1/c, equals one 
in the first period and then declines whereas the second weight, c − 1/c, equals zero in the 
first period and then increases, approaching one as c goes to infinity. The two weights sum up 
to the value of one in each period. Consequently, the , coefficients estimate market 
capacities in the first period (starting points) and the , coefficients estimate the long-run 
market capacity convergence levels in treatment s. The regression thus allows for different 
convergence patterns in each treatment.
12
 
   We ran a generalized least squares (GLS) regression that corrected the standard errors for 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity within markets across periods. Regression results are 
presented in Panel A of Table 2. In all treatments market capacities converge to levels 
significantly larger than the respective Cournot capacity (all ]s < 0.01, t-tests).13 
Convergence levels are rather close to 900, which is the competitive quantity. Indeed, in five 
of the seven treatments the convergence level is not significantly different from 900 at the ten 
percent level. Only in the high-knowledge treatment 7 do market capacities converge to a 
level significantly lower than the competitive quantity ( < 0.05). The convergence level in 
treatment 3 is significantly larger than 900, but this result hinges upon the inclusion of 
markets with bankruptcies. The low R
2
 of the regression indicates that there is a lot of 
variance in the capacity choice data which cannot be captured by treatment-specific 
convergence processes.
14
 
   In order to elicit treatment effects, we compare the coefficients of two treatments which 
differ only with respect to one treatment variable. Recall the treatment matrix in Figure 1 to 
see that there are three pairwise comparisons to investigate the effect of demand rationing 
(treatment 1 vs. treatment 2, 3 vs. 4, and 5 vs. 6), two for the number of firms in the market (1 
vs. 3 and 2 vs. 4), two for the subject matching rule (1 vs. 5 and 2 vs. 6), and one for the 
knowledge condition (1 vs. 7). We consider effects in both the starting points and the  
 
                                                 
12
 Unlike other specifications in the literature, we do not allow for different starting levels for each session or 
market within the same treatment. 
13
 All p-values refer to two-tailed tests. 
14
 Alternative specifications we tried yielded identical implications and even lower R
2
's. 
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Panel A: Estimated Starting Points (t′v) and Convergence Levels 
(w′v) of Market Capacities 
  , , 
Treatment 1 1,063.578 866.707  = 2, eff. rat., fixed match. (67.474) (36.111) 
Treatment 2 984.21 841.501  = 2, prop. rat., fixed match. (72.880) (39.004) 
Treatment 3 1,536.977 976.892  = 3, eff. rat., fixed match. (72.880) (39.004) 
Treatment 4 1,208.245 935.012  = 3, prop. rat., fixed match. (72.880) (39.004) 
Treatment 5 981.549 911.532  = 2, eff. rat., random match. (76.121) (40.739) 
Treatment 6 1,073.534 929.163  = 2, prop. rat., random match. (72.880) (39.004) 
Treatment 7 864.64 813.966  = 2, eff. rat., fixed match., high knowledge (61.661) (40.883) 
Observations 1,458 
Adjusted R
2
 0.064 
GLS regression with clustered errors on the market level. Clustered standard 
errors in parentheses. 
Panel B: Treatment Effects 
demand rationing  =   =  x >∗∗∗ y x = y 
  z = { z = { 
number of firms in the market  <∗∗∗ x  <∗∗ x 
   <∗∗ y  <∗ y 
subject matching  = z  = z 
   = {  = { 
knowledge  >∗∗ q  = q 
Results of two-tailed t-tests on equality of coefficients from Panel A. ">" ("<") 
indicates that the first coefficient is significantly larger (smaller) than the 
second, where ***, **, and * denote the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance 
levels. "=" indicates that equality of the two coefficients cannot be rejected at 
the 10 percent significance level. 
Table 2: Market capacities: Regression results (Panel A) and treatment effects (Panel B). 
convergence levels. The significance test results are presented in Panel B of Table 2. As to 
demand rationing and subject matching, the test results show no valid treatment effects. There 
is a significant effect of demand rationing on starting point capacities in only one of three 
pairwise comparisons, and no significant effect on capacity convergence levels. Subject 
matching never entails a significant effect. With respect to the knowledge condition, the 
visual impression from Figure 3 is confirmed by the test results. The high-knowledge 
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treatment yields significantly lower market capacities than the control treatment at the start, 
but the two convergence levels do not significantly differ from each other. The number of 
firms in the market is the only treatment variable in our setting which entails a uniform and 
persistent significant effect on capacities. Market capacities are significantly larger in triopoly 
than in duopoly in both pairwise comparisons and for both starting points and convergence 
levels.
15
 
   Our finding of capacities substantially above the Cournot prediction is in line with the 
observations in the majority of KS experiments. The results of earlier studies indicate that 
some features of our setting, namely inexperienced subjects (Muren, 2000; Goodwin and 
Mestelman, 2010; Le Coq and Sturluson, 2012) and low costs for installing capacity (Lepore 
and Shafran, 2013), are conducive to high capacity choices. Thus the high capacity levels 
observed in our experiment do not come out as a big surprise. As to the treatment effects, only 
two of our four treatment variables have already been varied in related studies. Our finding 
that demand rationing does not significantly affect capacity choices is in line with the result 
by Lepore and Shafran (2013). Yet, the significantly higher capacities observed in triopolies 
stand in contrast to the result by Brandts and Guillen (2007) who do not find such an effect. 
   Figure 4 already indicates that in all treatments capacities are higher than the Cournot 
benchmark in the vast majority of markets. Table 3 shows the number of instances in which 
the exact Cournot capacity was installed. Such instances are rare; their average frequency 
across all treatments is 1.8 percent.
16
 In the two triopoly treatments there is not a single 
instance in which the market capacity equals the Cournot benchmark. Apart from the fact that 
coordination on the Nash equilibrium becomes more difficult with more players, another 
important reason for this may be a prominent number effect. The Cournot market capacity in 
duopoly is 600 and requires each player to set a capacity of 300 if capacities are shared 
equally. In triopoly, by contrast, each player has to choose a capacity of 225, a less prominent 
                                                 
15
 As an alternative approach to investigate treatment effects, we also applied nonparametric significance tests on 
market capacity data from different treatments. In the treatments with fixed subject matching, mean capacities in 
a market over all periods are taken as observations while in the treatments with random subject matching the 
data from single periods are pooled. Pairwise comparing market capacities in two treatments as described above, 
Mann-Whitney tests yield results largely identical to those in Panel B of Table 2. Demand rationing and subject 
matching never affect capacity choices significantly. Capacities are significantly larger in triopoly than in 
duopoly ( < 0.05 for treatment 2 vs. treatment 4 and  < 0.1 for treatment 1 vs. treatment 3). High knowledge 
does not significantly decrease mean market capacities over all periods (1-9), although there is a significant 
difference in four single periods (periods 2-5, all ]s < 0.1). 
16
 Lepore and Shafran (2013) also find that Cournot capacities are relatively rare in their low-cost duopoly 
treatments. They observe frequencies of individual Cournot capacities between 7 and 9 percent. However, those 
frequencies cannot readily be compared to ours. Lepore and Shafran count instances where individuals choose 
the individual Cournot capacity while we count instances where the sum of all individual capacity choices in a 
market equals the Cournot market capacity. Moreover, they employ a much coarser capacity grid than we do, 
which renders observations of the exact Cournot capacity more likely in their setting. 
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number than 300, to bring about the Cournot market capacity of 675. Indeed, if we consider 
individual capacity choices, we do not observe any choices of 225 in the triopoly treatments 
either. The modal individual capacity choice is 400 in all duopoly treatments with an average 
frequency of 17.0 percent and 300 in the two triopoly treatments with an average frequency of 
13.6 percent. Hence, subjects do not only choose higher than Cournot capacities, but also 
concentrate their choices on prominent numbers. 
Frequencies of Exact Cournot Market Capacities 
by Treatment 
Treatment 1 0.032  = 2, eff. rat., fixed match. (8/252) 
Treatment 2 0.009  =2, prop. rat., fixed match. (2/216) 
Treatment 3 0.000  = 3, eff. rat., fixed match. (0/216) 
Treatment 4 0.000  = 3, prop. rat., fixed match. (0/216) 
Treatment 5 0.030  = 2, eff. rat., random match. (6/198) 
Treatment 6 0.014  = 2, prop. rat., random match. (3/216) 
Treatment 7 0.049  = 2, eff. rat., fixed match., high knowledge (7/144) 
Treatments 1-7 0.018 
  (26/1458) 
Table 3: Frequencies of Cournot capacities. 
   While the overall level of Cournot capacity choices is very low, Cournot capacities occur 
significantly more frequently in those treatments where the Cournot outcome is the Nash 
equilibrium (treatments 1, 3, 5, and 7; those treatments with efficient demand rationing) than 
in those where it is not (treatments 2, 4, and 6; those treatments with proportional demand 
rationing). In the four treatments where the Cournot outcome is the theoretical prediction, the 
frequency of exact Cournot market capacities is 2.6 percent whereas in the other treatments it 
is 0.8 percent. The hypothesis that the frequency is independent of the equilibrium prediction 
is rejected by a chi-squared test at the one percent significance level.
17
 
                                                 
17
 One may argue that the high knowledge treatment condition rather than demand rationing influences the 
frequency of Cournot capacities. The sample for the test is then biased because there is no counterpart treatment 
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6.3 Price choices 
We now look at price choices at the second stage. As measure for the market price we take the 
average price in a given market and period weighted by sales quantities, i.e. total sales 
revenue divided by total sales quantity. Both Table 4 and Figure 5 show the development of 
market prices across periods within each treatment. As at the first stage, we observe a much 
more competitive conduct than predicted by the Cournot benchmark, i.e. prices are 
substantially lower than the Cournot price of 400 (in duopoly) or, respectively, 325 (in 
triopoly). Prices are lowest in the triopoly treatments (3 and 4) and highest in the duopoly 
treatments with proportional rationing (2 and 6) as well as in the high-knowledge treatment 
(7). Prices increase somewhat throughout the experiment in most treatments. 
Market Prices 
periods 1-18 1-9 10-18 
Treatment 1 248.159 224.006 272.312  = 2, eff. rat., fixed match. (104.638) (97.497) (106.322) 
  [242.857] [205.044] [276.188] 
Treatment 2 310.254 297.457 323.052  = 2, prop. rat., fixed match. (90.772) (89.703) (90.436) 
  [307.689] [292.861] [328.204] 
Treatment 3 171.095 160.864 181.327  = 3, eff. rat., fixed match. (86.306) (85.707) (86.081) 
  [148.443] [131.391] [160.987] 
Treatment 4 214.815 201.467 228.162  = 3, prop. rat., fixed match. (82.141) (78.063) (84.284) 
  [204.711] [188.537] [216.192] 
Treatment 5 239.689 231.712 247.667  = 2, eff. rat., random match. (93.422) (83.414) (102.264) 
  [223.333] [218.200] [229.772] 
Treatment 6 296.431 263.900 328.963  = 2, prop. rat., random match. (146.042) (127.253) (156.608) 
  [266.987] [241.120] [307.317] 
Treatment 7 n.a. 277.258 n.a.  = 2, eff. rat., fixed match., high knowledge (80.407) 
    [270.272]   
Standard errors in parentheses. Medians in square brackets. 
Table 4: Market prices: Summary statistics. 
   In a first step, we analyze the impact of the treatment conditions on market prices without 
taking into account the influence of chosen capacities on pricing decisions. We perform a 
                                                                                                                                                        
of treatment 7 with proportional rationing. However, when the data from treatment 7 are excluded from the 
sample, the test result is still significant at the five percent level. 
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regression analogous to that explained in section 6.2 (the only change being the replacement 
of the endogenous variable) and again inquire the effect of the treatment variables by 
comparing treatments pairwise. The results are presented in column (1) of Panel B of Table 5. 
Concentrating our attention on the effects on the estimated convergence levels (the  
coefficients), we obtain clear-cut results. The convergence price level is significantly lower 
under efficient than under proportional demand rationing, and lower in triopoly than in 
duopoly. Subject matching does not entail a significant effect on prices. The high-knowledge 
condition yields higher prices in the first periods, but fails to produce a significant effect on 
the convergence price level. 
 
Figure 5: Series of market prices. 
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Average Market Prices at Second Stage
Treatment 1: n=2, efficient rationing, fixed matching
Treatment 2: n=2, proportional rationing, fixed matching
Treatment 3: n=3, efficient rationing, fixed matching
Treatment 4: n=3, proportional rationing, fixed matching
Treatment 5: n=2, efficient rationing, random matching
Treatment 6: n=2, proportional rationing, random matching
Treatment 7: n=2, efficient rationing, fixed matching, high knowledge
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Panel A: Estimated Starting Points (t′v) and Convergence Levels (w′v) of Market Prices 
  (1) (2) (3) , , , , , , 
Treatment 1 203.122 247.597 389.191 394.011 663.495 670.772  = 2, eff. rat., fixed match. (19.844) (12.353) (17.486) (8.159) (21.904) (15.502) 
Treatment 2 281.190 321.223 449.882 445.892 712.719 723.044  = 2, prop. rat., fixed match. (21.434) (13.343) (18.654) (8.743) (22.689) (15.924) 
Treatment 3 177.785 157.158 402.973 323.999 695.264 600.183  = 3, eff. rat., fixed match. (21.434) (13.343) (19.430) (8.846) (22.012) (15.869) 
Treatment 4 192.367 219.178 392.318 386.299 673.652 663.031  = 3, prop. rat., fixed match. (21.434) (13.343) (18.732) (8.953) (22.650) (16.550) 
Treatment 5 237.739 234.718 411.669 385.860 686.126 664.511  = 2, eff. rat., random match. (22.388) (13.936) (19.283) (8.953) (23.228) (16.534) 
Treatment 6 250.775 298.103 435.323 456.654 719.704 731.143  = 2, prop. rat., random match. (21.434) (13.343) (18.651) (8.448) (22.782) (15.868) 
Treatment 7 279.638 277.809 411.885 400.823 691.094 677.005  = 2, eff. rat., fixed match., high knowledge (18.718) (15.389) (15.742) (11.731) (20.343) (17.593) 
cap(600,800] -97.359 
(6.722) 
cap(800,1000] -154.071 
(6.591) 
cap(1000,1200] -212.236 
(7.106) 
cap(1200,1400] -236.052 
(8.110) 
cap(1400,1600] -265.027 
(10.454) 
cap(1600,...] -235.971 
(13.266) 
cap -0.653 
(0.028) 
cap
2 
1.95*10
-4 
(1.29*10
-5
) 
Observations 1,458 1,458 1,458 
Adjusted R
2
 0.086 0.561 0.577 
GLS regressions with clustered errors on the market level. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
… 
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Panel B: Treatment Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) 
demand rationing  <∗∗∗   <∗∗∗   <∗∗   <∗∗∗   <∗∗   <∗∗∗  x = y x <∗∗∗ y x = y x <∗∗∗ y x = y x <∗∗∗ y 
  z = { z <∗∗∗ { z = { z <∗∗∗ { z = { z <∗∗∗ { 
number of firms 
in the market  
 = x  >∗∗∗ x  = x  >∗∗∗ x  = x  >∗∗∗ x  >∗∗∗ y  >∗∗∗ y  >∗∗ y  >∗∗∗ y  = y  >∗∗∗ y 
subject matching  = z  = z  = z  = z  = z  = z 
   = {  = {  = {  = {  = {  = { 
knowledge  <∗∗∗ q  = q  = q  = q  = q  = q 
Results of two-tailed t-tests on equality of coefficients from Panel A. ">" ("<") indicates that the first coefficient is 
significantly larger (smaller) than the second, where ***, **, and * denote the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
"=" indicates that equality of the two coefficients cannot be rejected at the 10 percent significance level. 
Table 5: Market prices: Regression results (Panel A) and treatment effects (Panel B). 
 
Figure 6: Scatter plot of market capacities and market prices with kernel fit. 
   In a second step, we add market capacity as explanatory factor to the model. The scatter plot 
in Figure 6 illustrates the relationship between market capacity determined at the first stage 
and market price determined at the second. Each circle shows the market capacity and the 
average market price in one specific market and period. As one expects, higher capacities 
involve lower prices. The plot also illustrates that subjects are very reluctant to set a price 
below 100 at the second stage irrespective of the installed capacity, presumably in order to 
avoid a sure loss. Regressions (2) and (3) in Panel A of Table 5 amend regression (1) by 
including terms for the installed capacity at the first stage. Specification (2) includes a set of 
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six capacity dummies. A capacity dummy equals one if the installed market capacity lies in 
the interval mentioned in its caption.
18
 Capacities up to 600 units are the omitted category, i.e. 
the  and  coefficient estimates pertain to markets with a capacity of no more than 600 units 
and the dummy coefficients show the change in market price relative to that capacity interval. 
The estimates for the dummy coefficients are all negative and increase in absolute value, 
signifying a monotone negative relationship between capacity and price. The only exception 
is the sixth dummy coefficient for capacities larger than 1600 units which is smaller in 
absolute value than the fifth dummy coefficient. This, however, accords with the kernel fit 
line in Figure 6 indicating that the negative relationship between capacity and price is broken 
when capacities become very high.
19
 
   Specification (3) builds on the insight from Figure 6 indicating a convex relationship 
between capacity and price. It includes capacity as an exogenous factor with both a linear and 
a quadratic term. The regression yields a significant negative coefficient for the linear term 
and a significant positive coefficient for the quadratic term, thus confirming the supposed 
convex link. The magnitude of the coefficient estimates suggests that the first unit of installed 
capacity decreases the market price by approximately 0.65 ECU. If there are already 500 
(1000) units of capacity installed, one further unit leads to a price decrease of about 0.46 
(0.26) ECU.
20,21
 
   The inclusion of capacity as explaining factor increases the share of explained variance in 
the regression more than sixfold; specification (3) has a slightly better fit than specification 
(2). Nevertheless, the inclusion of capacity does not change the implications with respect to 
treatment effects, as the significance test results in Panel B of Table 5 reveal. If one controls 
for the level of capacity installed at the first stage, price convergence levels still are 
significantly higher with proportional than with efficient demand rationing and also in 
duopoly than in triopoly. By contrast, neither subject matching nor the knowledge condition 
                                                 
18
 Interval boundaries were chosen such that there are at least 20 observations in every capacity category. 
Variations in this respect leave the implications of the results unchanged. 
19
 All kernel fits in this study were generated with a Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth of 15 percent of the 
respective capacity range. 
20
 As an artifact of the regression, a price-increasing effect of further capacity is implied if capacity exceeds 1673 
units. However, this result is of little relevance since capacities are larger than this level in less than two percent 
of our observations. 
21
 As the regression contains no general constant, but a full set of treatment dummies without an omitted 
category, the  and  coefficients function as treatment-specific constants and indicate the starting point and 
long-run price levels in the respective treatment when all other variables take values of zero. Hence, in 
regression (3) the estimates of the  and  coefficients pertain to price levels in the respective treatment in a 
hypothetical state with zero capacity. 
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entails a significant effect. The two significant effects on pricing are in line with the results by 
Lepore and Shafran (2013) and Brandts and Guillen (2007). 
   The high capacities observed in the early periods of the experiment suggest that some 
subjects in the beginning fail to appreciate the impact of their capacity choice on the pricing 
subgame at the second stage. Le Coq and Sturluson (2012) find that the sensitivity of pricing 
decisions to installed capacity is higher in later periods. In order to investigate this matter in 
our setting, we set up two further regressions. The first, specification (4), has the form 
|na =+D,o, 1c + ,o, c − 1c E + }na 1c + ~na c − 1c + pna
q
,L . 
The dependent variable is the market price | in market ℎ and period c. The term in the 
brackets estimates treatment-specific price starting points and convergence levels, as known 
from the above regressions. In two additional terms the installed market capacity na is 
interacted with period weights. The } coefficient estimates the sensitivity of pricing to 
capacity in the first period while the ~ estimates the sensitivity in the long run (when c goes to 
infinity). We expect capacity to have a price-decreasing effect in any period, i.e. both } and ~ 
should be negative. Moreover, the sensitivity should increase over periods when more 
subjects learn about the effect of their choices at the first stage, i.e. ~ should be smaller (larger 
in absolute value) than }. The results presented in Table 6 confirm these suppositions.22 Both } and ~ are significantly negative and ~ is significantly smaller than } at the one percent level 
(t-test). 
   In specification (5) capacity is interacted with both period weights and treatment dummies o,. We thus can consider the sensitivity of pricing to capacity on the treatment level. The 
regression equation is 
|na =+D,o, 1c + ,o, c − 1c + },nao, 1c + ~,nao, c − 1c E + pna
q
,L . 
The regression results in Table 6 show that the } coefficient is not significantly different from 
zero in four of the seven treatments (treatments 1, 2, 3, and 5). That is, we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that subjects choose prices while completely ignoring installed capacities in 
the first period of those treatments. In treatments 4 and 6 installed capacity significantly 
decreases prices, but the effect is rather small. Only in treatment 7 do we find a significant 
and sizable negative effect. In contrast, in the long run higher capacities lead to lower prices 
                                                 
22
 As they are not in the focus of our interest in these regressions, the estimates for the  and  coefficients are 
omitted in Table 6. 
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in all treatments as all ~ coefficients are negative and significant. The sensitivity of pricing to 
capacity significantly increases from early to later periods in five treatments (null hypothesis ~, = }, rejected in favor of ~, < },,  < 0.01, t-tests). The two exceptions are treatment 3, 
where the sensitivity is still small in the long run, and treatment 7, where the sensitivity is 
large from the beginning. It appears that the extensive instructions in the high-knowledge 
treatment have been successful in teaching the subjects the connection between capacity and 
price choices ex ante, while many subjects in the other treatments had to learn about that 
connection by experience. 
Sensitivity of Pricing to Installed Market Capacity 
(4) (5) 
  } ~ }, ~,  
-0.109*** -0.280*** 
(0.022) (0.009) 
Treatment 1 -0.087 -0.286***  = 2, eff. rat., fixed match. (0.055) (0.020) 
Treatment 2 0.021 -0.284***  = 2, prop. rat., fixed match. (0.065) (0.032) 
Treatment 3 -0.023 -0.085***  = 3, eff. rat., fixed match. (0.038) (0.016) 
Treatment 4 -0.114** -0.260***  = 3, prop. rat., fixed match. (0.045) (0.024) 
Treatment 5 -0.028 -0.419***  = 2, eff. rat., random match. (0.076) (0.028) 
Treatment 6 -0.165*** -0.430***  = 2, prop. rat., random match. (0.057) (0.017) 
Treatment 7 -0.369*** -0.329***  = 2, eff. rat., fixed match., high knowledge (0.059) (0.037) 
Observations 1,458 1,458 
Adjusted R
2
 0.512 0.607 
GLS regressions with clustered errors on the market level. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
Table 6: Sensitivity of pricing to capacity: Regression results. 
   We now compare our pricing data to the Nash equilibrium prediction in the pricing 
subgame given capacity choices. A testable theory prediction is available only if individual 
capacities j are so small that market-clearing pricing is the pure-strategy equilibrium of the 
second-stage subgame. If, in contrast, chosen capacities at the first stage are too large, the 
equilibrium strategies involve randomization over prices. The conditions for market-clearing 
pricing to be the equilibrium of the second-stage subgame depend on both the demand 
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rationing scheme and the number of firms in the market. Under efficient rationing, in a market 
with  firms there are  conditions which must simultaneously hold. In our setting those 
conditions are 
j ≤ 500 −+ j,/2,H ,  = 1,… , . 
Under proportional rationing the condition is that the sum of individual capacities must not be 
greater than 500, 
+j ≤ 500. 23 
It is immediate that the condition under proportional rationing is more restrictive; that is, the 
region of capacity vectors for which market-clearing pricing is the equilibrium under 
proportional rationing is a real subset of the respective region under efficient rationing.
24
 
   The data in the first column of Table 7 show how often subjects at the first stage choose 
capacities that entail market-clearing pricing as the equilibrium of the second-stage subgame. 
Averaged over all treatments, such capacity vectors are chosen in only 8.2 percent of all 
instances. Pricing subgames with a pure-strategy equilibrium are especially rare in the 
treatments with proportional rationing (3.2 percent). 
   In the further analysis we consider only those subgames where market-clearing pricing is 
the pure-strategy equilibrium and investigate whether markets actually clear at the second 
stage and whether subjects choose the exact market-clearing Cournot price of 1000 − ∑ j . 
The results are displayed in the remaining columns of Table 7. We observe that market 
clearing occurs only in somewhat less than half of the instances where it is predicted. 
Nevertheless, the theoretical equilibrium possesses some predictive power since market 
clearing occurs in less than five percent of those cases where it is not predicted by first-stage 
capacities (data not reported). Our result stands in contrast to Lepore and Shafran (2013) who 
find that their KS markets clear in roughly 90 percent of those cases where it is predicted. 
                                                 
23
 See Lepore (2009) for an extensive treatment of these conditions. 
24
 Iskakov and Iskakov (2014) apply their concept of equilibrium in secure strategies to capacity-constrained 
price competition. Equilibrium in secure strategies is a broad pure-strategy equilibrium concept which contains 
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies as a special case, i.e. every pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is also an 
equilibrium in secure strategies. The conditions for a strategy bundle to be an equilibrium in secure strategies are 
that (i) no player  can impose a threat to another player s, i.e.  cannot change her strategy such that 's payoff 
increases and s's payoff decreases and (ii) no player can profitably and securely deviate from the given strategy 
bundle, where a deviation is secure if the execution of any threats the deviating player exposes herself to by her 
deviation cannot reduce her payoff below her initial payoff level. Using this equilibrium concept, Iskakov and 
Iskakov show that under proportional rationing an equilibrium in secure strategies exists if capacities fulfill the 
conditions given above for efficient rationing and that the equilibrium implies market-clearing pricing. While 
they consider only proportional rationing, their arguments go through also in the case of efficient rationing. 
Hence, interestingly, they provide an equilibrium concept where the conditions for existence of a pure-strategy 
equilibrium do not depend on demand rationing. 
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However, most of their observations stem from their high-cost treatments and the few 
observations from their low-cost treatments comparable to ours show substantially lower 
rates. Muren's (2000) KS markets clear in 50 to 60 percent of those cases where it is 
predicted, which is reasonably close to our rate of 46.2 percent. As regards exact market-
clearing pricing, we find that the respective price of 1000 − ∑ j  is set by a subject in 35.8 
percent of those cases where this price is the pure strategy equilibrium.
25,26
 Considering this 
issue on the market level, it occurs in 12.6 percent of the cases that the exact market-clearing 
price is set by all firms in the market. 
Market Clearing in the Pricing Subgame 
market-
clearing 
pricing is 
Nash 
equilibrium 
market 
cleared 
exact market-clearing price 
chosen… 
…on 
individual 
level 
…by all 
subjects in the 
market 
Treatment 1 0.156 0.625 0.400 0.075  = 2, eff. rat., fixed match. (40/256) (25/40) (32/80) (3/40) 
Treatment 2 0.019 0.750 0.250 0.000  = 2, prop. rat., fixed match. (4/216) (3/4) (2/8) (0/4) 
Treatment 3 0.093 0.300 0.233 0.000  = 3, eff. rat., fixed match. (20/216) (6/20) (14/60) (0/20) 
Treatment 4 0.009 1.000 0.167 0.000  = 3, prop. rat., fixed match. (2/216) (2/2) (1/6) (0/2) 
Treatment 5 0.079 0.294 0.559 0.294  = 2, eff. rat., random match. (17/216) (5/17) (19/34) (5/17) 
Treatment 6 0.069 0.333 0.100 0.000  = 2, prop. rat., random match. (15/216) (5/15) (3/30) (0/15) 
Treatment 7 0.146 0.429 0.524 0.333  = 2, eff. rat., fixed match., high knowledge (21/144) (9/21) (22/42) (7/21) 
Treatments 1-7 0.082 0.462 0.358 0.126 
(119/1458) (55/119) (93/260) (15/119) 
Table 7: Market clearing in the pricing subgame. 
                                                 
25
 Here decisions on the individual level are analyzed. The number of analyzed cases is therefore given by the 
number of markets where market clearing is the equilibrium multiplied by the number of firms in each market. 
26
 Davis (1999) finds that subjects in the initial periods of his KS treatment choose the market-clearing price in 
about 20 percent of those cases where market-clearing pricing is the equilibrium. This share increases throughout 
the experiment and circulates around 85 percent in the last periods. However, Davis' results are not directly 
comparable to ours for several reasons. The price grid Davis employs is coarser than ours. The maximum 
capacity each firm can install is smaller relative to market demand than in our setting, which renders capacity 
choices where market clearing is the equilibrium of the pricing subgame more likely. Subjects in Davis' study 
may therefore have more chances to learn the optimal pricing strategy in such a situation. Moreover, prices 
which are no more than two cents below the exact market-clearing price are considered by Davis as unsizable 
deviations from equilibrium and are included in the above shares. 
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   Examining the data in the third column of Table 7, we notice that subjects in the treatments 
with efficient rationing have a higher propensity to choose the exact market-clearing Cournot 
price than subjects in the treatments with proportional rationing. The relative frequencies are 
40.3 percent under efficient rationing and 13.6 percent under proportional rationing. A chi-
squared test rejects the independence of frequencies from the rationing scheme at the one 
percent significance level.
27
 This result parallels the finding from section 6.2 that under 
efficient rationing exact Cournot capacities are more likely to be installed at the first stage. 
Yet, whereas the influence of the rationing scheme at the first stage corresponds to the 
equilibrium prediction, at the second stage we find an unpredicted significant effect of the 
rationing scheme. Since we consider only those markets with a pure-strategy equilibrium in 
the pricing subgame, the equilibrium predictions are now identical under both rationing 
schemes. We can provide a somewhat speculative explanation for our finding at the second 
stage. Since capacities which entail market-clearing pricing as equilibrium at the second stage 
are chosen more rarely under proportional rationing, subjects in those treatments had less 
opportunity to experience market-clearing pricing to be optimal when capacities are 
sufficiently small. This explains the observed difference in pricing behavior if one assumes 
that experience is needed to understand how to price optimally. This is a plausible assumption 
in the rather complex KS framework and is also corroborated by our above finding that 
subjects need experience to appreciate the link between their decisions at the first and second 
stage. 
6.4 Profits 
After examining capacity and price choices separately, we now analyze how those choices 
interact and which profit levels they bring about. Table 8 provides summary statistics of 
profits per firm in each treatment. Although the individual profit data exhibit very high 
variances, it becomes clear that in all treatments profits are substantially lower than predicted 
by the respective Cournot outcomes.
28
 Moreover, profits are somewhat greater under 
proportional than under efficient demand rationing. This contrasts with the theory prediction, 
but is in line with the results from the low-cost treatments by Lepore and Shafran (2013). 
                                                 
27
 This result remains valid if we exclude the data from treatment 7 following the argument given in fn. 17. 
28
 Considering only the raw individual profit data in Table 8, due to the high variances the mean individual 
profits in the treatments are not significantly different from their respective Nash prediction. However, putting 
up a regression similar to that in section 6.2 with individual profit as endogenous variable, we find that in all 
treatments profit convergence levels are significantly smaller than the Nash equilibrium profit (all ]s < 0.01, c-
tests). 
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Profits per Firm 
periods 1-18 1-9 10-18 
Treatment 1 35,819.797 26,553.708 45,085.89  = 2, eff. rat., fixed match. (43,860.007) (44,606.965) (41,144.603) 
  [40,000.000] [25,100.000] [53,625.000] 
Treatment 2 60,001.518 53,699.266 66,303.77  = 2, prop. rat., fixed match. (37,421.334) (39,506.239) (34,156.647) 
  [61,953.100] [55.980.550] [67,556.500] 
Treatment 3 5,384.717 -1,973.653 12,743.09  = 3, eff. rat., fixed match. (29,451.782) (31,908.973) (24,712.170) 
  [5,617.500] [850.000] [12,000.000] 
Treatment 4 18,823.696 14,784.639 22,862.75  = 3, prop. rat., fixed match. (30,791.982) (31,241.118) (29,841.103) 
  [17,525.000] [14,623.050] [19,775.000] 
Treatment 5 34,128.109 30,721.520 37,534.70  = 2, eff. rat., random match. (35,494.925) (36,747.108) (33,948.457) 
  [35,070.500] [29,600.000] [38,557.500] 
Treatment 6 42,031.159 34,501.973 49,560.35  = 2, prop. rat., random match. (51,634.314) (49,213.397) (52,997.567) 
  [34,855.350] [32,242.300] [42,914.000] 
Treatment 7 n.a. 49,834.674 n.a.  = 2, eff. rat., fixed match., high knowledge (31,995.914) 
    [52,399.500]   
Standard errors in parentheses. Medians in square brackets. 
Table 8: Profits per firm: Summary statistics. 
   It is a common finding in KS experiments that subjects earn considerably less than the 
theoretical equilibrium profits. This is apparently due to excessive capacity installation at the 
first stage which, on the one hand, entails costs for units that cannot be sold and, on the other 
hand, triggers low sales prices at the second stage. Since subjects choose such high capacities 
even after many rounds when they have gained experience, the question arises whether they 
draw some latent utility from that behavior. 
   Davis (1999) suggests that subjects may strategically set high capacities in order to bully the 
other players in their market so that their competitors install less capacity and leave a large 
share of the market to the bully. He argues that such attempts are often successful, referring to 
the strong positive correlation between capacity shares and profit shares within markets in his 
KS treatment data. While we find a similar correlation in our data,
29
 we do not consider this to 
provide sufficient evidence for bullying to be strategically successful. After all, a larger 
                                                 
29
 Spearman's rank correlation coefficient between the capacity share and the profit share of a subject in her 
market, both averaged over all periods, is 0.56. The data of 14 subjects are disregarded in that calculation 
because the average market profit is negative in those cases. 
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capacity share leads to more market power and therefore is likely to induce a higher profit 
share within a market. To judge success, however, also performance across markets is to be 
considered. Davis acknowledges that average profits are lowest in those markets with the 
highest capacities. 
   The relationship between absolute individual capacities and absolute individual profits is 
suitable to investigate whether choosing high capacities is eventually a successful strategy. 
The results are clearly negative. Spearman's rank correlation coefficient between the mean 
individual capacity and the mean individual profit per period, averaged over all periods, is 
-0.47 in duopolies and -0.39 in triopolies. The scatter plots in Figure 7 allow for a more 
precise analysis. The kernel fits show that there exists an interior profit-maximizing capacity. 
According to the kernel regressions, the profit-maximizing capacity is 312 in duopoly and 274 
in triopoly. The profit-maximizing capacitiy in duopoly is remarkably close to the Cournot 
capacity whereas in triopoly it is roughly 20 percent above Cournot. The corresponding profit 
is about 56,300 in duopoly and about 17,400 in triopoly. In other words, the profit that can be 
attained on average with an empirically optimal capacity choice is still considerably lower 
than the equilibrium profit. Furthermore, subjects on average set substantially higher 
capacities than optimal ex post. We therefore do not share Davis' view of excess capacities as 
successful bully behavior. 
 
Figure 7: Scatter plots of individual capacities and individual profits with kernel fits. 
   Another explanation for excess capacities is put forward by Lepore and Shafran (2013). 
They argue that when the cost for installing capacity is low subjects lose little by choosing a 
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too high capacity that is not fully utilized at the second stage. However, high capacities bring 
about the chance of a large gain in case the other players happen to install low capacities. 
High capacity choices may thus be considered gambling behavior. The kernel fits in Figure 7 
illustrate that on average subjects lose by gambling. Moreover, we find that high profits in 
one period do not correlate with high capacity choices. Table 9 categorizes individual 
capacity choices in single periods by profit. We see that the highest individual profits are 
actually realized at below-average individual capacities. High profits are apparently more 
triggered by implicit collusion than by exploiting opportunities induced by a high individual 
capacity. 
Individual Capacities Categorized by Individual Profits 
   = 2  = 3 
All 455.562 349.674 
(166.869) (168.973) 
[431.000] [310.000] 
Top profit decile 438.000 324.566 
(134.388) (99.762) 
[400.000] [300.000] 
Bottom profit decile 579.483 551.369 
(195.877) (201.295) 
[600.000] [500.000] 
Standard errors in parentheses. Medians in square brackets. 
Table 9: Individual capacities categorized by individual profits. 
   Our analysis to some extent questions the explanations for excess capacities in the literature 
since it shows that choosing high capacities is rarely fruitful, no matter whether one assumes a 
strategic or an opportunistic rationale behind such decisions. It is then an unresolved question 
why even in the long run subjects do not realize the failure of their tactics and commence to 
choose lower capacities. 
7 Conclusion 
This study adds to the so far limited literature of experimental Kreps-Scheinkman oligopoly 
markets by providing a comprehensive analysis on how different experimental conditions 
affect market outcomes. Seven treatments are conducted with different combinations of the 
four treatment variables: number of firms in a market, demand rationing, subject matching, 
and subjects' understanding of KS markets (referred to as "knowledge"). Theory predicts the 
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Cournot outcome under efficient demand rationing and a more competitive mixed-strategy 
equilibrium under proportional rationing. 
   We find that both capacity choice and pricing is considerably more competitive than the 
Cournot outcome in all treatments. Larger market capacities are chosen in triopoly than in 
duopoly. Subjects with high knowledge first set lower capacities, but the effect vanishes when 
low-knowledge subjects reduce their capacities after the initial rounds. Neither demand 
rationing nor subject matching affects capacity choice. At the pricing stage, both the number 
of firms and demand rationing entail persistent effects. Prices are higher in duopoly than in 
triopoly and with proportional than with efficient rationing. Again knowledge makes a 
difference only in the initial rounds. Investigating the sensitivity of price choices on installed 
capacity, it appears that subjects in the low-knowledge condition have to learn by experience 
about the relationship between capacity and price choices. Exact Cournot capacities as well as 
exact market-clearing pricing are more likely to occur under efficient than under proportional 
demand rationing. Subjects' earnings substantially fall short of equilibrium profits due to 
excessive capacity installation. It still remains a puzzle why subjects do not reduce capacities 
even after many rounds of experience. 
Appendix A 
English translation of the written instructions in treatments 3 and 7. 
 
Treatment 3: 
Welcome to the Laboratory for Economic Experiments at Kiel University. 
You are about to participate in an economic experiment where you will have to make some decisions. You can 
also earn some money. The amount of money will depend on both your own decisions and the decisions of the 
other participants in the experiment. 
 
Please read these instructions carefully. If after reading there are any questions, please raise your hand. An 
experimenter will approach you and answer your questions in private. Please do not communicate with other 
participants during the experiment. 
 
All participants receive the same instructions. 
 
In this experiment you represent a firm producing and selling a single good. On a market you compete with two 
other firms being represented by two of the other participants. All firms produce and sell the same good. 
 
For your participation you will receive a fee of 6 Euro. You can earn further money during the experiment. The 
amount will depend on both your own decisions and the decisions of the other participants in the experiment. 
 
Throughout the experiment, all money amounts will be accounted in Experimental Currency Units (ECU). 
Your start balance at the beginning of the experiment is 240,000 ECU. Your final balance at the end of the 
experiment will be paid off to you at an exchange rate of 40,000 ECU/Euro, i.e. for each 40,000 ECU of your 
final balance you will receive 1 Euro. Additionally, you will receive your participation fee. 
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The experiment consists of 18 periods. At the beginning of the experiment, the participants will be randomly 
matched into groups of three. The other members of your group will be your competitors. The grouping will be 
fixed throughout the experiment. 
 
Each period of the experiment consists of two stages: 
 
First stage: At the first stage you and the other firms must simultaneously and independently decide on your 
production quantity of the good. All integers from 0 up to 1000 are admissible quantities. 
Production incurs costs of 100 ECU per unit produced. Your production costs will be subtracted from your 
balance. 
 
After the first stage all firms will be informed about the production quantities of the other firms within their 
group. 
 
Second stage: At the second stage you and the other firms must simultaneously and independently decide on the 
price at which to offer the good on the market. All integers from 0 up to 1000 are admissible prices. 
Your sales revenue will be added to your balance. Your sales revenue is equal to the price chosen by you 
multiplied by your sales quantity. Your sales quantity depends on both the production quantities and the prices 
chosen by you and the other firms. In the following paragraphs you can find a precise description of how sales 
quantities are determined. 
 
The market demand describes the quantity of the good that can at most be sold in each period at a given price. 
Demand will be simulated by the computer and will be identical in all periods. There are many different potential 
customers with different willingnesses to pay for the good. A sale will come about if the offer price is no higher 
than a customer's maximum willingness to pay. At a price of 0 ECU, there will be a total demand for 1000 units 
on the market. With a price increase by 1 ECU, demand is reduced by 1 unit. So, for example, at a price of 500 
ECU, 500 units will be demanded. At a price of 1000 ECU no one will be ready to buy the good. Here is a 
graphical representation of this relationship: 
 
Each firm in each period can sell at most as many units of the good at the second stage as it has produced at the 
first stage. 
 
Customers will first try to purchase the good from the firm offering at the lowest price. Customers with the 
highest willingness to pay will be served first. In case several firms choose the same price, demand will be 
divided equally among them. 
 
If a firm has not chosen the lowest price within its group, there may be some residual demand left over for it or 
not. This is illustrated by the following two examples. For both examples assume that firms 1 and 2 have chosen 
prices of 300 ECU and 400 ECU respectively. The production quantity of firm 1 be 700 units in the first 
example and 200 units in the second. The production quantity of firm 2 be 100 units in both cases. 
 
We are interested in the remaining demand for firm 3 at different price choices of firm 3. In the figures below, 
the remaining demand for firm 3 is represented by the bold line. 
If firm 3 chooses a price below 300 ECU, its price is the lowest and it is confronted with the entire market 
demand. 
If firm 3 chooses a price above 300 ECU, firm 1 sells its units first. In the first example (upper figure), the 
production quantity of firm 1 satisfies the whole demand at this price, so the other firms are unable to sell any 
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units at prices above 300 ECU. In the second example (lower figure), however, the production quantity of firm 1 
is not enough to satisfy all market demand. Therefore, a residual demand is left over at prices above 300 ECU. If 
firm 3 then chooses a price above 400 ECU, also firm 2 will sell its units previous to firm 3. In the example, firm 
2 again cannot satisfy all remaining demand at a price of 400 ECU, so there is some residual demand left for 
firm 3 even at prices higher than 400 ECU. 
 
 
 
 
In case a firm cannot sell its entire production from the first stage at the second stage, the units that could not be 
sold will forfeit and cannot be transferred to the next period. However, production costs are incurred for all units 
produced, no matter whether they can be sold or not. 
 
Your profit or loss (in ECU) in a period is equal to your sales revenue (= offer price chosen by you multiplied 
by your sales quantity) at the second stage minus your production costs (= production quantity chosen by you 
multiplied by 100 ECU) at the first stage. 
 
Your balance in each period is increased or decreased by your profit or loss respectively in this period. If your 
balance should become negative during the experiment, you can nevertheless go on producing and selling, i.e. 
your firm has a credit without limit in the experiment. If your final balance at the end of the experiment should 
be negative, you will only be paid your participation fee. Your participation fee will not be charged against any 
losses. 
 
To get a general idea of your sales quantities and profits resulting from different price and quantity 
combinations, you may use the "profit calculator". Simply enter a hypothetical production quantity and a 
hypothetical offer price for each firm and click on "Calculate". Then your resulting sales quantity and profit will 
be displayed. You may use the profit calculator throughout the whole experiment. 
 
Moreover, after each period a screen with a "history" will inform you about the outcomes so far. For all past 
periods the "history" shows the production quantities and prices chosen by the firms, your resulting sales 
quantity, your sales revenue, your production cost and your profit. Moreover, your current money balance will 
be displayed. 
 
The following two screenshots illustrate the use of the profit calculator and the history: 
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Here you can enter three hypothetical production  Here you can enter and submit your choice for the 
quantities and offer prices and have the results   current period (production quantity at the first 
calculated.      stage, offer price at the second stage). 
 
 
 
   The results of the profit calculator are displayed here. 
 
Your total profit so far is displayed here.   The results of the last period are displayed here. 
 
 
 
This is the history showing the outcomes of all past periods. Zeros are displayed for trial periods. 
 
To practice there will be three trial periods before the actual periods start. The procedures in the trial periods 
are the same as in the actual periods described above, but the outcomes of the trial periods will not add to your 
payoff. Your start balance for the trial periods is 100,000 ECU. After the trial periods your balance will be set to 
240,000 ECU – your start balance for the actual periods – independent of your profits or losses in the trial 
periods. After the trial periods, the participants will be randomly re-matched into new groups. The new groups 
will stay fixed throughout all actual periods of the experiment. The profit calculator will be available to you 
during both trial and actual periods. The history, however, will not be displayed after trial periods and will only 
contain the data of the actual periods. 
 
Your final balance will be paid to you after the experiment at the above-mentioned exchange rate. Additionally, 
you will receive your participation fee. None of the other participants will come to know your payoff, and 
neither will you come to know the payoff of any other participant. Furthermore, no participant will come to 
know with whom he or she interacted during the experiment. 
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If you click on the "Continue" button on your screen, some statements will appear to check whether all 
participants have understood the instructions. Please decide whether these statements are right or wrong. As soon 
as all participants will have evaluated the statements correctly, the first trial period will start. 
 
If there are any questions concerning the experiment, please raise your hand. Enjoy the experiment! 
 
Treatment 7: 
Welcome to the Laboratory for Economic Experiments at Kiel University. 
You are about to participate in an economic experiment where you will have to make some decisions. You can 
also earn some money. The amount of money will depend on both your own decisions and the decisions of the 
other participants in the experiment. 
 
Please read these instructions carefully. If after reading there are any questions, please raise your hand. An 
experimenter will approach you and answer your questions in private. Please do not communicate with other 
participants during the experiment. 
 
All participants receive the same instructions. 
 
In this experiment you represent a firm producing and selling a single good. On a market you compete with one 
other firm being represented by one of the other participants. All firms produce and sell the same good. 
 
For your participation you will receive a fee of 6 Euro. You can earn further money during the experiment. The 
amount will depend on both your own decisions and the decisions of the other participants in the experiment. 
 
Throughout the experiment, all money amounts will be accounted in Experimental Currency Units (ECU). 
Your start balance at the beginning of the experiment is 200,000 ECU. Your final balance at the end of the 
experiment will be paid off to you at an exchange rate of 40,000 ECU/Euro, i.e. for each 40,000 ECU of your 
final balance you will receive 1 Euro. Additionally, you will receive your participation fee. 
 
The experiment consists of 9 periods. At the beginning of the experiment, the participants will be randomly 
matched into groups of two. The other member of your group will be your competitor. The grouping will be 
fixed throughout the experiment. 
 
Each period of the experiment consists of two stages: 
 
First stage: At the first stage you and the other firm must simultaneously and independently decide on your 
production quantity of the good. All integers from 0 up to 1000 are admissible quantities. 
Production incurs costs of 100 ECU per unit produced. Your production costs will be subtracted from your 
balance. 
 
After the first stage all firms will be informed about the production quantity of the other firm within their group. 
 
Second stage: At the second stage you and the other firm must simultaneously and independently decide on the 
price at which to offer the good on the market. All integers from 0 up to 1000 are admissible prices. 
Your sales revenue will be added to your balance. Your sales revenue is equal to the price chosen by you 
multiplied by your sales quantity. In the following paragraphs you can find a precise description of how sales 
quantities are determined. 
 
The market demand describes the quantity of the good that can at most be sold in each period at a given price. 
Demand will be simulated by the computer and will be identical in all periods. The market demand function  is given by  = 1000 − . 
At a price of 0 ECU, there will be a total demand for 1000 units on the market. With a price increase by 1 ECU, 
demand is reduced by 1 unit. At a price of 1000 ECU no one will be ready to buy the good. Here is a graphical 
representation of this relationship: 
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Customers will first try to purchase the good from the firm offering at the lowest price. Customers with the 
highest willingness to pay will be served first. In case several firms choose the same price, demand will be 
divided equally among them. 
 
Your sales quantity depends on both the production quantities and the prices chosen by you and the other firms. 
Three cases are to be distinguished: 1. You choose the lower price. You are confronted with the entire market 
demand. 2. Both firms choose the same price. Market demand is divided equally. 3. You choose the higher price. 
First the other firm sells up to its capacity. There may be some residual demand left for you or not. 
 
This is illustrated by the following two examples. For both examples assume that the other firm has chosen a 
price of 300 ECU. The production quantity of the other firm be 200 units in the first example and 700 units in 
the second. 
 
 
 
In the figures above, the remaining demand for your firm is represented by the bold line. 
If your price is lower than 300 ECU, your price is the lowest and you are confronted with the entire market 
demand. If your price is higher than 300 ECU, the other firm sells its units first. The bold line in the figures is 
shifted leftwards by this quantity. In the first example (upper figure), the production quantity of the other firm is 
not enough to satisfy all market demand. Therefore, a residual demand is left over for you at prices above 300 
ECU. In the second example (lower figure), however, the production quantity of the other firm satisfies the 
whole demand at this price, so you are unable to sell any units at prices above 300 ECU. 
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Formally, the demand a firm is confronted with can be expressed as follows. Let  be your production quantity,  the production quantity of the other firm, and  and  the prices chosen by you and the other firm, 
respectively. The demand you are confronted with is given by 
 = l 1000 −   < 500 − /2  = max 0,1000 −  − !  > .  cannot be negative. In case you have chosen the higher price and 1000 −  −  yields a negative value, your 
residual demand is zero. 
 
At the second stage you can sell at most as many units as are demanded. Moreover, you can sell no more than 
you have produced at the first stage. That is, your sales quantity  is given by the minimum of these two values:  = min , !. 
 
Regard the following two examples to see how your sales quantity is determined. 
Example 1 Production quantity (units) Price (ECU) 
My firm 300 400 
Other firm 200 300 
You have chosen the higher price. Your residual demand is  = 1000 −  −  = 1000 − 400 − 200 = 400. 
As you have produced no more than 300 units, you can sell no more than those units:  = min 400,300! =300. 
Example 2 Production quantity (units) Price (ECU) 
My firm 300 350 
Other firm 700 250 
You again have chosen the higher price. 1000 −  −  = 1000 − 350 − 700 = −50 yields a negative value. 
Your residual demand is  = max 0, −50! = 0. You therefore cannot sell any units,  = min 0,300! = 0. 
 
In case a firm cannot sell its entire production from the first stage at the second stage, the units that could not be 
sold will forfeit and cannot be transferred to the next period. However, production costs are incurred for all units 
produced, no matter whether they can be sold or not. 
 
Your profit or loss Π (in ECU) in a period is equal to your sales revenue (= offer price chosen by you multiplied 
by your sales quantity) at the second stage minus your production costs (= production quantity chosen by you 
multiplied by 100 ECU) at the first stage: Π =  − 100. 
 
This profit function due to the case discriminations in determining the sales quantity is a piecewise function. 
Given the production quantities  and  and the price of the other firm , the following prices are possible 
candidates for the price which maximizes your profit: 
(I)  = 1000 − , 
(II)  = 1000 −  − , 
(III)  = 500 
(IV)  = 500 − /2, round to next integer if applicable, 
(V)  = , 
(VI)  =  − 1. 
When you will make your price choice in the experiment, you will know about  and , but not about . 
However, you may interpret  as the price which you expect the other firm to choose. 
 
The following example illustrates how to find your profit-maximizing price given , , and . 
Example 3 Production quantity (units) Price (ECU) 
My firm 400 ? 
Other firm 400 300 
The candidates for your profit-maximizing price are (I) 600, (II) 200, (III) 500, (IV) and (V) 300, and (VI) 299. 
The price candidates yield the following sales quantities and profits: 
(I)   = 1000 − 600 − 400 = 0   Π = 0 ∗ 600 − 100 ∗ 400 = −40000. 
(II)   = min 1000 − 200,400! = 400  Π = 400 ∗ 200 − 100 ∗ 400 = 40000. 
(III)   = 1000 − 500 − 400 = 100   Π = 100 ∗ 500 − 100 ∗ 400 = 10000. 
(IV) and (V)  = 500 − 300/2 = 350    Π = 350 ∗ 300 − 100 ∗ 400 = 65000. 
(VI)   = min 1000 − 299,400! = 400  Π = 400 ∗ 299 − 100 ∗ 400 = 79600. 
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A comparison of the profits reveals that 299 is your profit-maximizing price choice in this example. 
 
Your balance in each period is increased or decreased by your profit or loss respectively in this period. If your 
balance should become negative during the experiment, you can nevertheless go on producing and selling, i.e. 
your firm has a credit without limit in the experiment. If your final balance at the end of the experiment should 
be negative, you will only be paid your participation fee. Your participation fee will not be charged against any 
losses. 
 
To get a general idea of your sales quantities and profits resulting from different price and quantity 
combinations, you may use the "profit calculator". Simply enter a hypothetical production quantity and a 
hypothetical offer price for each firm and click on "Calculate". Then your resulting sales quantity and profit will 
be displayed. You may use the profit calculator throughout the whole experiment. 
 
Moreover, after each period a screen with a "history" will inform you about the outcomes so far. For all past 
periods the "history" shows the production quantities and prices chosen by the firms, your resulting sales 
quantity, your sales revenue, your production cost and your profit. Moreover, your current money balance will 
be displayed. 
 
The following two screenshots illustrate the use of the profit calculator and the history: 
 
Here you can enter two hypothetical production  Here you can enter and submit your choice for the 
quantities and offer prices and have the results   current period (production quantity at the first 
calculated.      stage, offer price at the second stage). 
 
 
 
The results of the profit calculator are displayed here. 
 
Your total profit so far is displayed here.   The results of the last period are displayed here. 
 
 
 
 
This is the history showing the outcomes of all past periods. Zeros are displayed for trial periods. 
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To practice there will be three trial periods before the actual periods start. The procedures in the trial periods 
are the same as in the actual periods described above, but the outcomes of the trial periods will not add to your 
payoff. Your start balance for the trial periods is 100,000 ECU. After the trial periods your balance will be set to 
200,000 ECU – your start balance for the actual periods – independent of your profits or losses in the trial 
periods. After the trial periods, the participants will be randomly re-matched into new groups. The new groups 
will stay fixed throughout all actual periods of the experiment. The profit calculator will be available to you 
during both trial and actual periods. The history, however, will not be displayed after trial periods and will only 
contain the data of the actual periods. 
 
Your final balance will be paid to you after the experiment at the above-mentioned exchange rate. Additionally, 
you will receive your participation fee. None of the other participants will come to know your payoff, and 
neither will you come to know the payoff of any other participant. Furthermore, no participant will come to 
know with whom he or she interacted during the experiment. 
 
If you click on the "Continue" button on your screen, some tasks will appear to check whether all participants 
have understood the instructions. As soon as all participants will have solved the tasks, the first trial period will 
start. 
 
If there are any questions concerning the experiment, please raise your hand. Enjoy the experiment! 
Appendix B 
Translation of the control questions. 
 
Control questions in treatments 1-6: 
Binary choice: correct or wrong. 
1. The participants will be re-matched into new groups before each period of the experiment. – Correct if 
random matching condition; wrong if fixed matching condition. 
2. Each firm in each period at first chooses its production quantity. Firms are informed about all production 
quantities in their group. Then each firm chooses its sales price. – Correct. 
3. Production costs per unit are equally large for every unit. – Correct. 
4. A firm which has not chosen the lowest price within its group can never sell any units in the respective period. 
– Wrong. 
5. In case a firm is unable to sell its whole production in one period, it can offer the unsold units in the next 
period again. – Wrong. 
 
Control tasks in treatment 7: 
Task 1 Production quantity (units) Price (ECU) 
My firm 500 300 
Other firm 500 350 
My sales quantity: ___ (correct answer: 500) 
My profit: ___ (correct answer: 100,000) 
 
Task 2 Production quantity (units) Price (ECU) 
My firm 700 400 
Other firm 400 500 
My sales quantity: ___ (correct answer: 600) 
My profit: ___ (correct answer: 170,000) 
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Task 3 Production quantity (units) Price (ECU) 
My firm 400 450 
Other firm 500 400 
My sales quantity: ___ (correct answer: 50) 
My profit: ___ (correct answer: -17,500) 
 
Task 4 Production quantity (units) Price (ECU) 
My firm 300 ? 
Other firm 300 400 
My profit-maximizing price: ___ (correct answer: 400) 
My maximum profit: ___ (correct answer: 90,000) 
 
Task 5 Production quantity (units) Price (ECU) 
My firm 250 ? 
Other firm 200 200 
My profit-maximizing price: ___ (correct answer: 550) 
My maximum profit: ___ (correct answer: 112,500) 
 
Task 6 Production quantity (units) Price (ECU) 
My firm 400 ? 
Other firm 400 500 
My profit-maximizing price: ___ (correct answer: 499) 
My maximum profit: ___ (correct answer: 159,600) 
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IV Demand Rationing in Bertrand-Edgeworth 
Markets with Fixed Capacities: An Experiment
*
 
Abstract. This study is the first to investigate the effect of demand rationing in experimental 
Bertrand-Edgeworth markets with fixed exogenous capacities. It is found that prices and 
profits are significantly higher under proportional than under efficient demand rationing. 
Moreover, the amount of capacity available to each firm is varied. In accordance with earlier 
studies, prices and profits are significantly higher when capacities are lower. Those effects 
accord qualitatively with the Nash equilibrium predictions of the corresponding stage games. 
However, the Nash equilibrium concept does poorly at quantitative predictions. Prices are 
significantly higher than the Nash prediction in all treatments, irrespective of whether the 
Nash equilibrium is in mixed or in pure strategies. Profits are higher than the Nash prediction 
with high capacities, but may converge to the equilibrium prediction in the long run with low 
capacities. The data of individual price choices feature dynamic patterns that can potentially 
be explained by both Edgeworth price cycles and imitation of the price set by the competitor. 
JEL classification: C72, C90, D43, L13. 
Key words: Bertrand-Edgeworth, demand rationing, Edgeworth cycles, oligopoly, laboratory 
experiment. 
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1 Introduction 
Edgeworth's (1925) enhancements of Bertrand's (1883) price competition model 
tremendously complicate its game-theoretic solution. Specifically, the Nash equilibrium 
becomes contingent on the rule according to which demand is rationed. Compared to other 
market institutions, few experiments have so far been conducted to investigate price oligopoly 
with capacity constraints. 
   We follow the seminal experiment by Kruse et al. (1994) in that we consider price 
competition in markets with fixed, exogenously given capacity constraints. Our study, to the 
best of our knowledge, is the first to investigate the effect of demand rationing in such a 
setting. The two demand rationing rules most prominent in the literature are considered: 
proportional and efficient rationing. Moreover, we vary the amount of capacity available to 
each firm in the market. 
   We find that the seemingly minor change in demand rationing entails a significant effect. 
Prices and profits are higher with proportional than with efficient rationing. Furthermore, in 
accordance with earlier findings, lower capacities yield higher prices and profits. These 
effects are predicted qualitatively by the Nash equilibria for the single treatments. However, 
our data do not fit the Nash predictions quantitatively. This holds even for the treatment with 
low capacities and efficient rationing where the Nash equilibrium is in pure strategies. The 
empirical mean price is significantly higher than the expected mean price in Nash equilibrium 
in all treatments. Profits are significantly higher than the Nash predictions in the treatments 
with high capacities, but approach Nash predictions in the long run in the treatments with low 
capacities. Alternative, off-equilibrium concepts that may rationalize the empirical data are 
Edgeworth price cycles brought about by myopic best response pricing and imitation of the 
price set by the competitor in the past. Both of these concepts are able to partially explain 
empirical price choices; Edgeworth's myopic best response theory does somewhat better. A 
simultaneous test of the two alternative concepts is impeded by excessive collinearity. 
Therefore, a definite answer cannot be given to the question which of the two alternative 
concepts is the true driver of the dynamic pricing patterns in the data. 
   The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Sections 2 and 3 briefly review the 
theory and existing experimental evidence concerning Bertrand-Edgeworth markets with 
fixed capacities. Section 4 describes the market setting of our experiment, and section 5 
presents the associated outcomes for prices and profits in benchmark situations. The 
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experimental procedures are explained in section 6. Section 7 states our hypotheses. Our 
experimental results are presented in section 8. Section 9 concludes. 
2 Theoretical background 
Bertrand's (1883) model of simultaneous price oligopoly yields the odd prediction that there 
will be perfect competition with marginal cost pricing and zero profits as soon as there are at 
least two firms in the market. That results from the assumption that each firm can produce any 
quantity at constant marginal costs. Edgeworth (1925) abandoned this assumption in order to 
receive a model with more realistic results. He assumed instead that firms' production 
capacities are constrained. The capacity constraints may be either exogenously given or 
endogenously imposed by introducing increasing marginal production costs, such that further 
production becomes unprofitable from some point. 
   While Edgeworth's modifications make the model more realistic, they also make it 
considerably more complicated. There is in general no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. 
The existence of Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies in the Bertrand-Edgeworth setting has 
been proven only in the 1980s (Dixon, 1984; Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986; Maskin, 1986). 
 
Figure 1: Proportional (a) and efficient (b) demand rationing. 
   Equilibrium depends on how demand is rationed if firms choose different prices. Two 
assumptions about demand rationing are prominent in the literature: proportional and efficient 
rationing. Proportional rationing means that customers are served in random order, such that a 
b
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fraction of randomly oedered customers, if any, is left for firms with higher prices. In 
contrast, under efficient rationing those customers with the highest willingness to pay are 
served first. Customers with a lower willingness to pay, if any, are then left for firms with 
higher prices. The quantity a firm is able to sell at a higher price will therefore be higher 
under proportional than under efficient rationing. Figure 1 illustrates the rationing rules 
graphically for a duopoly with linear total demand  = 1000 − . The bold line 
represents residual demand for firm 2 at varying prices , given that firm 1 is willing to sell 
quantity  = 300 at price  = 200. Whereas under proportional rationing the demand curve 
is rotated around the reservation price to obtain residual demand, it is shifted leftwards in 
parallel under efficient rationing. 
   For several special cases of Bertrand-Edgeworth markets with exogenous capacity 
constraints the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium has been characterized. Beckmann (1967) 
dealt with the symmetric duopoly with linear total demand under proportional demand 
rationing. The equilibrium for the otherwise same situation under efficient demand rationing 
was described by Levitan and Shubik (1972). Vives (1986) generalized the analysis under 
efficient rationing to markets with more than two firms and non-linear demand (retaining the 
symmetry assumption). Osborne and Pitchik (1986) provided a generalization for the duopoly 
under efficient rationing to firms with asymmetric capacities and non-linear demand. 
Beckmann's results were corrected and generalized by Allen and Hellwig (1993) who 
provided a complete characterization of the equilibrium pricing strategies in the duopoly with 
proportional rationing and established uniqueness of equilibrium under weak conditions. 
More recently, Hirata (2009) and De Francesco and Salvadori (2010) analyzed the triopoly 
under efficient demand rationing. De Francesco and Salvadori (2013) established uniqueness 
of the equilibrium characterized by Vives and extended the analysis to some asymmetric 
capacity combinations.
1
 
3 Related experiments 
Compared to the multitude of market experiments concerned with the standard models by 
Cournot and Bertrand, experiments in the more complex Bertrand-Edgeworth setting are still 
scarce. The first experimental investigation of Bertrand-Edgeworth markets with exogenous 
capacities is the seminal study by Kruse et al. (1994). They varied capacities and the amount 
                                                 
1
 The analysis of a special case of the duopoly with linear demand and asymmetric capacities can also be found 
in the appendix of Levitan and Shubik (1972). 
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of information firms have about cost and demand in symmetric oligopolies with four firms. 
An isoelastic demand function and proportional demand rationing were employed. The 
different capacity conditions gave rise to different mixed-strategy pricing Nash equilibria. 
Kruse et al. found that higher capacities leaded to lower prices while the variation of 
information did not entail a significant effect on prices. Subjects did not price according to the 
Nash equilibrium, but on average set higher prices. The dynamics of individual price choices 
can be explained by a partial adjustment to the myopic best response to the other firms' prices 
in the last period (as proposed by Edgeworth's price cycle theory). 
   Fonseca and Normann (2013) also found a negative effect of capacities on prices in a 
similar setting. Moreover, they conducted both duopoly and triopoly treatments and observed 
that prices in the latter are lower when total capacity in the market is held constant. Again, 
prices exceeded the equilibrium predictions. On the whole, Edgeworth's theory of myopic 
price adjustment rationalized the data better than the Nash equilibrium concept. In another 
study, Fonseca and Normann (2008) also considered asymmetric capacity distributions. 
Asymmetry had a clear price-declining effect and even resulted in average prices below the 
Nash equilibrium prediction. 
   The finding that behavior according to the Nash equilibrium is too demanding in Bertrand-
Edgeworth settings is corroborated by Heymann et al. (2014). They found that the pricing 
dynamics in their experiment can be explained by a simple heuristic: A subject raises her 
price by a certain increment as long as she does not fully utilize her capacity. In contrast, she 
lowers her price by that increment when she cannot sell up to her capacity. 
   This study is to our knowledge the first to investigate the effect of demand rationing in 
Bertrand-Edgeworth markets with exogenous capacities.
2
 However, demand rationing has 
been varied in related experiments of price competition with convex costs (Kruse, 1993; 
Jacobs and Requate, 2016) and two-stage games of capacity-setting and subsequent pricing à 
la Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) (Lepore and Shafran, 2013; Jacobs, 2016). All those studies 
have found that, independently of the direction of the predicted effect, proportional demand 
rationing yields higher prices than efficient demand rationing. 
                                                 
2
 Buchheit and Feltovich (2011) conducted a Bertrand-Edgeworth market experiment with exogenous capacity 
constraints and employed six different demand rationing schemes. However, demand rationing is not a treatment 
variable in their design. Rather, they investigated the effect of sunk fixed costs. In all their treatments, before 
each round one of the six rationing schemes is randomly determined to be effective in the next round. While 
Buchheit and Feltovich inform their subjects in the instructions which six rationing schemes can occur, subjects 
do not know the effective rationing scheme in the current round when they make their price choice. 
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4 The market setting 
We consider experimental duopoly markets where the two symmetric supplying firms offer a 
single homogenous good and compete in prices. Competition takes place repeatedly over 
several periods. In each period, firms are confronted with the linear market demand function  = 1000 − . Each firm can supply at most j units in each period; market capacity thus 
equals 2j. Capacity per firm is one of the two treatment variables. In the high-cap treatments j = 500 while in the low-cap treatments j = 300. For simplicity, production costs are set to 
zero, but the setting can easily be generalized to constant marginal costs up to the capacity 
constraint by appropriate rescaling. Any unsold capacity forfeits and cannot be transferred to 
the next period. For example, the setting may resemble competition between two retail firms 
which sell a perishable and are bound by long-term wholesale contracts, such that both 
quantity and unit price of their purchases are given and the accompanying costs are sunk. 
   The quantity a firm sells in a given period can be at most its capacity. Furthermore, the sales 
quantity  of firm  depends on the prices  and , the two firms choose and on the effective 
demand rationing scheme, the second treatment variable. Under efficient demand rationing, it 
is given by 
-, , , j. =  max0,min 1000 − , j!  < ,max0,min 500 − /2, j!  = ,max0,min 1000 − j − , j!  > , . 
In case  has chosen a higher price than s, a different sales quantity for  results under 
proportional demand rationing: 
00-, , , j. =
"#$
#% max0,min 1000 − , j!  < ,max0,min 500 − /2, j!  = ,
max 0,min (1000 −  *1 − j1000 − ,4 , j5  > ,
. 
As there are no costs, firm 's profit in a given period is equal to its revenue: @-, , , j. =-, , , j.. 
5 Benchmark outcomes 
As benchmark cases we calculate the market outcome in our model under full competition as 
well as under full collusion. While those outcomes depend on the market capacity, they do not 
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depend on the effective rationing scheme since both firms charge the same price in the 
benchmark settings. 
   The outcome under full competition is described graphically by the intersection of market 
supply and market demand in Figure 2. If there is enough capacity in the market to satisfy all 
demand, the competitive price is zero; otherwise the competitive price is given by the price at 
which market demand equals market capacity. Formally, 0 = max 0,1000 − 2j!. The 
corresponding individual sales quantities and profits are 0 = min 500, j! and @0 =max 0, j1000 − 2j!. 
 
Figure 2: Market supply and market demand. 
   Under full collusion, in case the market capacity is at least 500, both firms charge a price of 
500 maximizing joint profit. Even higher prices occur if market capacity is smaller,  =max 500,1000 − 2j!. Quantities and profits under full collusion are  = min 250, j! 
and @ =  125000 j ≥ 250j1000 − 2j j < 250. 
   Another benchmark is the Nash equilibrium outcome of the stage game.
3
 For the relatively 
simple case of duopoly with symmetric capacities we consider, for both proportional and 
efficient rationing Nash equilibrium has been characterized and its uniqueness has been 
                                                 
3
 In principle, since interaction takes place repeatedly over several periods, one may also expect supergame 
effects that lead to a more collusive conduct than predicted by the Nash equilibrium of the stage game. However, 
our experiment lasted for a given number of periods that was disclosed to the subjects ex ante. Thus, backward 
induction applies and the predictions for the stage game remain valid. Moreover, Kruse (1993) found that the 
stage-game Nash equilibrium can be a good predictor of behavior in a Bertrand-Edgeworth market experiment 
even if subjects are not informed about the number of periods to be played. 
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proven. The analysis of the case with efficient demand rationing is due to Levitan and Shubik 
(1972).
4
 For j ≤ 1000/3, which is fulfilled in our low-cap condition, the Nash equilibrium is 
in pure strategies with  = 1000 − 2j and @ = j1000 − 2j. For j ≥ 1000, price 
and profit in Nash equilibrium are zero. In the remaining interval, 1000/3 < j < 1000, there 
is a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. For our high-cap treatment condition with j = 500, 
the cumulative distribution function (cdf) describing the mixed-strategy pricing Nash 
equilibrium is given by 
Φnn, = "$
% 0  < 125500 − 62500 125 ≤  < 2501 250 ≤  . 
   Under proportional demand rationing, we have  = 1000 − 2j and @ =j1000 − 2j for j ≤ 250 and again zero price and profit for j ≥ 1000. Nash equilibrium 
is in mixed strategies in the capacity range 250 < j < 1000, that is, in both our high-cap and 
in our low-cap condition. From the more general analysis by Allen and Hellwig (1993) it 
emerges that the cdf in our market setting is described by the integral equation 
Φ00
=
"#$
#% 0  < 1 − j 1000 − 2j − 1000 +  1000 − 21000 − .z√2j − 1000 +  
z
0  ≤  < 5001 500 ≤ 
, 
where  is determined by the condition Φ00 = 0. For the case j = 500, a closed-form 
solution is provided by Beckmann (1967),
5
 
Φnn,00 =
"#$
#%1
0  < 
− 10001 − 431000 −  + 13 D1000 −  E  ≤  < 5001 500 ≤ 
, 
with  ≈ 171.773. For j = 300, we calculated the closed-form solution 
                                                 
4
 Levitan and Shubik as well as Beckmann below dealt with the normalized demand function  = 1 − . The 
results presented here have been adapted to fit the demand function in our experiment. 
5
 Beckmann considered the case of symmetric duopoly with linear market demand and provided closed-form 
solutions for any capacity. Yet, since he erroneously assumed 1000 − j instead of 500 to be the upper limit of 
the integral, his results are invalid except for the case j = 500. 
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Φ,00
=
"#
###
$
###
#% 0 																																																																																																																															 < 1 −  3100001000 −  − 400  −√50.5.z12√0.5 + 2.25arctan D 1√8E
+ 5x.z3 F1 − 1000I.z
1000 − 5 − 2000 (4 1 − 1000 D 7200000  − 291000  + 6E
− 91000 * 1000 − 4  100 − 4arctan * 4000 − 72¡2000 − 2¡5 − 20004¢  ≤  < 5001 																																																																																																																																500 ≤ 
, 
with  ≈ 404.644. 
   Figure 3 shows a plot of the Nash equilibrium cdf's for all four treatments. Given the cdf's, 
we can calculate the expected price and profit in Nash equilibrium. Table 1 summarizes the 
benchmark prices and profits for all treatments.
6
 
 
Figure 3: Cumulative distribution functions of the pricing Nash equilibria. 
                                                 
6
 Calculating expected prices and profits in the mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, we took into account that in our 
actual experimental setting price is not a continuous choice variable, but only integer prices were permissible. In 
order to discretize the setting, we took as probability that an integer price ∗ is chosen the value of the cdf at this 
price minus the value of the cdf at ∗ − 1, i.e. £[¤∗ = Φ∗ − Φ∗ − 1. The stated expected prices 
and profits as well as the accompanying standard deviations therefore differ slightly from the results with 
continuous pricing. 
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Full Competition Full Collusion Nash Equilibrium 
high, eff 
0 = 0  = 500 ¦ = 153.929 §0 = 24.570 @0 = 0 @ = 125000 ¦@ = 62667.833 §¨ = 9518.569 
high, prop 
0 = 0  = 500 ¦ = 233.779 §0 = 58.378 @0 = 0 @ = 125000 ¦@ = 86017.658 §¨ = 20128.786 
low, eff 
0 = 400  = 500  = 400 
@0 = 120000 @ = 125000 @ = 120000 
low, prop 
0 = 400  = 500 ¦ = 416.933 §0 = 14.655 @0 = 120000 @ = 125000 ¦@ = 121433.871 §¨ = 2223.262 
Table 1: Benchmark outcomes. 
6 Experimental procedures 
Combining two capacity conditions with two rationing schemes, we obtained four different 
treatments. The treatments are named according to their capacity condition ("high" or "low") 
followed by their effective rationing scheme ("eff" for efficient or "prop" for proportional). 
Two sessions of each treatment were conducted at the economics experimental lab at Kiel 
University during April and May 2015. Due to no-shows of subjects, the number of markets 
per treatment varies between 10 and 14. 96 subjects from all fields of study participated in the 
experiment;
7
 each subject took part only once. 
   At the beginning of each session, subjects were randomly allocated to computer terminals in 
the lab. They received printed instructions that provided full information about the market 
setting, but were not told any of the benchmark outcomes mentioned in the last section.
8
 After 
reading, the key features from the instructions were repeated by the experimenter in a short 
presentation. Then the actual experiment started which was computerized using the z-tree 
software (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects first played three unpaid trial rounds, then were re-
matched and played 20 paid rounds in fixed groups. The number of rounds to be played was 
common knowledge. In each round, each subject had to decide on her sales price. Integers 
                                                 
7
 The hroot software package (Bock et al., 2014) was used for subject recruitment. 
8
 Instructions for a sample treatment are included in Appendix A. 
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from 0 to 1000 were admissible prices. Buyers were simulated by the computer. Throughout 
the experiment, subjects could use a profit calculator implemented in the software. The profit 
calculator returned a subject's sales quantity and profit when two hypothetical sales prices 
were entered. After each round, subjects were informed about the prices chosen in that round 
and about their resulting own sales quantity and profit. In the end, subjects were paid the sum 
of their earnings from all paid rounds at a predefined exchange rate.
9
 Payments were made in 
private. An average session took about 80 minutes, including time for instructions and 
payment. The average payment per subject amounted to 16.1 Euro. 
7 Hypotheses 
Taking into account the benchmark outcomes from section 5 and the results of the related 
experiments mentioned in section 3, we set up hypotheses about the experimental outcome. 
The first two hypotheses concern the effects of the two treatment variables. 
Hypothesis 1: Prices and profits will be higher in the low-cap than in the high-cap 
condition. 
Hypothesis 2: Prices and profits will be higher with proportional than with efficient 
demand rationing. 
The hypotheses follow from the Nash equilibrium predictions stated in Table 1. Moreover, 
evidence from the experiments by Kruse et al. (1994) and Fonseca and Normann (2013) 
supports Hypothesis 1. The effect of demand rationing has not yet been investigated 
experimentally in the market setting we employ, but support for Hypothesis 2 stems from the 
experiments by Kruse (1993) and Jacobs and Requate (2016) which consider the closely 
related setting of price competition with convex production costs. 
   While the first two hypotheses are only qualitative, the Nash equilibrium predictions allow 
us to set up also quantitative hypotheses. Assuming behavior in accordance with Nash 
equilibrium, we formulate the next two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: The distribution of individual price choices in each treatment will follow 
the probability distribution predicted by the respective Nash equilibrium. 
Hypothesis 4: The mean price and profit in each treatment will equal the expected 
mean price and profit in the respective Nash equilibrium. 
As it is quite demanding to expect that the experimental data will fit the Nash prediction even 
in their distributions, we take Hypothesis 4 as an alternative to test a somewhat weaker 
accordance of the data with Nash equilibrium theory. However, the studies by Kruse et al. 
                                                 
9
 The exchange rate was 1 Euro per 120,000 experimental currency units (ECU) in the high-cap treatments and 1 
Euro per 150,000 ECU in the low-cap treatments. 
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(1994) and Fonseca and Normann (2013) support neither of the two hypotheses. They found 
that pricing within the same market across periods is not independent as the Nash predictions 
purport. Instead, they observed dynamic pricing patterns that can be explained by Edgeworth's 
off-equilibrium theory of price cycles which come about when subjects myopically optimize 
taking past prices as fixed. Hence, our next hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: Individual price choices will follow a myopic best response rationale as 
purported by Edgeworth's price cycling theory. 
Yet, as investigated in Jacobs and Requate (2016) for Bertrand-Edgeworth markets with 
convex costs, still another possible behavioral pattern is that subjects just imitate past prices 
of their competitor: 
Hypothesis 6: Individual price choices will be based on imitation of the other firm's 
price observed in the last round. 
We thus have two opposing hypotheses of off-equilibrium behavior that provide alternatives 
to the Nash predictions. 
8 Results 
We divide the presentation of our results into two parts. Hypotheses 1 and 2 are concerned 
with how the market outcome is affected by variations of the treatment variables in the 
experiment. We therefore use data aggregated on the market level to evaluate those 
hypotheses. Hypotheses 3 to 6, in contrast, pertain to individual price choices and the 
resulting individual profits. Consequently, data on the individual level have to be considered 
for an assessment. 
8.1 Market performance 
As measures to assess market performance, we use the market price and the average profit per 
firm in a market. The market price is the quantity-weighted average of the prices the single 
firms in a given market and period set; it equals total revenue divided by total sales quantity 
in a given market and period. The average profit per firm equals the total profit realized in a 
given market and period divided by two, the number of firms in each market. Thus, for both 
price and profit we have one observation per market and period. 
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Figure 4: Series of market prices. 
 
Figure 5: Series of average profits per firm. 
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Panel A: Market Prices 
periods 1-20 1-10 11-20 
high, eff 259.007 285.382 232.633 
(77.847) (82.528) (62.864) 
  [232.878] [277.292] [211.335] 
high, prop 289.050 295.967 282.133 
(65.447) (68.715) (61.495) 
  [276.611] [284.716] [269.512] 
low, eff 419.820 421.907 417.732 
(30.444) (38.118) (20.009) 
  [416.076] [423.053] [411.957] 
low, prop 461.447 464.901 457.994 
(36.394) (39.530) (32.798) 
  [462.162] [467.435] [453.909] 
Panel B: Average Profits per Firm 
periods 1-20 1-10 11-20 
high, eff 88,409.2 92,330.6 84,487.8 
(16,266.9) (16,813.2) (14,746.8) 
  [85,039.750] [93,119.750] [80,836.000] 
high, prop 99,673.1 101,233.6 98,112.6 
(11,865.9) (12,955.0) (10,485.6) 
  [98,871.325] [101,379.125] [95,987.100] 
low, eff 117,270.9 114,864.8 119,677.1 
(8,461.3) (11,255.9) (2,337.4) 
  [120,000.000] [119,077.000] [120,000.000] 
low, prop 122,772.4 122,336.0 123,208.7 
(3,648.2) (4,632.4) (2,215.7) 
[123,680.325] [123,648.475] [123,708.525] 
Standard errors in parentheses. Medians in square brackets. 
Table 2: Market prices (Panel A) and profits (Panel B): Summary statistics. 
   Aggregating data from different markets in the same treatment, Figures 4 and 5 illustrate 
how prices and profits develop throughout the experiment in the different treatments.
10
 Table 
2 presents the corresponding numbers, combining data from several periods for conciseness. 
The graphical impression from Figures 4 and 5 supports Hypotheses 1 and 2. Prices and 
profits are considerably higher in the low-cap than in the high-cap treatments. Whereas the 
effect of demand rationing is somewhat less sizable, the results appear clear-cut also in this 
respect. Holding capacity constant and comparing the data points in Figures 4 and 5 pairwise, 
we find that prices and profits are almost always higher under proportional than under 
efficient rationing. The only exception to this can be found in the first four periods where in 
                                                 
10
 Figures showing the development of market prices within single markets can be found in Appendix B. 
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the high-cap condition the market price is somewhat higher under efficient than under 
proportional rationing. 
   For a formal statistical analysis, we compare market prices and profits between two 
treatments within single periods with nonparametric Mann-Whitney tests. For conciseness, we 
restrict our attention to the data from the second half of the experiment (periods 11 to 20). The 
implications of our results do not change if all periods are considered. For each treatment 
variable, two pairwise treatment comparisons apply: To investigate the effect of capacity, data 
from treatment "high, eff" ("high, prop") are compared to data from "low, eff" ("low, prop"). 
The effect of the rationing scheme is examined by comparing data from "high, eff" ("low, 
eff") to data from "high, prop" ("low, prop"). That is, for both prices and profits we conduct 
20 significance tests per treatment variable (2 pairwise treatment comparisons multiplied by 
10 periods). 
Panel A: Market Prices 
significance test results 
   < 0.01 0.01 ≤  < 0.05 0.05 ≤  < 0.1  ≥ 0.1 
effect of capacity 
"high, eff" vs. "low, eff" 10/10 0/10 0/10 0/10 
"high, prop" vs. "low, prop" 10/10 0/10 0/10 0/10 
     effect of the rationing scheme 
"high, eff" vs. "high, prop" 2/10 5/10 2/10 1/10 
"low, eff" vs. "low, prop" 6/10 4/10 0/10 0/10 
Panel B: Average Profits per Firm 
significance test results 
   < 0.01 0.01 ≤  < 0.05 0.05 ≤  < 0.1  ≥ 0.1 
effect of capacity 
"high, eff" vs. "low, eff" 10/10 0/10 0/10 0/10 
"high, prop" vs. "low, prop" 10/10 0/10 0/10 0/10 
     effect of the rationing scheme 
"high, eff" vs. "high, prop" 5/10 4/10 0/10 1/10 
"low, eff" vs. "low, prop" 10/10 0/10 0/10 0/10 
Pairwise comparison of treatments in periods 11 to 20. Frequencies of results of two-tailed Mann-
Whitney tests. Table entries in the first three columns indicate the number of cases in which the null 
hypothesis of equal medians is rejected at the displayed significance level in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis that the median is higher in the second treatment. 
Table 3: Market prices (Panel A) and profits (Panel B): Results of significance tests for 
treatment effects. 
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   The test results are summarized in Table 3. The results concerning the effect of capacity are 
as clear-cut as they can be: Every single test result is significant at the one percent level.
11
 
Both prices and profits are significantly higher in the low-cap than in the high-cap condition. 
We also find a consistently significant effect of the rationing scheme although the results are 
somewhat less powerful. Comparing prices in the two high-cap treatments, the effect of 
rationing becomes significant in period 12 and remains significant thereafter. In the low-cap 
treatments there is a significant effect in all periods. The same pattern holds for the profit 
data. Hence, Hypotheses 1 and 2 are strongly supported, and we conclude: 
Result 1: Prices and profits are significantly higher in the low-cap than in the high-cap 
condition. 
Result 2: Prices and profits are significantly higher with proportional than with efficient 
demand rationing. 
8.2 Individual-level data 
As the Nash equilibrium makes predictions about individual pricing, we examine our data on 
the individual level in order to test the accordance of our subjects' behavior with the Nash 
equilibrium prediction. Hypothesis 3 purports that the distribution of individual prices in each 
treatment will follow the respective Nash distribution. Figure 6 for each treatment plots the 
cdf of empirical price choices against the predicted cdf. It can be seen that the empirical cdf's 
almost entirely lie to the right of the predicted cdf's. That is, subjects largely choose higher 
prices than predicted. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests allow us to clearly reject Hypothesis 3. In 
each treatment, the maximum difference between the values of the empirical and the predicted 
cdf is at least 0.43. The accompanying probability that the empirical and the predicted price 
distribution are identical is smaller than 10b© in each case. If one assumes that subjects need 
some incentivized trials to learn optimal pricing behavior and hence considers only the price 
choices from period 11 onwards for the empirical cdf's, the test results remain strongly 
significant. 
Result 3: The distribution of individual price choices does not follow the probability 
distribution predicted by the respective Nash equilibrium. 
   However, it still can be that some qualities of the Nash equilibrium predictions are 
contained in the empirical data. We first test for each treatment whether the empirical mean 
price equals the predicted mean in Nash equilibrium. As mentioned in the above paragraph, 
from Figure 6 it appears that higher prices than predicted are chosen. That impression is 
                                                 
11
 All -values refer to two-tailed tests. 
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confirmed by the test results. The null hypothesis of equal means can be rejected at the one 
percent level for each treatment (c-tests). This still holds if only price choices from periods 11 
to 20 are included. The test results are visualized in Figure 7. Figure 7 for each treatment 
shows the 99 percent confidence interval of the empirical mean price (from all periods) 
together with the Nash equilibrium prediction. The result that prices are higher than the Nash 
equilibrium prediction is in accordance with the findings in Kruse et al. (1994) and in Fonseca 
and Normann (2013). Moreover, it can be seen that the difference between the empirical mean 
price and its Nash prediction is larger in the high-cap treatments, which confirms another 
observation by Fonseca and Normann. 
 
Figure 6: Empirical cumulative distribution functions (blue) and Nash equilibrium predictions 
(red). 
   At first sight, it appears especially noteworthy that pricing behavior significantly deviates 
from the Nash prediction even in the "low, eff" treatment where the Nash equilibrium is in 
pure strategies and pricing according to that equilibrium promises fairly high profits. Yet, 
while the chosen prices are significantly higher than the Nash equilibrium prediction, subjects 
may have little incentive to price exactly according to the Nash equilibrium when the payoff 
function is flat. This pertains especially to our low-cap treatments where the (expected) profits 
in all benchmark outcomes are close to each other (recall Table 1). Therefore, we also 
compare realized profits to their equilibrium predictions. For the two high-cap treatments, the 
test results are clear. Profits are significantly higher than the Nash prediction, no matter 
Demand Rationing in Bertrand-Edgeworth Markets with Fixed Capacities 
125 
 
whether one considers all periods or only periods 11 to 20 (all ]s < 0.01, c-tests). The 
results for the low-cap treatments are somewhat ambiguous. In the "low, eff" treatment, 
profits are significantly lower than predicted by the Nash equilibrium if data from all periods 
are included ( < 0.01). However, if one includes only the data from periods 11 to 20, profits 
are not significantly different from the Nash equilibrium profit ( = 0.45). It may be that 
learning takes place in the first periods of the experiment and subjects adjust their pricing 
behavior towards the Nash equilibrium, such that profits then converge towards the 
equilibrium level. Due to the flatness of the payoff function, this can lead to a situation where 
prices are still significantly different from the benchmark, but profits are not. In the "low, 
prop" treatment, profits are higher than the Nash prediction. The difference is weakly 
significant ( < 0.1) for both periods 1 to 20 and periods 11 to 20. 
 
Figure 7: 99 percent confidence intervals of empirical mean prices and Nash equilibrium 
predictions (circles). 
   These results indicate that we cannot generally exclude ex ante that there are dynamic 
patterns which lead to long-run convergence to Nash equilibrium prices and profits. In order 
to investigate such possible dynamics, we set up two regressions. The first regression 
equation has the form 
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,a =+D,o, 1c + ,o,E + p,a.
y
,L  
The endogenous variable ,a is the individual price chosen by subject  in period c. o,, s = 1,… ,4, is a set of treatment dummy variables. In the first summand in the brackets on the 
right hand side of the equation, the treatment dummies are interacted with the inverse of the 
period, 1/c. The , coefficients hence account for treatment-specific time trends. The , 
coefficients measure the long-run price convergence level in treatment s. An analogous 
regression equation is set up for profits. In the second equation the endogenous variable is the 
profit subject  realizes in period c; the right hand side of the equation remains unchanged. 
Dependent Variable Individual Price Individual Profit 
  (1) (2) nn, 195.341*** 8,139.560 
(19.044) (7,688.602) nn,00 25.340 11,187.087 
(19.763) (7,978.840) , 42.505** -18,185.939** 
(21.485) (8,673.913) ,00 43.652* -2,014.018 
(22.534) (9,097.277) nn, 229.562*** 83,319.644*** 
(7.007) (1,591.999) nn,00 301.549*** 96,701.571*** 
(7.271) (1,652.096) , 415.193*** 120,575.874*** 
(7.905) (1,796.017) ,00 453.817*** 123,536.027*** 
  (8.290) (1,883.679) 
Observations 1,920 1,920 
Adjusted R
2
 0.258 0.181 
GLS regressions with clustered errors on the individual level. Clustered standard errors 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
Table 4: Convergence of individual prices and profits: Regression results. 
   Generalized least squares (GLS) estimations are performed to account for possible 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity of prices set by the same subject in different periods. 
The regression results are presented in Table 4.
12
 The  coefficient estimates in the first 
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 We also ran an extended version of the two regressions which included individual characteristics of the 
subjects (age, gender, and field of study) as exogenous variables. While these characteristics have no significant 
effect on price choices, there are two significant, albeit small, effects on realized profits: Females earn about 
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regression indicate that there is a significant downward time trend for prices in three of the 
four treatments. The price decline over time is most pronounced in the "high, eff" treatment. 
In the "high, prop" treatment there is no observable time trend in prices. The picture is more 
diverse in the second regression concerning the profit data. For the two high-cap treatments, 
we find a downward time trend as for prices, but the effect is not significant. In the two low-
cap treatments, in contrast, profits increase over time. The time trend is significant only in the 
treatment with efficient rationing. 
   The estimates of the  coefficients allow us to test whether prices and profits converge to 
their Nash equilibrium levels in the long run (c-tests). We find that the price convergence 
levels are significantly higher than the Nash equilibrium predictions in all treatments. 
Whereas the result is significant at the one percent level in the three other treatments, we 
observe only weak significance at the ten percent level in the "low, eff" treatment. One can 
speculate that this is due to the fact that the Nash equilibrium for this treatment is in pure 
strategies and the equilibrium price of 400 has some attraction. Indeed, the exact equilibrium 
price accounts for 34 percent of all price choices in the treatment. In periods 11 to 20, the 
share is even higher; we then observe 44 percent exact Nash equilibrium price choices. 
   The profit convergence levels are significantly higher than the Nash equilibrium predictions 
at the one percent level in the two high-cap treatments. In contrast, we cannot reject equality 
of the convergence levels to equilibrium profits in the low-cap treatments ( = 0.75 in "low, 
eff",  = 0.26 in "low, prop"). Moreover, for the "low, prop" treatment we can neither reject 
equality to the benchmark profit under full collusion ( = 0.44).13 
   On the whole, we have found very limited support for Hypothesis 4. Prices are considerably 
higher than the Nash equilibrium predictions and do not converge to equilibrium levels either. 
As to profits, these conclusions hold only for the high-cap treatments. In the treatments with 
low capacities, however, profits are close to their equilibrium predictions in the long run. 
Result 4: With high capacities, the mean price and profit are higher than the expected 
mean price and profit in the respective Nash equilibrium. With low capacities, the mean 
price is higher than the expected mean price in the respective Nash equilibrium, but the 
mean profit converges to a level close to the expected Nash equilibrium profit. 
   Having found that the Nash equilibrium concept has little explaining power for our 
empirical data, we turn to the alternative off-equilibrium concepts formulated in Hypotheses 5 
                                                                                                                                                        
4,500 ECU less per round than males ( < 0.01, c-test), and subjects who study economics or a related subject 
earn about 3,600 ECU more per round than subjects with other fields of study ( < 0.05). 
13
 In the three other treatments, the profit convergence levels are smaller than the collusive benchmark profit at 
least at the five percent level. Price convergence levels are significantly smaller than the collusive benchmark 
price at the one percent level in all four treatments. 
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and 6. In order to investigate the presence of myopic best response pricing or price imitation 
in our data, we estimate the regression equation ,a − ,ab =  + -PQ-,,ab. − ,ab. + -,,ab − ,ab. + p,a. 
The endogenous variable ,a − ,ab is the change of subject 's price choice compared to her 
choice in the last period. PQ-,,ab. is the best response price of subject  to the price set by 
subject s, the other subject in the same market, in the last period. The  coefficient thus 
measures the share of adaptation to the best response price. In case each subject in each period 
sets the price which is the best response to the price she has observed in the last period, i.e. ,a = PQ-,,ab., we have perfect myopic best response pricing as Edgeworth's theory 
suggests. The  then takes a value of one. Imitation is included as an additional explaining 
factor. The  coefficient measures the share by which subject  adapts her price choice in 
period c to the price chosen by subject s in period c − 1. The  takes a value of one if each 
subject in each period mimics the price the other subject in the market has set one period 
before. 
   The regression model originates from Kruse et al. (1994), but has been enlarged to consider 
also imitation, such that Hypotheses 5 and 6 can be tested against each other. A similar 
approach is pursued in Jacobs and Requate (2016). The results from those studies indicate that 
one should not expect that one of the two factors completely explains empirical pricing 
patterns. Coefficient estimates have not been close to one for either factor. Instead, it has been 
observed that, depending on the exact experimental setting, only one of the factors or both 
factors can have a significant impact, but in any case adjustment has been only partial.
14
 That 
is, we expect that either both the  and the  coefficient or only one of them will be 
significant, and that any significant coefficient will be positive, but smaller than one. 
   Note that our specification includes both adaptation to subject s's price and adaptation to the 
best response price, which, in turn, is a function of subject s's price. In all treatments, there is 
some price interval in which the best response is to underbid subject s's price by one ECU, the 
smallest admissible increment. Collinearity may therefore be a serious issue with this 
specification. As a consequence, we consider two more regressions with a restricted version 
of the model in which either of the two factors is dropped, i.e. we let either  = 0 or  = 0. 
                                                 
14
 The Figures in Appendix B show price fluctuations in some markets, but a more or less monotone price 
decline in others. Note that in the "low, eff" treatment Edgeworth's myopic best response rationale does not 
predict price cycles either since there is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. 
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Dependent Variable de,f − de,fbg 
(1) (2) (3) 
Restriction None  = 0  = 0  -1.659 -5.026*** -2.605 
(1.912) (1.921) (1.883)  0.713*** 0.513*** 
(0.076) (0.020)  -0.194*** 0.451*** 
  (0.072) (0.019)   
Observations 1,824 1,824 1,824 
Adjusted R
2
 0.272 0.238 0.270 
Ordinary least squares regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
Table 5: Best response pricing and imitation: Regression results. 
   Table 5 presents the regression results. Specification (1) allows for both myopic best 
response and imitation effects. Whereas the  coefficient is significant and lies between zero 
and one as expected, the  coefficient is significantly negative. This would mean that subjects 
react to other prices with counter-adaptation, i.e. if a subject observes that the other firm in 
her market has set a lower price than her, she would raise her price, and vice versa. Such a 
behavioral pattern does not appear to make any sense. In synopsis with regressions (2) and 
(3), the results of regression (1) appear as an artifact of overfitting due to excessive 
collinearity in our data. The bivariate correlation coefficient between the two factors is as high 
as 0.965; the corresponding variance inflation factors of the two coefficients in regression (1) 
are around 15, which indicates considerable collinearity. If only one factor is included in the 
estimation, the respective coefficient is roughly equal to the sum of the two coefficients in 
regression (1),
15
 i.e. the joint effect of the two factors in regression (1) can be reproduced in 
the more parsimonious specifications (2) and (3). Comparing specifications (2) and (3), the 
best response pricing rationale supposed in regression (3) explains a higher share of the 
variance in the data than price imitation in regression (2). The difference between models (1) 
and (3) in the share of explained variance is negligible; thus, specification (3) appears to 
provide the best fit to the data.
16
 
                                                 
15
 Letting subscripts denote the regression from which a coefficient estimate originates, we can reject the null 
hypothesis  +  =  ( < 0.01, c-test), but we cannot reject that  +  = x ( = 0.77). 
16
 We could not find any treatment-specific effects. Substituting the respective exogenous variable in regressions 
(2) and (3) by interactions of this variable with dummy variables for all treatments does not improve the fit of the 
regressions. Neither can the hypothesis be rejected that all four treatment-specific coefficients are equal ( =0.22 and  = 0.67, respectively, _-tests). 
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   As to our Hypotheses 5 and 6, our conclusions have to remain reluctant. After all, the 
pricing patterns in our data can be explained by either myopic best response behavior or 
imitation (or a mixture of both). Although Edgeworth's myopic best response rationale fits the 
data better if only one explaining factor is considered, it does not follow that an imitation 
effect is absent since the two factors are highly collinear. In regressions (2) and (3), an effect 
caused by the omitted factor can add to the coefficient of the contained factor. Model (1) 
which considers both myopic best response and imitation simultaneously suffers from 
overfitting, such that the effects of the two factors cannot be disentangled. 
Results 5 and 6: The data contain dynamic pricing patterns that can be explained by 
both myopic best response pricing and imitation. The effects of the two explaining 
factors cannot be disentangled due to the high collinearity between the factors. 
Confining the analysis to one factor, myopic best response pricing explains the data 
better than imitation. 
Nevertheless, the comparison of the results from regressions (2) and (3) lets us conjecture that 
Edgeworthian myopic best response pricing is the prevailing factor.
17
 This is corroborated by 
the result by Jacobs and Requate (2016) that imitation becomes important only in triopolies 
where finding the best response is more complex whereas best response pricing is the prime 
driving factor in duopolies. 
9 Conclusion 
This study adds to the so far quite limited evidence of pricing behavior in experimental 
Bertrand-Edgeworth markets. It is the first to investigate the effect of demand rationing in 
Bertrand-Edgeworth markets with fixed exogenous capacities. The second treatment variable 
besides the demand rationing scheme is the amount of exogenous capacity per firm. 
   We find that both treatment variables entail significant and sizable effects on prices and 
profits. Prices and profits are higher with proportional than with efficient demand rationing 
and with low than with high capacities. This accords qualitatively with the Nash equilibrium 
predictions. However, the quantitative Nash predictions are not reflected by the data. Mean 
prices are significantly higher than the equilibrium level. This holds even when the Nash 
equilibrium predicts pure-strategy pricing. The gap between predicted and observed prices is 
more pronounced with high capacities. As to profits, empirical profits significantly exceed the 
                                                 
17
 If one applies the procedure suggested by Kruskal (1987) and Lipovetsky and Conklin (2001) to attribute 
shares of explained variance to the factors, myopic best response pricing accounts for 15 percentage points and 
price imitation for 12 percentage points of the total R
2
 of 0.27. The procedure is analogous to the calculation of 
the Shapley value in cooperative games. 
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equilibrium level with high capacities, but converge to the equilibrium level with low 
capacities. 
   Two alternatives to the Nash equilibrium concept are considered: Edgeworth's theory of 
myopic best response pricing that leads to price cycles and simple imitation of the 
competitor's price in the last period. Considered separately, each alternative is able to explain 
individual pricing dynamics partially, where Edgeworth's concept does somewhat better than 
simple imitation. A simultaneous analysis of the two alternative off-equilibrium concepts is 
inhibited by the tremendous collinearity between them. Therefore, we cannot say whether 
myopic best response behavior or imitation is the underlying driver of individual pricing. This 
shortcoming suggests that further research is needed in order to disentangle the different 
effects. Although collinearity between myopic best response pricing and price imitation is to 
some degree an inherent feature of Bertand-Edgeworth markets since for some prices it is the 
best response to just underbid them, a suitable parameterization might trigger more price 
choices outside the price range where underbidding is the myopic best response and thus 
allow for a clear discrimination between Edgeworth cycles and imitation. 
Appendix A 
English translation of the written instructions in treatment "high, eff". 
 
Welcome to the Laboratory for Economic Experiments at Kiel University. 
You are about to participate in an economic experiment where you will have to make some decisions. You can 
also earn some money. The amount of money will depend on both your own decisions and the decisions of the 
other participants in the experiment. 
 
Please read these instructions carefully. If after reading there are any questions, please raise your hand. An 
experimenter will approach you and answer your questions in private. Please do not communicate with other 
participants during the experiment. 
 
All participants receive the same instructions. 
 
In this experiment you represent a firm which sells a single good. On a market you compete with one other 
firm being represented by one of the other participants. Both firms sell the same good. 
 
The experiment consists of 20 periods. At the beginning of the experiment, the participants will be randomly 
matched into groups of two. The other member of your group will be your competitor. The grouping will be 
fixed throughout the experiment. 
 
In each period you and the other firm must simultaneously and independently decide on the price at which to 
offer the good on the market. All integers from 0 up to 1000 are admissible prices. 
 
Throughout the experiment, all money amounts will be accounted in Experimental Currency Units (ECU). 
Your total profit will be paid off to you after the experiment at an exchange rate of 120,000 ECU/Euro, i.e. for 
each 120,000 ECU earned in the experiment you will receive 1 Euro. 
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The demand side of the market will be simulated by the computer and will be identical in all periods. There are 
many different potential customers with different willingnesses to pay for the good. A sale will come about if the 
offer price is no higher than a customer's maximum willingness to pay. At a price of 0 ECU there will be a total 
demand for 1000 units on the market. With a price increase by 1 ECU, demand is reduced by 1 unit. At a price of 
1000 ECU no one will be ready to buy the good. Here is a graphical representation of this relationship: 
 
Customers will first try to purchase the good from the firm offering at a lower price. Those customers with the 
highest willingness to pay will be served first. In case one firm does not meet its whole demand, the remaining 
demand will be left for the other firm that offers the good at a higher price. If both firms choose the same price, 
demand will be divided equally among them. 
 
Each firm can sell up to 500 units of the good in each period. Firms do not incur any costs for those units. In case 
a firm cannot sell all 500 units in a given period, the units that could not be sold will forfeit and cannot be 
transferred to the next period. 
 
Your profit (in ECU) per period equals the offer price chosen by you multiplied by your sales quantity. Your 
profit thus depends on the offer prices chosen for this period by you and the other firm. 
 
To get a general idea of your sales quantities and profits resulting from different price combinations, you may 
use the "profit calculator". Simply enter two hypothetical prices (one for each firm) and click on "Calculate". 
Then your resulting sales quantity and profit will be displayed. You may use the profit calculator throughout the 
whole experiment. 
 
Moreover, after each period a screen with a "history" will inform you about the outcomes so far. For all past 
periods the "history" shows the prices chosen by the two firms, your resulting sales quantity, your resulting profit 
per period, and your total profit over all previous periods so far.  
 
The following two screenshots illustrate the use of the profit calculator and the history: 
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Here you can enter two hypothetical prices    Here you can enter and submit your price 
and have the results calculated.     choice for the current period. 
 
 
 
 
The results of the profit calculator are displayed here. 
 
Your total profit so far is displayed here.   The results of the last period are displayed here. 
 
 
 
 
 This is the history showing the outcomes of all past periods. Zeros are displayed for trial periods. 
 
To practice there will be three trial periods before the actual periods start. The procedures in the trial periods 
are the same as in the actual periods described above, but the outcomes of the trial periods will not add to your 
total profit or payoff. After the trial periods, the participants will be randomly re-matched into new groups. The 
new groups will stay fixed throughout all actual periods of the experiment. The profit calculator will be available 
to you during both trial and actual periods. The history, however, will not be displayed after trial periods and will 
only contain the data of the actual periods. 
 
Your total profit is the sum of your profits in the single periods of the experiment (not including the trial 
periods). 
 
Your total profit will be paid to you after the experiment at the above-mentioned exchange rate. None of the 
other participants will come to know your profit, and neither will you come to know the profit of any other 
participant. Furthermore, no participant will come to know with whom he or she interacted during the 
experiment. 
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If you click on the "Continue" button on your screen, some statements will appear to check whether all 
participants have understood the instructions. Please decide whether those statements are right or wrong. As soon 
as all participants will have evaluated the statements correctly, the first trial period will start. 
 
If there are any questions concerning the experimental procedures, please raise your hand. Enjoy the experiment! 
Appendix B 
Evolution of market prices in single markets. 
Demand Rationing in Bertrand-Edgeworth Markets with Fixed Capacities 
135 
 
 
Figure B1: Development of market prices within single markets: treatment "high, eff". 
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Figure B2: Development of market prices within single markets: treatment "high, prop". 
Demand Rationing in Bertrand-Edgeworth Markets with Fixed Capacities 
137 
 
 
Figure B3: Development of market prices within single markets: treatment "low, eff". 
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Figure B4: Development of market prices within single markets: treatment "low, prop". 
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V Conclusion 
The results of the single experiments have already been summarized in the introduction of this 
dissertation and in the concluding sections of the respective chapters. Therefore, this overall 
conclusion shall provide a synopsis of the three experiments and highlight some similarities 
and differences in our findings. 
   The first comment concerns the overall level of competitiveness in the three experiments as 
measured by the benchmarks of full competition, full collusion, and Nash equilibrium. The 
large differences in the degrees of competitiveness among such narrowly related market 
settings appear remarkable in themselves. The most competitive conduct is observed in the 
Kreps-Scheinkman setting where capacity choices are close to the fully competitive 
benchmark in most treatments. While above the fully competitive level, price choices are still 
rather competitive. The same is observed for price choices in Bertrand-Edgeworth markets 
with increasing marginal costs. By contrast, a more collusive conduct can be found when 
capacities are fixed. The same relationship between the two Bertrand-Edgeworth experiments 
holds when the Nash equilibrium of the corresponding stage game is employed as benchmark. 
Whereas prices are consistently below the Nash predictions in markets with increasing 
marginal costs, they are consistently above the Nash predictions in markets with fixed 
capacities. 
   The second significant result pertains to the effect of demand rationing, the only treatment 
variable considered in all three experiments in the dissertation at hand. Proportional demand 
rationing yields significantly higher price choices than efficient demand rationing in all three 
experiments. Thus, collusion is consistently fostered by rationing schemes which leave more 
residual demand to firms with higher prices. It is notable that this effect occurs independently 
of (i) which market model underlies the experiment, (ii) the degree of absolute 
competitiveness observed in the setting, and (iii) the direction of the predicted effect of 
demand rationing. The third point is especially noteworthy: We find that conduct is more 
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collusive under proportional rationing even in the Kreps-Scheinkman setting, where the Nash 
equilibrium predicts less collusion under proportional than under efficient demand rationing. 
   The third remark is about the irrelevance of subject matching. Subject matching is varied in 
Bertrand-Edgeworth markets with increasing marginal costs and in Kreps-Scheinkman 
duopolies. The effects of the subject matching are largely insignificant and always too small 
to be regarded as relevant determinants of the competitiveness level. At first sight, this may 
appear as a non-result, but it might actually have more relevant implications than the large 
and significant effect of demand rationing since the stability of the composition of oligopoly 
markets can – via institutional regulations which lead to more or less severe entry barriers – 
be influenced by policy whereas this is hardly possible for the sort of demand rationing. The 
results imply that, at least in the artificial laboratory setting where subjects are anonymous 
and the only possibility to communicate is signaling via the choice variable(s), it does not 
matter whether the same firms interact repeatedly or the composition of firms is changed, 
provided that the total number of firms in the market remains constant. This gives a hint that 
frequent invasions of new firms into a market need not lead to a more competitive market if 
old firms are crowded out by the entrants such that the total number of firms does not change. 
   The last comment considers the dynamics of behavior. The dynamics cannot satisfactory be 
explained by convergence to the Nash equilibrium. While prices in Bertrand-Edgeworth 
markets with fixed capacities and both capacities and prices in the Kreps-Scheinkman setting 
come closer to equilibrium in later than in the initial periods, our estimations reject complete 
convergence to equilibrium. In Bertrand-Edgeworth markets with increasing marginal costs, 
prices even depart more from equilibrium in later periods. Myopic best response pricing and 
simple price imitation are investigated as alternative off-equilibrium explanations for the 
observed dynamics in the two Bertrand-Edgeworth experiments. In the setting with fixed 
capacities the conclusions remain ambiguous. With increasing marginal costs both alternative 
theories entail predictive power, and it crucially depends on the number of firms in the market 
which theory is the prime explaining factor. The results suggest that there is no simple and 
general answer to the question what subjects do instead of playing the Nash equilibrium when 
finding the equilibrium becomes too demanding. Rather, the choice which alternative 
rationale to follow depends on further factors of the setting as those further factors can 
possibly render even some simpler off-equilibrium behavioral rules too complex to be played.
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